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Growing up in contexts with armed conflict: Individual exposure to large-scale violence and differences in emancipative values in Colombia and Mexico

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Abstract:
This paper investigates the legacies of growing up in a country with large-scale armed conflict on individuals’ emancipative values. We used a most-similar case research design to analyze these consequences of armed conflict. We selected Mexico and Colombia as cases to compare, because they were similar in variables related to emancipative value preferences at the onset of our comparison. These two cases, however, varied, later on, in the level to which individuals of similar age-cohorts were exposed to large-scale political violence. The results show that individuals who have grown up in a country with high levels of armed conflict tend to endorse less emancipative values in adulthood.

Keywords: armed conflict, emancipative values, Mexico, Colombia, formative socialization.

Introduction

Research on armed conflict has recently begun to examine the legacies of armed conflict in relation to a vast array of societal beliefs: attitudes regarding peace efforts and political compromise, social and institutional trust, political tolerance, political participation / collective action, ethnic prejudices and authoritarian values (Blattman, 2009; Canetti et al., 2017; Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii, 2014; Grosjean, 2014; De Luca and Verpoorten, 2015; Peffley, Hutchison and Shamir, 2015; Dyrstad, 2013; Strbac and Ringdal, 2008). Such research, however, has paid relatively little attention to whether the destructive power of armed conflict can lead to variation in value preferences between societies with, otherwise, a similar socioeconomic structure and political regime.

We argue that focusing on the legacies of armed conflict in terms of values is relevant for two reasons. Firstly, values function as people’s touchstone to classify, prefer and
evaluate other human beings and things (Rokeach, 1973; Feather, 1975). Secondly, unlike other kinds of societal beliefs, values are relatively enduring and do not change easily over time. In this text, we focus on examining the legacy of armed conflict in relation to emancipative values. The study of the specific consequences of war on emancipative values, we argue, is relevant for societies with past and/or ongoing war. Emancipative values signal a higher preference for autonomy, equality of opportunities, freedom of choice and the voice of the people. Overall, they provide a more tolerant and libertarian orientation, important in conflict termination, reconciliation and peace preservation contexts (Echeverría et al., 2019).

A theoretical framework relevant to the study of how value preferences are constituted is Ronald Inglehart’s theory of modernization, and its latest formulation in Christian Welzel’s evolutionary theory of emancipation (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013a). This framework theorizes how people’s values are shaped by the conditions in which they have lived. These researchers argue that contexts with existential constraints, such as growing up in countries with low economic and institutional development but also armed conflicts, are related to the content of values. In this article, we investigate the legacies of armed conflict on values. We evaluate Inglehart and Welzel’s modernization theory in its latest version, focused on emancipative values. We test, in a novel way, the theoretical expectation that contexts of existential constraint – measured as armed conflict – are related to a lower disposition to emancipative values (Welzel, 2013a, 2014).

For this purpose, we reconstructed individual histories of exposure to armed conflict. By individual histories, we mean the extent to which an individual lived in a country with large-scale armed conflict during his/her formative years. We included major episodes of political violence caused by state and non-state actors. We used a “most-similar” case design (Gerring, 2007) to compare the cases of Mexico and Colombia. Both are located in the same geographical region; and, at the beginning of our comparison, they had similar levels in variables which effect emancipative values: socioeconomic development (action resources) and political regime (democracy/autocracy). These two cases, however, vary in the extent to which individuals were exposed to armed conflict in their formative years and later endorse emancipative values.

The following section outlines the contextual background. Later, we will review the literature that has investigated the societal legacies of armed conflict in the countries under analysis. Afterwards, we will discuss the theoretical framework that supports the study. We will then describe the data and methodology of the empirical study. After assessing the results, we will end with a discussion and conclusion.

**Background. Armed conflict in Colombia and Mexico**

Latin American countries share a politically violent past. Throughout the 19th century, periodic armed conflict was linked to state formation and competition between ruling elites (Deas, 1997; Centeno, 2002). In Mexico and Colombia, this was manifested in recurrent disputes to settle power arrangements (see Aguilar and Meyer, 1989; Moncayo, 2015; Sánchez, Solimano and Formisano, 2005). By the middle of the 20th century, both coun-
tries achieved a relatively stable political regime, characterized by periodic rotation of power through regular elections and an enduring party system (Ocampo, 2005; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Sánchez, Solimano and Formisano, 2005; Gutiérrez Sanín, Acevedo and Viatela, 2007; Meyer, 1976b; Hamnett, 2002). As exceptional cases in Latin America, neither Colombia nor Mexico had long periods of military rule, but were mostly ruled by civilian governments after the Second World War. However, as the situation in Latin America became more peaceful, the Colombian social context began to polarize and there were violent political confrontations, giving rise to the Colombian “paradox”: a formal democracy with endemic political violence (Tuft, 1997).

Colombia faced a protracted internal armed conflict that endured for more than six decades. The recent history of armed conflict in Colombia can be roughly divided into two stages. The first was the episode of “La Violencia”. This erupted by 1948 into a ten-year armed confrontation between the two major political parties, each wanting to control the state. The second is related to unequal distribution of land in the Colombian countryside; this triggered rural conflicts from 1975 and was further ignited by the formation of guerrilla groups. Later, it was fuelled by drug-trafficking activities and the formation of paramilitary groups (see Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas, 2004; LeGrand, 2003), leading to an escalation of violence and criminal activities against civilians (homicide, extortion, kidnapping) (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2003). This situation lasted until 2016, when a peace deal was signed between the government and the guerrilla groups. The protracted nature of the armed conflict has meant that the Colombian population has grown up in a highly violent environment (Richani, 2005; Rochlin, 2003).

Large-scale armed conflict started in Mexico at a much later point in time. Ethnic violence in Chiapas only erupted in 1994-1997, and drug-related violence peaked in 2006, dramatically increasing homicide rates in the country (Shirk and Wallman, 2015). The first episode of armed conflict was more localized, while the second was (and continues to be) more geographically widespread, involving drug-trafficking organizations and state officials in turf wars. Competition between drug cartels has significantly increased other criminal activities that directly target civilians, such as extortion, kidnapping and theft (Guerrero, 2011, 2012). The last decade has been one of the most violent in the history of modern Mexico.

