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Liebe Leserinnen,
liebe Leser,


Die Reihe der Schwerpunktthemen wird in den kommenden Heften fortgesetzt. Im Mittelpunkt des nächsten Schwerpunktes wird die Dynamik von Stieffamilien stehen. Auch hierfür ist die Perspektive des internationalen Vergleiches vorgesehen.

Wir wünschen Ihnen eine anregende Lektüre.

Hans-Peter Blossfeld
Geschäftsführender Herausgeber

Kurt P. Bierschock
Redakteur
Recent decades have witnessed a growing interest in the interaction between the welfare state and the reproduction of gender relations. Scholarship in this vein has been conducted by Gøsta Esping-Andersen, whose most influential work laid out three paradigmatic types of welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). The feminist critique of this pioneering concept (e.g., Orloff 1996; Bambra 2004) did not aim at demolishing it but at pointing out its shortcomings and at highlighting the extent to which the welfare state is organized around differential roles of men and women. The gendered division of labour, both on the labour market and within the family, is among the fundamental principles of welfare state organization (Esping-Andersen 2009), and gendered patterns of gainful employment and unpaid care are prevalent in virtually all modern Western societies. Feminist scholars have shown that the institutional structures of the welfare state promote the gendered division of paid and unpaid work (Ostner/Lewis 1995; Sainsbury 1996). However, these scholars have focused primarily on Western democracies. The few studies that have considered former state socialist regimes used the categories of the dual-earner model with state childcare (Pfau-Effinger 1998) or the dual-earner and state-carer model (Crompton 1999), neither of which fully corresponds to the institutions and social structures originating from the socialist era. The contributions to this special issue implicitly challenge this categorization as an oversimplification of both the past and the present. They shed light on the role of central social institutions in their impact on gender relations in different societal contexts.

In fact, state socialist societies went further than most Western welfare states in expanding the female role beyond that of a family caregiver, encouraging women to join the labour force, become economically independent, and participate in society outside the private sphere. However, social policy goals were inclined primarily to satisfy the extensive demand for labour, while ideas about women’s emancipation played a subordinate role (Haney 2002). Nevertheless, the widespread integration of women into the labour market led to the emergence of institutions that supported and encouraged female full-time employment – even as early as the 1960s, when conservative Western welfare states strongly encouraged a traditional division of labour based on a male breadwinner and a
female homemaker. Although there were variations in the gender-specific roles that emerged across the socialist countries, the propagation of the dual-earner model was a universal feature of these countries during the decades preceding the fall of the Iron Curtain.

During the post-1989 period, most if not all Central and Eastern European countries witnessed a considerable decline in women’s labour force participation, in many cases accompanied by a reversion to more traditional gender role attitudes and gender relations. The transition from centrally planned to market economies left many women in a more vulnerable position than men, not only on the labour market but also in the home (Schnepf 2010). Broadly speaking, women became more familialized, that is, more economically dependent on a male earner and more focused on family care than before 1989 (Pascall/Manning 2000). With the downsizing of public childcare, the model of the female full-time worker was undermined substantially, although to differing degrees across the Central and Eastern European countries. Consequently, the female employment rate (age 15-64) shows vast differences across Eastern Europe, ranging from below 50 percent (Hungary) to 64 percent (Slovenia) in 2009 (Eurostat 2010). A similar degree of variation is seen in the division of domestic work (Fuwa 2004). It appears that women’s labour force participation in Central and Eastern Europe declined sharply immediately after the fall of the Iron Curtain, but has re-increased steadily since the late 1990s. Again, the extent to which female employment has approached pre-1989 levels varies across the region. However, these aggregate figures only tell part of the story. They fail to take into account important changes in the distribution of paid and unpaid work at the household and family level.

A key intention of this special issue is to investigate changes and continuities in gender relations and gender role attitudes in the transition from state socialism to capitalism in different Central and Eastern European societies. Although this transition process has been going on for 20 years, social science research has been remarkably reluctant to address these issues. An obvious question is why some societies have produced distinctly gendered divisions of labour. Explanations for changes or continuities in these patterns could focus on institutional factors (i.e., the role of social policies), economic factors (i.e., the role of labour markets), cultural aspects (i.e., the role of traditional norms and preferences), or the notion of path dependency (i.e., the role of social legacies). This collection of articles aims to advance this debate by taking a strictly comparative approach across both time and space. Two of the studies employ this approach to compare developments in different Eastern European countries, while the other two compare gender relations between Eastern and Western European countries. As a joint trait, all the articles in this volume argue from a thoughtful and theoretically grounded perspective.