Literature review

Studies aiming to understand the legacies of violence in countries with past armed conflict focus on whether and how the experience of large-scale political violence shapes a society’s economy, political regime, beliefs and attitudes. In this study, we aimed to understand the legacies of armed conflict on societal beliefs, particularly emancipative values.

Research discussing the consequences of the armed conflict in Colombia is vast. Most of the discussion, however, centers on the diminishing/destruction of material and intellectual resources rather than on examining the societal beliefs of the Colombian population. Previous research, for example, has documented that material resources, such as the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), total factor productivity, investment decisions of firms, have been negatively impacted by the violence (Cárdenas, 2007; Riascos
and Vargas, 2011; Camacho and Rodriguez, 2012). Connective resources have diminished due to armed attacks that targeted infrastructure (roads, lines of communication, industry and oil facilities) (Cortés and Montolio, 2014). Educational indicators have shown a shrinking of enrolment rates in those municipalities with higher levels of violence (Barrera and Ibáñez, 2004; Rodríguez and Sánchez, 2012). Armed conflict, moreover, has indirectly affected the intellectual resources of the country, due to the destruction of schools, the recruiting of school age children in armed groups, the internal displacement of people and the reduction in educational investment due to the contraction of household income (Barrera and Ibáñez, 2004).

Fewer studies focus on the consequences of the Colombian armed conflict on societal beliefs. These studies highlight the relevance of cultural factors, such as values and norms, for the persistence of violence in societies faced with armed conflict. Waldmann (2007), for instance, developed the concept of “culture of violence” to describe the prevalence of societal beliefs that endorse and sustain the use of violence in Colombia. McLlwaine and Moser (2001) used focus groups to analyse social capital in Colombia and Guatemala. They found that violence in Colombia has diminished trust and collaboration, has enhanced perverse forms of social capital that benefit members of criminal organizations but not the wider community, and has eroded trust in institutions dealing with violence, such as the police, the military and the judicial system. These findings support the literature that has found negative consequences of armed conflict on societal beliefs (see Canetti et al., 2017; Dyrstad, 2013; Grosjean, 2014; Peffley, Hutchison and Shamir, 2015; Strabac and Ringdal, 2008) and echo the general perception that the armed conflict has eroded trust and solidarity in Colombian society (Gutiérrez, 2015; Estrada, 2015).

More recent studies have quantitatively assessed the effects of violence on societal beliefs. Using a 2012 representative survey of the Colombian population, Nussio, Retterberg and Ugarriza (2015) found that the Colombian people generally support transitional justice efforts (receiving reparations, punishing perpetrators, seeking truth and remembering human rights violations), and there is no significant difference in these attitudes between victims and non-victims. Taylor, Nilsson and Amezquita-Castro (2015), studying the Caribbean region of Colombia, found that a higher experience of violence is related to higher participation in reconciliation initiatives. People who join those initiatives also tend to be more civically engaged. These findings give support to past studies that found resilient features in people exposed to armed conflict (See Bauer et al. 2016; Blattman, 2009; Gilligan et al., 2014; De Luca and Verpoorten, 2015).

In the case of Mexico, large-scale drug-related violence has peaked relatively recently. A growing number of studies, nonetheless, have aimed to quantify the short-term consequences of drug violence on material and intellectual resources. On the one hand, increasing drug violence since 2006 is associated with lower levels of economic activity in municipalities with spikes of violence (Robles, Calderon and Magaloni, 2015). Intellectual resources have diminished because a greater number of people migrate towards the United States due to drug violence (Rios, 2014); academic achievement decreases due to teacher and pupils’ absenteeism (Jarillo et al., 2016); early educational achievement drops (Caudillo and Torche, 2014); and educational attainment of young adults shrinks due to household financial hardship (Brown and Velásquez, 2017). On the other hand, rising homicide rates associated with the Mexican war on drugs did not affect human capital formation measured as ed-
Political Socialization Theory, Research, and Application

History and Analysis of Forty Years of the Research Committee on Political Socialization and Education of the International Political Science Association: 1997-2019

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Abstract:
The Research Committee on Political Socialization and Education of the International Political Science Association celebrated its 40th anniversary in 2019. The RC was recognized by IPSA in 1979 following a solid and successful pioneering phase in the 1960s and ’70s. The RC flourished with a full board during 40 years, more than fifty RCPSE panels at IPSA World Congresses, more than thirty RCPSE conferences in thirteen countries, more than 60 RCPSE sponsored books, and its RCPSE journal during 27 years. Research highlights include four international comparative political socialization studies and several political socialization panel studies. For more than thirty different political orientations and behaviours it has been investigated whether political socialization contributes to the explanation of the variance therein. Research focused on eight political socialization agents and about thirty specific political socializers in these domains. Forty years of research has yielded a lot of insights and an auspicious theory development. Some topics deserve much more attention than they have received so far while new political, economic and social developments require a retest of what was discovered about political socialization in the past and a study of the many new ways, forms and contents of political socialization at the present time and in the future.

Introduction

Researchers of political education and socialization have been meeting, cooperating and supporting each other in the last forty years in, first, the Research Committee on Political Education (RCPE) and later in the Research Committee on Political Socialization and Education (RCPSE) of the International Political Science Association (IPSA). This Research Committee is a professional network and brings together political scientists, educationalists and political psychologists from all over the world. It aims to advance the study of political education and socialization by encouraging and facilitating research, es-
pecially cross-national studies, disseminating relevant information at international congresses and conferences, publishing scholarly research, and by providing a framework and platform for co-operation between individuals and organisations involved in research and teaching on political education and socialisation. On the occasion of the 40th birthday we present in this article a short history of the RCPE and the RCPSE in factual data, intended as a birthday present for scholars in countries where research into political socialization has recently begun and for new generations of young researchers worldwide who want to build on what others have already discovered. The topics are Run-up, foundation and recognition; Organization; Panels; Conferences; Books; Journals; Highlights; States-of-the-art; and Looking from the past to the present.