The paper by Hana Hašková and Christina Klenner is a fascinating case study of the emergence and persistence of distinct types of dual-earner models in Czech, Slovak, and East German societies before and after 1989. The analysis focuses on the role of institutions, norms, and practices in establishing different work-care policies. The authors argue that the socialist ideal of female full-time work led to the emergence of a variety of dual-earner models, as the social policy approaches aimed at disburdening women in the reconciliation of work and motherhood differed across countries (public childcare in the GDR; extended maternity leave in Czechoslovakia). In Czechoslovakia, an interrupted
dual-earner model prevailed, and in the GDR, a continuous dual-earner model. These models and the work-care policies associated with them had a deep impact on the norms and ideas of “good” childcare and motherhood that remain in place to this day. The transformation after 1989 brought about slight modifications in the two distinct dual-earner models, but these models still reflect the cultural and institutional legacy of their respective societies. This continuity is even more astonishing in light of the radical social changes these particular societies underwent in the processes of reunification in Germany and separation in Czechoslovakia.

The paper by Éva Fodor and Anikó Balogh explores differences in gender role opinions and attitudes between men and women in 13 Eastern European countries. They analyse a unique set of representative country data collected in 2007. The data set also covers some countries that have been almost entirely neglected in the social science research to date (like Belarus, Moldova, or Ukraine). The study investigates the assumption that women in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe fail to recognize their interests as women or that they lack “feminist consciousness.” This idea has been put forward to argue that a conservative turn in gender role attitudes is to blame for the declining number of women in the labour force and for the unequal division of household work (Gal/Kligman 2000). Contrary to this line of reasoning, the main findings of the empirical analysis show that gender remains an important determinant of gender role attitudes in post-socialist Eastern Europe. Like women in Western industrialized countries, women in the former socialist countries tend to express more egalitarian attitudes than men do. In this sense, Eastern Europe corresponds to the broader trends in the formation of gender-role attitudes, and does not seem to form an exception to the general rule.

The other two contributions to this special issue examine gender relations in post-socialist societies, each comparing a Central European to a Western country. Heather Hofmeister, Lena Hünefeld, and Celina Proch investigate how dual-earner couples in Germany (primarily West-Germany) and Poland cope with job-related spatial mobility. They use data from the 2007 Job Mobility and Family Lives Survey. Their central finding is that gender trumps national differences and spatial mobility constraints. Polish and German women, whether mobile or not, report doing more housework and childcare than their partners. Men who travel for their job often report delegating housework to their partners, but women rarely do. However, there is a stronger tendency toward an egalitarian division of labour among Polish couples than among German couples, especially in terms of childcare, which may be the result of the longer tradition of a dual-earner model in Poland. This legacy might also be relevant for the younger Polish generation that did not grow up under state socialism, but may have absorbed the ideal of a more egalitarian division of labour through processes of socialization.

Anna Matysiak and Daniele Vignoli provide an elaborate investigation of the relationship between women’s first birth and employment choices based on national retrospective data. For their analysis, they focus on a comparison of Poland and Italy, two countries that share important similarities (e.g., culture, family ties, low support for working parents), to better understand the crucial role of differences in important details (Neyer/Andersson 2008) as can be observed in female labour market attachment around birth. The authors disentangle how educational differentials affect the transition of working women to motherhood and the return of the labour market after first birth. They also identify clear cross-
country differences in women’s return to the labour market: women tend to combine work and motherhood more often in Poland than in Italy. The authors argue that Polish women’s stronger labour market attachment is rooted both in economic necessity and in the lasting influence of the socialist ideal of the full-time working woman.

This special issue of the Zeitschrift für Familienforschung/Journal of Family Research does not provide a generalized answer to the question of whether post-1989 transformation processes resulted in change or continuity in gender relations. Rather, the articles presented here offer important insights into how state socialism and subsequent transformation processes interacted with the cultural and historical origins of these diverse societies. The findings underscore the importance of more differentiated, in-depth research on the gendered welfare state with respect to the former socialist countries.

Such a differentiated view needs to go beyond conceptualizing present-day gender relations in Central and Eastern Europe simply as the consequence of a joint legacy of state socialism. There is no doubt that the socialist era left a powerful imprint on the societies in question, perhaps the most important one being the ideal of the full-time working woman. This ideal remains prevalent in all the countries examined here, but its impact on women’s economic independence differs widely from one country to the next due to specific economic developments, traditions, and policy paths taken. The outcomes range from the close labour market attachment of women in East Germany and Poland to a stronger focus on caregiver roles in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Future research on gender relations needs to take such differences into account by looking at specific national historical legacies rather than attempting to collapse the Central and Eastern European countries together into the single category of state socialist origin. This special issue has taken a first step in this direction by stressing the key role of national historical and cultural legacies in the emergence of the broad variation in gender relations seen today across the former socialist countries of Europe. It remains a task for future research to investigate the underlying mechanisms and to search for consistent patterns in gender relations across Central and Eastern Europe.

References


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Why did distinct types of dual-earner models in Czech, Slovak and East German societies develop and persist?