Run-up, foundation and recognition


The driving force behind the birth of the Study Group and later the Research Committee on Political Education has been Artur Bodnar from the University of Warsaw, Poland. He started to pave the path in 1973 at the 8th World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) in Montreal in a series of ad hoc panels, and at an international conference in Bloomington, Indiana (IN), United States of America (U.S.A.) in 1975. IPSA recognized the Study Group on Political Education as its 9th Study Group in 1976 at the Council Meeting at the Xth IPSA World Congress in Edinburgh, Scotland. Following the recognition as a Study Group in 1976, Artur Bodnar co-organized an international conference in Tützing in the Federal Republic of Germany (1977) and an international conference in Jaszowiec, Poland, in 1979 with about forty participants from Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), The Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the U.S.A., who presented thirteen papers and three communiques. Bodnar also organized a panel on Political Education at the 10th IPSA World Congress in Moscow, 12-18 August 1979. Five papers were presented from Austria, The Netherlands, Rumania, the USSR and the U.S.A. It was during this Congress, on 18 August 1979, that the IPSA Executive Committee granted the research group its new status as Research Committee. The Research Committee on Political Education (RCPE) became IPSA’s 21st Research Committee (IPSA, 1999). Bodnar was elected as Chairman of the Executive Board at a meeting in Salzburg, Austria in October 1979,
together with eleven board members (reported in Participation, Newsletter of the International Political Science Association, 4: 3, October 1980) and continued to serve the Research Committee as Chairman until the IPSA World Congress in Paris 1985. Papers of the conferences in Jaszowiec and Moscow were published in Bodnar and Göhring (1982).

In the 1990s, the members changed the name into Research Committee on Political Socialization and Education (RCPSE) to express that their research also focused on political learning outside the school, and not only on cognitions but also on affections and behaviours. In 2003, the Research Committee entered into a cooperative arrangement with another IPSA Research Committee, RC29 Psycho-politics (with Ofer Feldman and Paul Dekker), which renamed itself in 2016 into RC29 Political Psychology. Since 2003 the two RC’s have been working together in conferences and publications. Both RC’s frequently report about their activities to IPSA and every 6 years IPSA review their results (IPSA, 2018).

Organization

The organizational structure of the RC includes Members, Business Meetings for members, and an Executive Board. Membership of the RC is open to all individual members of IPSA and to all members of national associations affiliated to IPSA as collective members. Business Meetings for members of the RC21 are regularly held during IPSA World Congresses and RC21 Round Table Conferences, corresponding to IPSA regulations. Members discuss past activities, decide upon future activities, and elect the Executive Board and the Chairperson. The reports of the Business Meetings are published in the RCPSE Newsletter, send to the members, and posted on the website.

The Executive Board of the RC organizes, among others, the Panels at the IPSA World Congresses, the RC Round Table Conferences, and the Business Meetings for members. The Board members, including the Chairperson, are elected at Business Meetings. The RC has had a full board during 40 years. The members of the first complete Executive Committee, elected at a meeting in Salzburg in October 1979, were Artur Bodnar (Poland; Chairperson), Suna Kili (Turkey; Vice-Chairperson), Walter Göhring (Austria; Vice-Chairperson), Willem Langeveld (The Netherlands; Vice-Chairperson), Gunnel Gustafsson (Sweden; Scientific Secretary), Ryszard Zelichowski (Poland; Organizational Secretary), Theophilus D. Odetola (Nigeria), Vladimir Kazimirtschuk (USSR), Harry Proß (West Berlin), Wlodzimierz Knobelsdorf (Poland), Bernhard Claussen (Federal Republic of Germany), Karl-Heinz Röder (German Democratic Republic) and Richard M. Merelman (U.S.A.). Chairpersons came from 6 different countries: U.S.A (2), Poland (2), and Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, and China. Chairpersons have been so far: Artur Bodnar (Centralny Ośrodek Metodyczny Studiów Nauk Politycznych Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warsaw, Poland, for the years 1979-1985), Bernhard Claussen (University of Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany, for the years 1986-1992), Russell F. Farnen (University of Connecticut, U.S.A., for the years 1992-1997); Henk Dekker (Leiden University, The Netherlands, for the years 1997-1999), Daniel B. German (Appalachian State University, Boone, U.S.A., for the years 1999-2007), Christ’l De Landtsheer (University of Antwerp, Belgium, for the years 2007-2013), Maria Marczewska-Rytko (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin, Poland, for the years 2013-2018), and Yingfa Song.
Within the RC also various informal cross-cultural and cross-institutional research groups were and are active. These groups meet and report about their work also during the IPSA World Congresses and the RC Round Table Conferences.

For internal communication with and between the members the RCPE published a RCPE Bulletin between 1980 and 1992, an average of two issues per year (including reports, calls for papers, announcements, book reviews, scientific articles, obituaries, etc.). The editor was Ryszard Zelichowski from Poland, 1980-1984, and Bernhard Claußen from Germany, 1985-1992. Since 1992, several RCPSE Newsletters have been published and edited by changing members of the Executive Board. The RC21 websites www.ipsa.org/page/rc21-political-sozialization-and-education, and www.politicalsocialization.org have been set up by Christ’l De Landtsheer and Lieuwe Kalkhoven and continued by Oleksy Polegkyy and Ganna Diedkova, all from University of Antwerp with IPSA grants.

Certificates of Achievement for outstanding contributions to the RCPE/RCPSE have been awarded to Bernhard Claußen in 1999 (affiliated to IPSA and some of its Study Groups or Research Committees since 1980, paper giver and discussant, organizer of Panels and Conferences, editor and fund raiser as a member of the Executive Board of RC 21, 1980-1997, Chairman, 1985-1992, Co-Chairman 1992-1997), Henk Dekker 18 May 1999 (for his outstanding contribution as Chair of the IPSA/RCPSE), and Heinz Sünker in 2001 (for his scholarly and administrative excellence). At the retirement in 2008 of Dan German, former President of RC21 and still active as Vice-President, his university – Appalachian State University – instituted the ‘Dr. Daniel B. German Eminent Professorship in Political Science and Criminal Justice’ to honor Dr. German’s 36 years of service to the students of Appalachian State University (McMahon 2008).

Panels

The RCPSE organizes one or more Panels at the IPSA World Congress which takes place every three years and since 2014 every two years. The first panel was in 1979 at the XI World Congress, August 12-18, 1979 in Moscow, USSR; the IPSA Study Group 9 Political Education organized a panel about ‘Political Socialization’. The Convenor was, as we reported earlier, Artur Bodnar of the Centralny Osrodek Metodydzny, Studiow Nauk Politycznych, Warsawa, Poland. We counted 15 congresses and 53 panels.

Overview 1: IPSA World Congresses and RCPSE Panels at these congresses 1979-2018

- XI IPSA World Congress in Moscow, 1979; Panel: Political Education: Political Socialization.
- XII IPSA World Congress in Rio de Janeiro, 1982; Panels: New Approaches to Political Socialization and Political Education
- XIII IPSA World Congress in Paris, 1985; Panels: Changing Structures of Political Power and Political Education; and Political Socialization through Mass Media
- XIV IPSA World Congress in Washington, D.C., 1988; Panels: Political Education Research as a Topic of Global Political Science; Perspectives of Globalization and Internationalization of Political Education and Political Socialization; Comparative Political Education Research: Aspects of Cross-Cultural Studies; and Political Socialization for Citizenship
Political socialization in a failed democracy:
Civic education in Thailand

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Abstract:
In 1932 Thailand became a constitutional democracy with a traditional monarchy. Since then the country has experienced twelve ‘successful’ military coups d’etat to make it one of the most coup prone nations in the world and an unstable democracy. This paper analyses an opportunity for schools in Thailand to contribute significantly to the political socialization of young Thais as a means to address the persistent failure of the country’s democratic procedures. Non-school factors, such as authoritarian family characteristics, may negate school attempts to instill democratic behavior. Although civic education in Thai schools appears to have largely failed, the Democratic Citizenship Education Curriculum Project, developed by, with and for Thais, provides schools and teachers with the opportunity to develop democratic citizens through the school socialization process.

Keywords: political socialization, democracy, democratic citizenship education

“Democracy has to be born anew every generation, and education is its midwife.”

(John Dewey)

Since 1932, when a constitutional democracy based on a traditional monarchy was proclaimed, there have been 12 “successful” military coups d’etat and 7 “unsuccessful” ones, making Thailand one of the world’s most military coup-prone nations and a failed democracy. However, democracy is not a natural condition. It has to be learned. And where, how much, when, and in what ways it is learnt helps determine a person’s understanding and practice of democracy. In Thailand, like most countries, civic learning and civic action opportunities within school contexts are intended to promote the development of active and informed democratic citizens. Yet the evidence suggests that this is not the case in Thai schools.

This paper asks how school education, especially civic education, can contribute to the political socialization of young Thais in order to strengthen democracy in Thailand. It reports on a unique project in political socialization in a failed democracy to build a base

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for political and democratic stability through creating an educational program that counters decades of political instability and military intervention. Specifically in the context of the Thai Democratic Citizenship Education Curriculum Project the paper addresses the question – How can Thai schools contribute to the political socialization process of building citizens when democracy is more than a form of government but a way of life?

A century ago, John Dewey cogently argued for schools to serve as a key source for learning about democracy (Dewey, 1916):

“[…] a government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated. Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education. But […] a democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.” (p.57)

By the standards of many Asian countries Thailand is a relatively wealthy nation with stable banks, internationally owned modern factories, a flourishing tourism industry, a growing, educated middle class and other typical markers of a successful democracy. With schools structured as Dewey suggests, supported by a school curriculum encouraging learning about democracy, Thailand should be a relatively stable constitutional democracy. Yet Thailand has had so many coups in its modern history that its democracy is anything but “successful” or stable. After the latest military coup of May, 2014, some four years on the junta is still in charge with a drawn out, multiple delayed, proposed election date aimed for February, 2019 and held on March 24.

Political socialization to stabilize Thai democracy

Thailand is in a political transition with the military government, from yet another coup, moving slowly towards an unclear form of “democracy”. A stable democracy is one where governments continue or change without coups d’etat and where informed and active citizens follow democratic processes and practices (Crick, 1998; Harber & Mncube, 2012; Macedo, 2005; Pasek, Feldman, Romer, & Jamieson, 2008). It is clear that the people of Thailand are not confident with their understanding and practice of stable democracy, a feature of Thai society for some time (Chachavalpongpun, 2014; Farrelly, 2013; Pitiyanuwat & Sujiva, 2005). To address this situation in the medium to long term, and to build a base for a stable democracy young Thais need to understand, value and practice democracy, a situation common to many democracies but more so to Thailand due to its fundamental political instability.

Thailand could be described as an on-going failed democracy, failing not because of a lack of desire and need for democracy but because it has been the subject of multiple military coups, frequently designed to protect the power of elites (Chachavalpongpun, 2014) or what Farrelly terms the “distinctive elite coup culture” (2013, p. 281). On average since 1932 Thailand has experienced a coup every four years given the 12 “successful” and 7 “unsuccessful” coups (Chachavalpongpun, 2014; Farrelly, 2013). The reasons for these coups are complex and multifaceted, but there is a fundamental persistence in Thai society that democracy is not valued as highly as in more successful democracies (Chacha-
valpongpun, 2014). Farrelly, (2013), for example, claims that “Put simply, the behaviour of senior members of Thailand’s armed forces, at repeated intervals over many years, suggests engrained anxiety about the quality and power of democratic institutions, and particularly the elected politicians who control them” (p. 289).

Thailand as an unstable democracy suggests, among other explanations, that Thai schooling has not successfully transmitted modern democratic values and knowledge to all its citizens (Pitiyanuwat & Sujiva, 2005) in ways found more readily evident in other democracies. One possible explanation for Thailand’s democratic instability may be found in the 2009 International Civics and Citizenship Study (ICCS) which showed Thai student democratic knowledge, skills and attitudes as well below international averages and amongst the lowest in Asia (Fraillon, et al., 2012).

This finding may be supported by case study research on civic and citizenship learning for democracy in Thailand that concluded that “It is evident that despite what the Thai education reform has been calling for, daily routines and enforcement of school rules in Thai schools tend to promote conservative values and priorities which have been maintained for decades.” (Boontinand & Petcharamesree, 2017, p. 48)

In preparing the next generation of democratic citizens international research has identified positive links between learning and practicing democracy through Civics and Citizenship Education (CCE) and more democratic citizens (Galston, 2004; Henderson & Tudball, 2016; Kahne & Sporte, 2009; Niemi & Junn, 1998; Reichert & Print, 2016; Saha & Print, 2010) who contribute to more stable democracies. From this base Thai educators can enhance Thai democracy by educating the next generations of young Thais about democratic practice.