Abstract:
We examine pre-1989 and post-1989 work-care models in Czech, Slovak and East German societies. Inspired by the institutionalist approach, we develop a framework that allows to analyze how, when and why two distinct work-care models evolved and persisted in the region. Once problems of the modernized gender model emerged, Czechoslovak and East German governments set the two countries on two distinct work-care policy paths. Consequently, fundamental differences in work-care practices and work-care related values and norms emerged between the two countries. Based on an examination of the institutional and cultural legacy, we explain why the transition from totalitarian to democratic regimes was accompanied by continuity in work-care models rather than radical departures from the previous models. In contrast to traditional institutionalist studies we point out that more recent institutional changes in the sphere of work-care policies in Czech, Slovak and East German societies did not occur as a consequence of the 1989 revolutionary transition.

Zusammenfassung:
period, but rather evolved in a period of relative stability.

**Key words:** dual-earner model, work-care arrangements, institutionalism, Central and Eastern Europe

**Introduction**

The objective of our paper is to examine and explain pre-1989 and post-1989 continuities and changes in work-care models in the three neighboring Czech, Slovak and Eastern German societies. We were inspired by institutionalist theory to develop a framework that allows us to analyze how, when and why two distinct work-care policy paths and work-care models developed and then persisted until today in the region.

The goal of our article is thus threefold:

1) To show that two distinct work-care policy paths and work-care models developed in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR, for short, East Germany), which continue to influence the respective models today
2) To explain how and why the two distinct work-care policy paths and work-care models developed in these countries
3) To explain the continuity in the work-care models in Czech, Slovak and East German societies despite revolutionary changes in 1989, unification of East and West Germany in 1990, and the break-up of Czechoslovakia and the formation of the Czech and Slovak Republics in 1993.

Our framework stresses the role of work-care institutions, practices, norms and values, which influence each other and which are influenced by structural conditions and influential actors who contribute to reconceptualizing and reorganizing existing institutions through policy-making processes. Within this framework we can explain differences in work-care models between the respective countries as well as continuity and change in the work-care models within each country.

**The main differences between the two distinct dual-earner models**

Comparing Czech, Slovak and East German societies is particularly interesting because they shared many similarities in the past. Even though the three societies had many characteristics in common, two different versions of the dual-earner model evolved in the
former Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Work-care models in Czech, Slovak and East German societies differed only slightly from those found elsewhere in continental Europe before the Second World War. Urban middle-class women took responsibility for the household and childcare tasks, while men were the only breadwinners. State socialist policies quickly departed from the gender-conservative male breadwinner model by encouraging all women to work outside the home. Income policies made it extremely difficult for families to live on one income and an increase in the number of public childcare institutions made it easier for mothers to work. Additionally, the absence of a male breadwinner in female-headed single-parent families after the Second World War (especially in Germany) and the ideology of women’s emancipation through their lifelong full-time employment played a role in diminishing the male breadwinner model.

Until the 1960s, Czechoslovakia and the GDR pursued similar work-care policies with similar outcomes. In both countries, a paid maternity leave of several weeks was offered to working mothers, and both governments established an extensive supply of childcare facilities. In terms of outcomes, both countries experienced relatively high employment among women and a rapid increase in accessibility and utilization of childcare institutions. However, in the late 1960s and during the 1970s, work-care policies diverged in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. East Germany’s policies approached the Scandinavian model, which is considered the best promoter of gender equality to date. Similarly to the Scandinavian model but under the completely different conditions of a totalitarian regime, the East German government supported the continuous employment of mothers of small children. In contrast, state socialist Czechoslovakia – similarly to conservative Western countries – gave more support to mothers caring for their children at home. The establishment of these divergent work-care policies contributed to the gradual development of two distinct work-care models since significant differences in work-care practices, values and norms supporting them emerged.

Based on the study of the development of work-care policies, practices and discourses in East German, Czech and Slovak societies since the Second World War, we argue against the idea that there was just one state socialist work-care model in the countries of pre-1989 Central Europe. We agree with studies that categorize state socialist Central European countries as examples of the dual-earner model with state childcare (Pfau-Effinger 1998) or dual-earner/state-carer model (Crompton 1999). However, we go further in arguing that we have identified two distinct work-care models in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Both models could be described as being extensive because both men and women worked mostly full-time and long hours. However, in Czechoslovakia an interrupted dual-earner model evolved, while in the GDR a continuous dual-earner model prevailed. The interrupted dual earner model can be characterized by continuity in men’s careers and interruptions in women’s careers. In contrast, the continuous dual-earner model can be characterized by significantly less difference in the continuity in

2 While the government of the GDR introduced one year of income-related parental leave (called the Babyjahr) for mothers in 1976 in addition to extensive state support for childcare facilities, Czechoslovak leaders introduced two years of parental leave at a flat rate in 1970 (referred to as “extended maternity leave” in the following), which was gradually extended to three years (Klenner/Hašková 2010).
women’s and men’s careers. Both dual-earner models were traditional in terms of men’s gender role, because initially the right to parental leave was given to mothers only.3