Civic and citizenship education in schools

School can play a significant role in the political socialization process whereby young people learn to value and practice democracy, especially through the study of civics and citizenship education (Pasek, et al., 2008, Print, 2007b, 2009b). Specifically, Pasek et al. (2008) found that civic education contributed to sustained democratic participation by youth and the more courses of civic education taken the more sustained. In a significant study on student civic learning opportunities in schools Kahne and Sporte (2008) found that the overall measure of classroom civic learning opportunities (with an effect size of .41) was highly efficacious in fostering student commitment to civic and democratic participation, a result that resonates with related studies (Galston, 2004; Niemi & Junn, 1998; Saha & Print, 2010). In an Asian context, Lee argued (2003, 2004), reinforced by Print (2017) to achieve these outcomes teachers and students need learning opportunities provided through a well-conceptualized school CCE curriculum supported by well-prepared teachers.

While some refer to civics education (United States, Germany, Thailand), others refer to citizenship education (England) while in Australia and the ICCS we include both terms (ACARA, 2012, 2014; Henderson & Tudball, 2016; Schulz, et al., 2010). Although the terms are contested (Henderson & Tudball, 2016; Lee, 2003) and frequently overlap, the Australian Curriculum, which treats the terms in an integrated manner, refers to civics education as primarily concerned with learning about government, democracy and the law
Essay

Populism and the psychopolitics of morality

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Abstract: Jung’s theory of complexes sheds light on populists’ identity as the “virtuous people” who are opposed to the “corrupt elites”. Their complexes underlie three well-known populist attitudes. First is their anti-pluralism, their sense of moral superiority toward immigrants and minorities. Second, in reaction to the failures of neoliberalism, they experience moralistic relative deprivation regarding the “undeserving” underclasses that benefit from government hand-outs. And third, as native white Christians, their moral indignation stems from comparisons with ethnic workers in the same occupations earning the same pay. This psychopolitical analysis explains much of the populists’ anger, frustration, and resentment.

Keywords: populism, morality, Jung, complexes, neoliberalism.

Introduction

In a recent study of populism, Jan-Werner Müller ties populism to issues of morality no less than forty times. What he calls the “logic of populism” has a moralistic basis: “Populism, I suggest is a particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified – but, I shall argue, ultimately fictional – people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior” (Müller, 2016, pp. 19-20). Populists not only oppose these elites but also oppose the downtrodden that fail to qualify as belonging to “the people”. “Populists pit the pure, innocent, always hardworking people against a corrupt elite that do not really work (other than to further their self-interest) and, in right-wing populism, also against the very bottom of society (those who also do not really work and live like parasites off the work of others)” (Müller, 2016, p. 23). The explicit morality in these citations underlies the way populism (1) excludes from political representation those who are not the “authentic” people (anti-pluralism), (2) challenges economic doctrines whose benefits by-pass the...
“authentic people” (anti-neoliberalism), and (3) justifies certain material advantages of the “authentic people” at the expense of ethnic minorities (distributive justice). In this essay I apply the Jungian theory of complexes as a framework for the analysis of morality, a somewhat neglected dimension of populism (Alschuler, 2009a). When populists claim to be morally superior, they will undoubtedly generate in themselves what C.G. Jung (2014) called a “dark shadow”. The brighter the ego’s self-image, the darker the shadow, and greater the one-sidedness of the personality. John W. Perry (1970) reformulated Jung’s ideas in a way that enables us to be more precise about how the populists’ moral claims produce shadow projections on the populists’ opponents. According to Perry, complexes are found in pairs, one of which is aligned with the ego and the other is repressed and projected onto an “Other”. By saying that the first is aligned with the ego, Perry alludes to the “persona” or self-image. The second in the pair of complexes, the shadow, is largely incompatible with one’s positive self-image. The mechanism of dissociation “removes” this dark side from consciousness and repression relegates it to the personal unconscious where it does not lie dormant. Rather, this complex is projected onto a suitable “Other” allowing for the possibility that the ego might recognize this as a projection and eventually retrieve it, contributing to the wholeness of the personality. This process, according to Jung, enables ego consciousness to grow and one-sidedness to diminish.

Perry further postulates an emotional relationship between the ego and the Other in a pair of complexes. For Perry the alignment of a complex with the ego creates an illusory ego that differs from the genuine ego (Perry, 1970, pp. 3-4). Similarly, the projection onto an Other creates an illusion that differs from the genuine Other. The illusory ego experiences an emotion toward the illusory Other within the pair of complexes, all differing from the genuine ego and genuine Other. The emotions most often expressed by the populist toward the Other are frustration, anger, and resentment (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 47, 102, 103).

With this in mind, it is enlightening to consider how this pair of complexes (populists’ moral superiority and inferiority of Others) governs populist beliefs about “the people”, the political establishment, and the Others: immigrants and ethnic groups. Kaltwasser speaks of “interpreting reality through the lens of populism” (p. 101). Among these populist beliefs are the following:

- the people are virtuous, sovereign
- the people are hard-working
- the people are worthy, neglected
- native-born people are marginalized
- White supremacists are disadvantaged
- the elites are corrupt, unresponsive
- the Others are lazy
- the Others are unworthy, pampered
- immigrants are favored
- ethnics are privileged

One could imagine how in the United States the historical memory of slavery and the extermination of indigenous people would weigh heavily on the conscience of God-fearing Christians. The dissociation of this memory and its repression into the unconscious would generate projections onto suitable “Others”. Could this psychological sequence underlie the populists’ adherence to a self-image of moral superiority?