Even today, after the countries went through radical post-1989 transformation, the main aspects that had distinguished East German and Czechoslovak work-care models persist in Czech, Slovak and East German societies. The Czech and Slovak Republics are among the European countries with the smallest percentage of children under the age of three in formal childcare. The former GDR, on the other hand, is a region with a high percentage of children under three in formal childcare (see OECD Family Database, available at www.oecd.org; Bothfeld et al. 2005). Moreover, the Czech and Slovak Republics rank among the European countries with the highest negative impact of motherhood on women’s employment, while employment among mothers in East Germany remains high (European Commission 2008; Bothfeld et al. 2005). The establishment of the two distinct work-care policy paths and dual-earner models continues to affect the prevalence of attitudes toward gender roles to this very day. These gender role attitudes rank among the most traditional in Europe among Czechs and Slovaks, while attitudes of East Germans are among the most modern (Klenner/Hašková 2010). Although the transformation after 1989 brought some changes to the two distinct dual-earner models, these changes are modifications rather than radical departures from the two types. These modifications still reflect the cultural and institutional legacy under radically altered post-1989 conditions. In this paper, we explain why and how the two distinct work-care models developed and then persisted in the respective countries.

Institutional analysis

Our article ties into a very recent trend that investigates the connection between state socialist work-care policies and models and work-care policies and models in post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Heinen/Wator 2006; Bicksel 2006; Saxonberg/Sirovátka 2006; Saxonberg/Szelewa 2007; Hašková/Saxonberg 2010 forthcoming). This connection has been explained primarily within the historical institutionalist approach. Historical institutionalists focus on how institutions structure action and outcomes. They emphasize the importance of decisions that set countries on different policy paths. They argue that once countries follow a certain policy path, it becomes difficult to leave this path (Mahoney 2000). Policies are thus “path dependent.” Historical institutionalists usually start at a point when several courses of action are possible. However, once a course of action (path) is chosen, it is easier to continue along the chosen policy path than to start a completely new course of action (Pierson 2000).

While historical institutionalists focus on the development of political institutions that follow the “logic of path-dependency,” sociological institutionalists focus on social actors who act according to the “logic of appropriateness” in policy-making. While historical institutionalists stress the manner in which policy decisions set countries on different institutional paths (Mahoney 2000; Kenny 2007; Pierson 2000), sociological institutionalists

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3 In the GDR, fathers obtained the right to a Babyjahr in 1986, while Czechoslovakia first offered parental leave to single fathers in 1985.
focus on the manner in which institutions influence cultural values, norms, ideologies and beliefs. When both approaches are combined, one could explore how cultural values, norms, ideologies and beliefs influence policies that tend to be path dependent and how, once established, institutions influence cultural values, norms, ideologies and beliefs (see Thelen 2004). The relationship between institutions and values shared by the population is not easy to study, however, because institutions and values are interdependent, each of them influencing the other (Voicu 2004: 232).

If applied to our particular case, a combination of historical and sociological institutionalist analysis could help us understand how ideologies, beliefs, values and norms influenced work-care policies in Czech, Slovak and East German societies and how the established work-care policy paths, in turn, influenced work-care ideologies, beliefs, values and norms in the three societies. Moreover, in our framework, both work-care policies and values and norms influence work-care practices. As Hobson and Fahlén (2009) put it, when explaining differences in work-care arrangements and gender models in Europe, it is laws and specific policies as well as norms and values that are legitimated and reproduced in policy and discourse that are crucial for gender equality in practice. According to them, path dependency is the core mechanism that explains patterns of institutional development, stratification outcomes in welfare states and the types of logic of gender regimes, that is, the extent to which welfare states weaken or sustain a male breadwinner model (see Lewis 1997). Similarly, Crompton states that “gender relations are produced and reproduced via already existing institutions, norms and practices, as well as through the ongoing relationship between individual women and men” (Crompton 1999: 19).

Moreover, we argue that not only institutions, values and norms influence practices. The relationship among all three – institutions, values and norms, and practices – is reciprocal. Work-care practices in given structural conditions can lead to conflicts; reflection on them can generate ideas, which can be seized by influential actors for reconceptualizing and reorganizing existing institutions. This takes us closer to the question of how institutional change happens if historical institutional paths and cultural norms “lock” actors into a certain path of institutional development.

Institutionalist studies have tended to focus on explaining the continuity of social policies rather than changes, and changes were usually explained as coming from outside as a result of exogenous shocks. However, recent institutionalist studies have increasingly sought to “endogenize” change. As Thelen (2004) puts it, even though existing institutional structures to some extent “lock” actors into a certain path, they do not completely determine future policy steps; there is room for innovation. This turn toward endogenous explanations of institutional changes has often meant a turn of attention to ideas and discourses. Those researchers who stress the role of ideas and discourse in explaining the institutional change work primarily within the tradition of historical, sociological, or, as Vivien Schmidt calls it, discursive institutionalism.4 For historical institutionalists, institutions serve mainly as external constraints in terms of historical paths that shape action. For sociological institutionalists, institutions serve mainly as constraints in terms of cultural norms that frame action. Discursive institutionalists take a more dynamic ap-

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4 Less often within the tradition of rational choice institutionalism (Schmidt 2010), which we do not refer to, and thus leave the discussion on this type of institutionalism out of scope of this paper.
For discursive institutionalists, institutions serve as structures that constrain action as well as constructs created and changed by agents. However, as Schmidt recently emphasized, empirical evidence of how, when, where and why ideas and discourse matter for institutional change still remains underexplored (Schmidt 2010).

Similarly to Schmidt, Pfau-Effinger emphasizes the interplay between cultural ideas, path-dependent institutions and social actors and argues that a care arrangement can be firmly established and coherent in the long term if its cultural foundations are embedded as norms at the level of institutions and actors’ behavior (Pfau-Effinger 2005). Transformation of care arrangements can be expected primarily if certain agents seize contradictions in those arrangements. Then the arrangement can become the object of conflict and negotiation concerning innovative models or new institutional arrangements. These conflicts can take the form of discursive struggles for interpretations that precede policy change. Success of new discourses usually depends on the extent to which they pick up on trends or contradictions in the attitudes of the general public in favor of the changed values (Schmidt 2010).

Similarly to Pfau-Effinger (2005) and Schmidt (2010), in our framework, we do not define institutions only as constraints but also as constructs and stress the importance of influential actors and discourses to maintain, modify or change established institutions. Moreover, we point out that differences in the mechanisms of institutional change in democratic and totalitarian regimes can be expected because totalitarian societies suppress freedom of speech and limit the number, diversity and opportunities for social actors to act publicly. Thus, a single actor or decision could be much more influential under a totalitarian regime due to limited opportunities for critical evaluation, public debate and democratic negotiation of political measures.

Inspired by the theoretical discussions within the above mentioned institutionalist traditions, we developed a framework that helps us examine how, when and why two distinct work-care model: Interplay of institutions, practices, and norms and values

- Structural conditions: economic necessities, political regime etc.
- Work-care model
  - Work-care practices
  - Work-care related values and norms
  - Established work-care policies/institutions
- Influential actors: organizations or individuals
- Work-care policy-making
care policy paths and work-care models emerged and continue to persist in Czech, Slovak and East German societies despite the revolutionary changes that came about in the region. The framework emphasizes the interplay between work-care institutions (as constructs and outcomes of work-care policies and as structures that influence the development of further work-care policies), work-care related norms and values expressed in beliefs, ideologies and dominant discourses, and work-care practices. These three elements—work-care practices, norms and values, and institutions—constitute a work-care model, which is further affected by structural conditions (such as economic necessities) and influential actors who may strengthen specific discourses and bring about institutional change.

**Toward a dual-earner model – The Marxist ideology of women’s emancipation and institutional arrangements to achieve it**

Processes of women’s individualization, including the growth in women’s employment and the decline of the male breadwinner model, characterize the era after the Second World War in all European countries. However, women’s employment grew faster and to a larger extent in the state socialist countries than elsewhere in Europe. The post-war need for paid work was accompanied by the introduction of the centrally planned economy in the former Eastern Bloc. The centrally planned economy was supposed to reduce poverty and class differences. Massive investments were made to stimulate industrial growth and the notion of women’s emancipation through their economic independence from men was promoted.

After 1948, when the communists came to power in Central and Eastern European countries, all existing institutions and policies had to be quickly (re)constructed to follow the Soviet model. The male dominated character of the state and the Communist Party as well as the lack of democracy led to a “patriarchal way” of women’s liberation “from above” (Nickel 1993). Although some influential women were involved in the process, there was no chance for masses of women to articulate their needs. Since childcare was crucial for increasing the number of women in industry, similar childcare policies were introduced in all state socialist countries. The introduction of paid maternity leave of several weeks was accompanied by education and healthcare reforms that firmly established kindergartens (childcare institutions for preschool children from the age of three) as educational institutions under control of the ministries of education. Crèches (childcare institutions for preschool children below three years of age) were considered healthcare institutions and were monitored by the ministries of health. Instead of educators, the main responsibility for childcare in crèches was thus given to children’s nurses.

Affected by the newly introduced policies and the economic needs of the family, the share of women in the labor force and the share of children in public childcare increased drastically in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Due to long working hours and the ongoing expansion of round-the-clock enterprises, the number of children increased not only in daycare facilities but also in childcare facilities covering all workdays of the week. In those facilities, children stayed during the week and parents took them home only for the weekend. An official ideal was established and promoted in the media stressing that “only a working mother who strengthens the workers’ and peasants’ state … is a good mother”
(“Frau von heute” 1955 cited in Paterak 1999: 237), whereas housewives were denigrated.