The populists’ claim to moral superiority may also produce fanaticism. Jung’s insights about fanaticism may serve us as a guide (Alschuler, 2009b). Extreme beliefs, strongly held and defended, characterize fanaticism. When the populists believe that they are morally superior, they fall victim to psychic inflation, often resulting in the splitting off and
To Tweet or not to Tweet? An analysis of Twitter use during the 2014 Belgian elections

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Abstract:
Social media, and Twitter in particular, are playing an increasing role in the day-to-day activities of politicians (Weber Shandwick, 2014). Before the digital revolution, the relationship between the politician and the voter was intermediated by journalists and broadcast media. In contrast to traditional media, social media are presumed to enable politicians to engage directly with the electorate (Kruikemeier, Van Noort, Vliegenthart & De Vreese, 2015). In the last decade, there was a growing interest in the role of social media in election campaigns, triggered by Barack Obama’s electoral presidential election victory in 2008 and more recently by Donald Trump’s triumph in 2016 (Rodriguez-Andres, 2018). The research presented in this article answers three main questions. First, who are the politicians using Twitter for campaigning purposes and what variables can predict Twitter use? Second, when do Belgian politicians use it and with which frequency? And third: do tweeting politicians perform better at the ballot box? The main findings reveal that a Flemish candidate has a higher probability of 18.7% to be present on Twitter compared to a candidate from the French community. Another important finding is that there is no significant association between the number of tweets and number of preferential votes, although a trend towards significance was observed for Flemish politicians.

Keywords: Twitter, social media, elections, Belgium, political communication

Introduction

Over the past decade, the modernisation of politics has encouraged the use of social media in the context of perception politics and political impression management (De Landtsheer, De Vries & Vertessen, 2008). Political parties and candidates increasingly use the possibilities of social media in general and Twitter in particular to interact with the public (Vergeer, Hermans & Sams, 2013; Weber Shandwick, 2014). Not only because of their easy accessibility but also because of their direct and interactive character. Social media in general are extremely adequate for self-promotion directly to the public without any in-
tervention of the media. Through these channels, politicians can easily enter into a continuous conversation with the voter or the media (Kruikemeier, 2014).

Thus, a well-thought through combination of social media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube, have become an essential facet of the campaign repertoire (Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). However, the strategy behind the use of digital tools appears to be building on case by case findings, rather than consistent theory formation. Consequently, there is a growing need for knowledge. Questions related to Twitter’s role in election campaigns have – therefore – been studied extensively in recent years by researchers from various fields such as political marketing, political communication and computer science. A clear majority of the existing research is focused on the United States of America (Christensen, 2013; Hemphill, Otterbacher & Shapiro, 2013; Lassen & Brown, 2011; Rodriguez-Andres, 2018; Zhang, Seltzer & Bichard., 2013) and the United Kingdom (Adi, Erickson & Lilleker, 2014; Baxter & Marcella, 2012; Graham, Jackson & Broersma, 2014; Lilleker & Jackson, 2010). But this does not mean that there is not a wealth of information available for other countries across the globe such as Australia (Bruns & Highfield, 2013), Brasil (Gilmore, 2012), Israel (Aharony, 2012), the Netherlands (Kruikemeier, 2014; Vergeer, Hermans & Sams, 2011; Vergeer et al., 2013; Vergeer & Hermans, 2013), Italy (Vaccari et al., 2013), Pakistan (Ahmed & Skoric, 2014) or South Korea (Lee & Oh, 2012).

Many of these recent studies have focused on three different topics. Firstly, research examining what kind of parties and candidates tend to adopt Twitter. Secondly, an extensive amount of literature addresses questions on how parties and candidates use Twitter by analysing the technical features, such as the use of messages or retweets, or a content analysis of tweets. The third group of research contains effect studies trying to understand the effects of Twitter on the users consuming tweets. This article examines issues relating to the first and the third group of studies by answering the following questions: who are the politicians using Twitter during election campaigns, when do they use it and how frequent? And lastly but equally important, do Tweeting politicians perform better at the ballot box? The answers to these questions can play an important role in the digital strategy development in electoral campaigns for Belgian politicians. Recent studies in the Netherlands have demonstrated how online communication can lead to an increase of electoral engagement and possibly to an increase in preferential votes (Kruikemeier, 2014). Yet, very little is known about this topic within a Belgian context. In the seldom cases that Belgium has been used as a case study for Twitter, the authors focus on a different topic than the present article namely a network analysis of the conversation patterns on Twitter (D’Heer & Verdegem, 2014). The present study explores, for the first time, the effect of Twitter on preferential votes in both the Flemish and French speaking region of Belgium.

**Theoretical Framework**

In recent years, social media have become an essential facet of political campaigning and numerous studies have been conducted on the topic (Agranoff & Tabin, 2011; Jacobs & Spierings, 2016). Only a few studies examine the underlying online communication strategies of politicians during campaign periods (Jackson & Lilleker, 2011). It is essential to
get a better understanding of these different strategies because they have been proven crucial and potentially beneficiary on electoral outcome (Graham & al, 2014; Kruikemeier et al., 2015; Spierings & Jacobs, 2014). Therefore, we need a better understanding why social media is included in election campaigns around the world. Three decades ago, research already demonstrated that politicians having a website, received significantly higher number of votes compared to those without (D’Alessio, 1997). More recently, several authors have observed an association between cyber-campaigning and the number of votes a candidate receives (Gibson & Mcallister, 2011; Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2014; Koc-Michalska, Lilleker, Surowiec & Baranofski, 2014). Some studies even found a moderate but positive effect of Twitter use on preferential votes (Jacobs & Spierings, 2014; Spierings & Jacobs, 2014; Kruikemeier, 2014; Kruikemeier et al., 2015). Notwithstanding other authors, such as Park and Perry (2008) who are rather sceptical about a potential voter bonus. They are convinced that online campaigning will reach people that are already engaged in politics. According to these authors, online campaigning has the potential to promote other forms of political engagement, such as money donations. But this will not result directly in additional votes. Therefore, it is argued that in the case a significant difference would be found, it would be small (Kruikemeier et al., 2015).

Social presence theory

Because of its interactive character, Twitter facilitates two-way conversations between a candidate and his followers which resembles features of offline interpersonal communication. Via these personal and interactive messages, the candidate appears to be closer to the reader and is perceived as more ‘present’. This interactive and personal use of messages by the candidate could lead to a feeling of closeness, an enhanced positive feeling towards the candidate followed by an increase of political involvement. The ‘social presence theory’ postulates that the ‘social presence’ of a politician, the feeling of closeness, could result in a higher intention to vote. Hence, politicians would benefit significantly when present on social media (Kruikemeier et al, 2015; Lee & Oh, 2012; Lee & Shin, 2012). However, being present online is not sufficient. The frequency of tweets (Spierings & Jacobs, 2014) and the level of personalized interaction with followers is essential in order to generate a small but significant effect on preferential votes (Kruikemeier et al., 2013). Therefore, Spierings and Jacobs (2014) conclude that politicians who do not update their social media account, also referred to as ‘social zombies’, do not generate any additional votes.