However, this extensive dual-earner model brought about many problems. Despite the official ideal and governments’ promises to help working mothers, a lack of childcare and household services together with long working hours and the shortage economy contributed to women’s double burden. Subsequently, the double burden on working mothers started to be criticized in the media (Schröter 2009) and to be documented by researchers who analyzed time use surveys and public opinion polls (Háková 1966) in the 1960s. In both countries many mothers preferred to work part-time as a result of the difficulties related to combining work and family (von Oertzen/Rietzschel 1997; Srb/Kučera 1959). However, party leaders saw women’s affinity to part-time work as a “lack of ideological clarity” (Schröter 2009: 43). Childcare facilities were overcrowded, which was one of the reasons for a higher illness rate among children in crèches. Moreover, research uncovered detrimental development among children who were raised in long-term institutional childcare, mainly in permanent institutional care (e.g. in children’s homes), but also in week-long institutional care, particularly crèches (see e.g. Koch 1963:12). Although the Soviet model officially supported long-term institutional childcare in the 1950s, research findings led policy makers to come to the conclusion that these forms should be given up, which was then followed by a rapid decline in the share of week-long crèches in the first half of the 1960s (Bulíř 1990; Niebsch et al. 2007).

Setting up two different work-care policy paths and two versions of the dual-earner model

The popular paradigm presents the state socialist regime in the Eastern Bloc as homogenous in devaluing the full-time female carer and in celebrating working mothers. However, research shows that there were fundamental differences in the discourse, policies and work-care practices between state socialist countries of the Eastern Bloc. In the 1960s, Eastern Bloc governments had to deal with three major problems linked to the promotion of the state socialist women’s emancipation project: declining birth rates, working mothers’ double burden and the aforementioned high illness rate among children in crèches. Although these problems were discussed widely in the public media in the Eastern Bloc in the 1960s, open civil society discussion about proper ways to solve these problems could not take place in the totalitarian regime. The country leaders decided to establish state bodies that would focus on the issue of motherhood and women’s employment. These bodies became important actors whose policy proposals and the discourse they promoted contributed to the establishment of the two different work-care policy paths and dual-earner models in Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

5 E.g. in 1964, there were only 58,000 places in crèches for 280,000 children of employed mothers in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak National Assembly discussed this ratio as one of the reasons for the high illness rate among children in crèches (transcript of speeches of the Czechoslovak National Assembly on the 1st of April 1964, accessible at http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1960ns/stenprot/025schuz/s025001.htm).
In the GDR, the Socialist Unity Party in power dealt with women’s issues in a special party committee. In addition, a scientific advisory committee was established in 1964 called The Woman in Socialist Society (“Die Frau in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft”). This scientific committee emphasized the role of time budgets in the reconciliation of work and family and proposed measures to ease the burden on working mothers. The government later introduced some of these measures, such as a proposal to reduce women’s working hours.

Although the right to part-time work for mothers was introduced in the Labor Code (“Arbeitsgesetzbuch”) as early as 1961, the party frowned upon part-time work. Only 16% of women worked part-time in 1960. However, the need to alleviate the time burden on working mothers was urgent and women were increasingly able to have their request for a part-time job approved. The percentage of women working part-time grew to 33% in 1975 and has never dropped below 27% since but it shall be mentioned that a considerable part of this share were women of pre-retirement age.

Moreover, in 1972 working time was reduced to 40 hours per week among mothers who worked shifts and had two or more children and among mothers who worked full-time and had three or more children while they retained their full salary. In addition, mothers with two or more children received an additional three to nine days of holiday. Shortly thereafter, in 1977 the working time was reduced to 40 hours for all mothers who worked full-time and had at least two children.

The emphasis on the time issue of mothers’ employment was also a consequence of the fact that the debate in the GDR never questioned the goal of achieving uninterrupted full-time employment of all women including mothers of very young children. Therefore, the question regarding childcare for babies and toddlers was never whether collective care was beneficial for children but how it could be improved. The physician and scientist Eva Schmidt-Kolmer, who held leading positions in the GDR’s health-care administration, played a decisive role in research on childcare and child development, and consequently promoted the public acceptance of crèches (Niebsch et al. 2007). In 1966, the Institute for Social Hygiene (“Institut für Sozialhygiene”) was founded, which reflected the existing critical discourse on the detrimental effects of long-term (and long hours) institutional childcare. Under Schmidt-Kolmer’s leadership the institute studied how to provide quality childcare in childcare institutions, mainly in day crèches. The first issue addressed was the high illness rate among children in crèches (Reyer 1996). Based on the recommendation by the Institute for Social Hygiene, opening hours in crèches were shortened from 14 to 12 hours a day. At the same time, mothers were allowed to adjust their work schedules to the opening hours of the childcare facilities even though the opening hours remained long.

The percentage of children in childcare facilities grew rapidly as a result of the expansion and improvements in childcare facilities. In the 1980s, the share of children under the

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6 “The Woman in Socialist Society” cooperated with trade unions (which were seen as “transmission belt” of the political party), the editorial board of the leading women’s journal For You (“Für Dich”) and other actors. The few attempts of the women’s mass organization Democratic Women’s Association of Germany (“Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands” (DFD)) to express women’s interests independently were suppressed (Schröter 2009).

7 Information based on an interview with Herta Kuhrig (January 27th, 2010).
age of three in crèches in the GDR reached 80% and the share of preschool children from the age of three who attended kindergartens reached 90% (Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR 1989; Winkler 1990). In line with the increase in childcare facilities, the employment rate of women in the GDR increased from 52% in 1950 to 89% in the late 1980s (Klammer et al. 2000). The ideal of a working mother in all adult stages of her life cycle became widely accepted and practiced. The dual-earner model became firmly embedded in work-care policies, practices, values and norms in the GDR.

However, other ideas and policy proposals were discussed before the policy path based on strong support of childcare facilities became established, and mothers’ working hours were reduced in the GDR, too. In the 1960s, the introduction of a three-year maternity leave was suggested as a compromise between mothers’ continuous full-time employment and full-time care. This proposal was rejected with reference to compromising women’s emancipation. Part of the story was, however, that on the structural level, labor demand in the GDR was still high.

In Czechoslovakia, different advisory bodies were established in the 1960s that were intended to deal with the consequences of growing female employment. In 1965, on behalf of the Communist Party, the Czechoslovak Union of Women was founded. The union had the right to comment on laws relating to the position of women and families in society and to submit their own proposals. This was done through the Government Population Commission, which was an advisory body to the Czechoslovak government established in 1959 (Uhde et al. 2009). Similarly to other countries of the former Eastern Bloc in the 1960s, the Czechoslovak government supported the idea that family and women’s issues should be addressed by scientists. But while in the GDR, the scientific committee The Woman in Socialist Society emphasized the time issue of working mothers and how to organize quality care in childcare institutions, the main goal of the Czechoslovak Government Population Commission was to combat the fertility decline.

In 1968, in line with the discourse on the need to alleviate the time burden of working mothers, the Czechoslovak Union of Women demanded the supply of part-time jobs. The Union also demanded working hours for mothers being reduced to six hours per day at full wage compensation. In line with the discourse on the detrimental effects of long-term (or long hours) institutional childcare, the Union also demanded opening hours of crèches to be reduced to six hours a day. All these demands were similar to the proposals by the East German scientific committee The Woman in Socialist Society and the Institute for Social Hygiene. None of these demands by the Union were implemented, however. The Union was successful in demanding another policy: the introduction of paid extended maternity leave.

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8 Table 2A3b on CD-ROM: The provided data are based on various sources, and thus cannot be compared with similar indicators directly.
9 The Government Population Commission was chaired by the federal vice prime minister. Its members included researchers, vice-ministers of several ministries and representatives of trade unions, the Czechoslovak Union of Women and some other organizations (United Nations 1979).
10 The party leaders in the GDR were concerned by falling birth rates, too. However, political measures to increase fertility were introduced only in the late 1970s when public acceptance of crèches was already high.
11 Part-time jobs were supposed to be available for mothers with dependent children since the adoption of the 1956 Czechoslovak Labor Code but companies mostly denied to offer part-time jobs with reference to operational difficulties (Srb/Kučera 1959).
However, this particular demand was also the most controversial within the Czechoslovak Union of Women. Some of its members called for a paid maternity leave of three years. Studies by psychologists and pediatricians on the detrimental effects of overcrowded crèches with long opening hours contributed to the formulation of this demand. As in the GDR, members of the Union also argued that such a long duration of maternity leave would hamper women’s emancipation. Following negotiations among the Union’s members, the Union demanded two years of paid extended maternity leave together with the reduction of mothers’ working hours and an improved as well as increased supply of crèches.12

Two main institutional and structural factors contributed to the success or failure of the Union’s policy proposals. On the institutional level, the Czechoslovak Union of Women was supposed to submit their policy proposals on work-care issues in coordination with the male-dominated Government Population Commission. The commission focused on how to stop the fertility decline. Since it seemed to be connected to the increase in women’s employment, the commission supported an extended maternity leave as a pro-natalist measure. Of course, it was expected that the number of employed women would decrease if this pro-natalist measure was applied. The economists argued though, that the decrease would not cause any economic problems because there was no longer any deficit in labor supply in the female-dominated areas of industry in Czechoslovakia. When two years of paid extended maternity leave were introduced in 1970-1971, the Czechoslovak National Assembly argued that even though the allowance would be expensive, there would be less demand to build costly crèches and fewer expenses for employed mothers on sick leave to care for their ill children. Thus, to stop the fertility decline, it was argued that priority should be given to women’s reproductive role during the first years after childbirth.13

Although the intention to extend the paid maternity leave up to three years was officially declared in the 1960s (Klima 1969), this plan was implemented only gradually during the 1970s and 1980s. Since mothers had the option of staying at home on an extended maternity leave, the number of crèches in Czechoslovakia increased much more slowly than in the GDR since the 1970s. Moreover, as less financial support was given to crèches and no such institute as the East German Institute for Social Hygiene existed in Czechoslovakia, the quality of crèches did not improve as quickly as in the GDR.

While in the GDR the official media discourse promoted the acceptance of public childcare, in Czechoslovakia no such trust emerged. Instead the public discourse depicted crèches primarily as facilities to support single mothers (due to economic reasons) and highly career-oriented women (Klima 1969).14 Consequently, the belief that women’s employment was harmful to young children became much more common in Czechoslovakia.