Who uses Twitter and when?

A number of studies has examined what background features can predict Twitter use of political parties and candidates. These features will help to answer the second research question: what variables can predict Twitter use and who uses it today? Surprisingly, the general findings are quite consistent across various countries and election cycles. In general, the variables that might predict higher Twitter use are: incumbency, media attention, age, gender and party ideology. The overall conclusions are that candidates of well-established major parties, incumbent parties, and those with high budgets are more likely to include Twitter in their strategy (Jungherr, 2016). Additionally, it has been observed
Children’s Social Participation with Peers – Some Manifestations and Conditions from the Perspective of Children

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Abstract:
Peers can be regarded as important for the development of children’s and youths’ social participation, since they provide the chance of reciprocal relations and cooperation between equals. Therefore, in this article, manifestations and conditions of children’s social participation with peers are analyzed on the basis of interviews with children at the age of ten to twelve years who took part in an empirical study on children’s and youths’ participation in Switzerland. In contrasting participation in peer groups with participation in adult-centered contexts, some specific aspects can be depicted based on the descriptions the children gave in the interviews. Furthermore, this article looks at different family backgrounds with respect to experience of participation and its significance for social participation with peers.

Keywords: social participation, children, peers, family

Introduction

In this article, various aspects of social participation in the context of peers are analyzed. By using the term “social participation,” we refer to the concept of taking part in shaping social contexts that are relevant for children’s and youths’ everyday life and being involved in decision making processes in these contexts (Hart, 1992, p. 5). In comparison with the term “political participation,” which mostly refers to a more narrow understanding of taking part in political procedures of older adolescents or young adults (Hoecker, 2006; Levine, 2007; Youniss and Levine, 2009), “social participation,” in contrast, refers to a wider spectrum of activities and contexts, even relevant for children and younger adolescents (Hoecker, 2006, p. 11). Research on contexts that are important for children’s and adolescents’ learning to participate socially refers to family and school in most cases. Besides these adult-centered contexts, peers also seem to be relevant for participation. James Youniss (1980) argues that social relations with peers that are symmetrical and characterized by reciprocity enable children and adolescents to cooperate among equals –
unlike relations with adults, which can be characterized as asymmetrical and complementary. Against this background, adults know and teach children the correct solution, whereas mutual solutions are developed in the context of peers. As a consequence, in regard to children and youths growing up, attention has been directed to the integration of peer contexts for some time now. It can be shown that most adolescents report being integrated in a group or that they maintain individual friendships and relationships with peers that are especially important to them. Against this background, peer relationships are considered to be a virtually indispensable element of growing up, which help children and youths to meet developmental challenges and to participate socially (Adler and Adler, 1998). As a consequence, peers seem to be important for learning processes regarding social participation, but there is still very little research with enough precision in the understanding of what is learned and how this learning occurs (Moser, 2010).

Against this background, it needs to be clarified in what specific ways the relationships with peers are shaped and what consequences arise that concern the social participation of children and youths. This article starts with a short overview of some research in the field of social participation of children and youths. The second part provides some information on the empirical study which serves as the basis for the following considerations. We then present the results – in the first section with reference to various aspects of social participation in the context of peers and in a second section, the different family backgrounds of the children, especially their experience with participation in the family, are studied in relation to their participation with peers. The concluding remarks resume and discuss these findings in order to generate some theoretical insights which supplement existing views on the relevance of peers for participation.

State of Research on Social Participation of Adolescents

In recent years, research has often focused on the lack of political and social participation of young people. Especially in the field of traditional politics and with respect to organized forms of engagement, there are low rates of participation reported (e.g. various contributions in Youniss and Levine, 2009; Hoecker, 2006). On the other hand, a remarkable willingness of youths and young adults can be attested to take part in more open and flexible contexts where participation is associated with fun and seems to be relevant for young people’s everyday life (Knauer and Sturzenhecker, 2005, p. 51). Furthermore, new forms of civic engagement can be observed which are associated with internet-based communication (e.g. social networking, blogging, online-petitioning), can be shaped individually, do not require long-term engagement or organizing, but are realized when related to an occasion and spontaneously (Levine, 2007, p. 94).

Research consistently shows substantial individual differences concerning the ability and willingness of young people to participate in the various contexts of political and social engagement (e.g. Rieker et al., 2016). With reference to social participation, these individual differences hardly correlate with traits like gender, migration, or class, as can be stated for the engagement in the field of traditional politics (Youniss and Levine, 2009; Hoecker, 2006) on the one hand. On the other hand, research has shown that the willingness of young people to participate socially is linked to experiences made in childhood.
Narcissism and Leadership: What we can learn from a case-study of Silvio Berlusconi

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Abstract:
There has been a sustained interest in personality of politicians, in particular aversive personality traits such as psychopathy, narcissism and machiavellianism. To overcome the hurdle of limited access when studying political leaders, it is argued that psychodiagnostic meta-analysis methodologies can be applied in combination with validated psychological instruments. In this study the focus will be on a hypothesised narcissistic leader: Italy’s ex prime-minister Silvio Berlusconi. Using the Million Inventory of Diagnostic Criteria (MIDC) by Immelman (2004) as the at-a-distance psychodiagnostic meta-analysis tool to assess the overall personality, scales associated with narcissism will be compared to results on the well established Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) to test the usability and relevance of an extended psychodiagnostic meta-analysis scale to specifically assess narcissism in political leaders. Results of the study verify that the ambitious scale of the MIDC, which is defined as the correlate with narcissism, is not sufficient to verify the presence of narcissistic traits, as hypothesised by expert-opinions. Implications of these findings are further discussed.

Keywords: Narcissism, Berlusconi, Immelman MIDC method, Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI), Italian politics.

Introduction

Narcissism in our political leadership has been in the spotlight the past years. Popular media has warned for the narcissism trap for American presidential frontrunners and the Republican candidate Donald Trump has already been labeled as a narcissist by an Ivy League professor and healthcare professionals (The Economist, 14.05.2015; Henry Alford, Vanity Fair, 11.11.2015). European politicians haven’t been spared, with the likes of Nicolas Sarkozy and Silvio Berlusconi having received similar labels in the past. Freud (1950) already recognized the link between narcissism and leadership. Narcissists are

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more likely to be seen as self-confident and outgoing by others, which are prominent characteristics in the perception of leadership (Lord, Foti & De Vader, 1984). In the following article we will illustrate the theoretical background of the study of narcissism in leadership and its hypothesized effects. Subsequently some attention will be given to the challenges in studying the personality of leaders in general, proposing psycho-diagnostic meta-analysis as a possible methodology to study narcissism in leadership. After discussing the article’s objectives, a case study of a hypothesized narcissistic leader is proposed to test the applicability of this methodology, specifically the case of Silvio Berlusconi, who’s personally will be assessed in the first study using the Millon Inventory for Diagnostic Criteria (Inmmelman, 2004). Moreover, the specific scale scores, especially for those scales associated with narcissism, will be compared to the results of a third party rating with a well-established narcissism measure using a similar methodology in the second study. Conclusion and implication will be discussed.

Some studies have indicated that, especially in the contemporary individualistic western societies, narcissistic characteristics have become increasingly valued (Foster, Campbell & Twenge, 2003; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell & Bushman, 2008). Coupled with the finding that we choose leaders who look most ‘leaderlike’ (Hogan, Curphy & Hogan, 1994) it is no surprise that it has been suggested that individuals with more prominent narcissistic traits raise to prominent positions (Lasch, 1987). Interestingly, it is argued that there are both upsides and downsides to narcissism in our leaders and the impact they have (Rosenthal, 2005; Nevicka, Hoogh, Van Vianen & Ten Velden, 2013). On the upside, narcissistic leaders have been described as leaders with bold vision, charismatic and innovative motivators (Galvin, Waldman & Balthazard, 2010; Deluga, 1997; Maccoby, 2000; Post, 1993). Looking at the downsides, narcissistic leaders have a leadership vision which is synonymous with their own personal needs, rather than those of their constituents (Conger, 1997). Narcissists are more likely to self-promote and dominate (Hogan, Raskin & Fazzini, 1990) and more likely to employ their skills in deception, manipulation and intimidation (Glad, 2002) to secure their position. They display an air of dominance which inspires followers often to select the narcissist to lead them (Hogan et al., 1994; Gladwell, 2002, Post, 1986). It is suggested that some of the psychological underpinnings of the problems associated with narcissistic leadership stem from (I) a feeling of inferiority (Glad, 2002; Harwood, 2003). These feelings would be so strong, that even taking credit for success and blaming others for failures can only temporarily alleviate them. Another suggested cause is an (II) insatiable need for recognition and superiority which is a method of coping for their feelings of inferiority (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Narcissistic leaders have, usually, a very large assortment of means by which they can prove their superiority, like demanding unquestioning devotion and loyalty from followers, and embark on grandiose projects and indulge in conspicuous consumption (Post 1993, Harwood, 2003, Horowitz & Arthur, 1988), at their worst, like for example former Iraqi head of state Saddam Hussein, turning to sadism and destructiveness (Glad, 2002; Post & Baram, 2003). A third cause might be found in (III) hypersensitivity and anger which manifests when grandiosity is threatened (Horowitz & Arthur, 1988). For example, a feeling of justification to commit horrific acts may arise. Steinberg (1991) argued that the Cuban Missile Crisis escalated at least in part because of the narcissistic hypersensitivity of both Fidel Castro and U.S. president John F. Kennedy. Fourthly, (IV) a general
Lack of empathy is also associated as a cause. This trait is part of psychopathic pathology and is highlighted in Paulhus and Williams’ (2002) Dark Triad of Personality. Also, (V) Amorality is described; Narcissistic leaders may inevitably turn to immoral behavior that serve no political purpose, often overreaching in foreign engagement and inviting challenge (Glad, 2002); and lastly (VI) irrationality and inflexibility as well as (VII) paranoia are indicated, which is a trait that most narcissistic leaders share often destroying/rejecting their most loyal followers out of distrust (Glad, 2002).

But, as mentioned before, not all aspects of narcissism are negative and some have argued that narcissistic leaders are not exclusively destructive or toxic. Post (1986, 1993) has argued that in specific historical contacts, a narcissistic leader might be a necessity, as sometimes an “ideal-hungry” follower is looking for a “mirror hungry” leader that can resolve division in society. Macoby (2000; 2004) even advocates the virtues of narcissistic leaders, being possible grand visionaries and innovators, getting the job done and charmers. The term productive narcissist was used with examples such as Steve Jobs. Main qualities of these narcissistic leaders would be their ability to inspire a great number of followers and also a willingness to charme or convert masses with their rhetoric. They always keep the eye on the big picture (Rosenthal, 2005).

There is a clear indication that narcissistic leaders can have negative consequences on those they lead, which warrants a heightened level of attention for this personality trait, in addition to the work that has been published on this subject. Moreover, it calls for a systematic approach to aid in the assessment of this particular trait in our leaders.

However, there is an inherent difficulty in studying narcissism and differentiating it from normal or healthy self-confidence (Rosenthal, 2005). It has been found that over self-confidence associated with “constructed” narcissism can be seen as a positive leadership trait (Chemers, Waterson & May, 2000). There are competing and sometimes contradictory, definitions of narcissism, sometimes including normative self-confidence (e.g., Campbell, 2001), while others do not (e.g., APA, 2000). In addition to this, there is an even greater challenge when studying the personality of political leadership.

Studying the Personality of Political Leaders

In addition to the difficulties described above, there is an elemental hurdle in studying political leaders that has to be overcome, namely a lack of access to relevant data (Winter, 2003). To counter this problem, psycho-biographers relied on biographical information, cross-checking it with factual information, to synthesise clinical diagnoses (for a review of the history of psychobiography, see Winter (2003). Others relied on the opinions of knowledgeable experts or a content analysis of spoken words (Winter 2003, Immelman, 1998). To further assist these approaches, scholars developed standardized instruments to assess personality at a distance. Immelman (1993) developed an inventory based on Millon’s concept of personality that has frequently been used to assess various political leaders (Millon, 1969, 1981, 1986a, 1986b, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1996; Millon & Everly, 1985). This methodology has been termed as psycho-diagnostic meta-analysis. However, since the main source of information in this methodology is analysis of communication from and about the subject, it would be more realistic to assume that the results from psycho-