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12 An extended maternity leave had already been introduced in Czechoslovakia in 1964. However, this leave was available only until the child reached the age of one year and it did not include any financial benefits. Consequently, many mothers did not take advantage of it due to financial constraints.


14 While psychological and pediatric advisory literature of the 1960s described crèches as a positive supplement to family childcare, the 1970s witnessed a debate, which increasingly perceived crèches as support facilities, compensating the limited time budgets of career-oriented mothers and low-income families (see e.g. Mečíř 1962; Koch 1963; Schiller et al. 1971; Langmeier/Matějček 1974; Švejcar 1985).
vakia than in the GDR. While career interruptions became considerably shorter during the state socialist regime in the GDR (Trappe 1995: 135), mothers in Czechoslovakia stayed on leave increasingly longer, and interruptions in women’s careers were not just institutionalized but also socially accepted (Klenner/Hašková 2010). As a consequence, different norms emerged in the two countries. In contrast to the increasing normality of crèche care for children under three years in the GDR, which strengthened the norm of the mother working at all stages of her life, the ideal of full-time maternal childcare for children up to age three became internalized as a social norm in Czechoslovakia (Čákiová et al. 1977; Kreipl et al. 1979).

As a result of the policy path of extending the paid maternity leave in Czechoslovakia, the percentage of employed women in general was rather high (Pascall and Kwak 2005) and the share of preschool children in kindergartens reached relatively high levels, but the share of children under three in crèches stayed much lower than in the GDR. While 94% of three to five-year-old children were in kindergartens in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia and 86% in Slovakia, only 18% of children younger than three were in crèches in both the Czech and the Slovakian region in the mid-1980s (Historical Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia 1985).

To conclude, using our framework, we explained how the two distinct work-care policy paths and extensive dual-earner models developed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia despite previous overwhelming similarities in this area. In the 1960s, the main conflicts arose in both countries on account of women’s mass entry into the labor force. These conflicts were reflected in public discourse in Czechoslovakia and the GDR with limited possibilities of various actors to act publicly. While Czechoslovak policy focused on extending maternity leave in order to combat the fertility decline, the policy of the GDR concentrated on expanding and improving the public infrastructure of childcare facilities. The GDR invested in improving the quality of crèches, cut working hours for mothers slightly and allowed mothers to work part-time. In contrast, Czechoslovakia introduced extended maternity leave so that women could concentrate on home-based care until their children reached the age of three years. The different policies affected work-care practices which started to diverge significantly in the two countries at the beginning of the 1970s. Moreover, the many years of distinct work-care practices under the impact of specific work-care policies in the two countries translated into radically different work-care related values, norms and beliefs in the two societies.

The legacy of the policy paths chosen and continuity of work-care models

Despite the revolutionary changes that Czech, Slovak and East German societies underwent after 1989, the societies experienced overall continuity of the two distinct work-care models and work-care policies.

First of all, the unification of East and West Germany meant applying the familialist policies of West Germany that supported the male breadwinner model to East Germany in the 1990s. This gave East German mothers incentives to take longer career breaks. Splitting of the couple’s income for tax purposes, free health co-insurance for non-working wives and three years of parental leave with a two-year means-tested childcare allowance
Nonetheless, a deeply rooted continuous dual-earner model with a broad supply of public childcare continued to influence work-care practices in East Germany even after unification. The work-care policies applied earlier created institutions people were accustomed to and affected their beliefs, values and norms. Unlike policies at the federal level, state and community officials in the federal states in eastern Germany were aware of the established East German dual-earner model and did not dare to reduce support for public childcare facilities excessively. The continuous dual-earner model was deeply rooted in the East. Families also depended on the woman’s income and spouses depended economically on each other. Moreover, the percentage of households with a female main (or sole) breadwinner increased (Klenner 2009). In several East German states, the right to childcare was even codified so that the familialist tendencies could not thwart the network of existing childcare facilities. The high ratio of all-day kindergarten places in East Germany remained widely stable from the late 1980s on. Although the percentage of children in crèches has decreased because some mothers take advantage of the longer parental leave, two-fifths of children under three still receive formal childcare and every second mother of a child between two and three years of age is gainfully employed in eastern Germany (Bothfeld/Tobsch/Schmidt 2005: 12).

While East Germans experienced the introduction of familialist policies during the 1990s as part of the implementation of “foreign” West German policies in their society, Czechs and Slovaks experienced familialist policies during the 1990s as a continuation of the policy path previously chosen. Since childbirths had already begun to drop in the 1980s and since Czechoslovakia introduced three years of paid maternity leave to reduce the demand for costly crèches, Czechoslovakia had already begun to reduce the number of childcare facilities in the 1980s. This trend persisted in the Czech Republic and Slovakia over the 1990s. While the ministries of education in the two countries continued to provide subsidies to kindergartens after 1989 and the decline in the number of kindergartens corresponded with the decline in fertility, crèches as healthcare facilities were excluded from the list of facilities supported by the ministries of education after 1989. Consequently, crèches disappeared entirely in Slovakia. In the Czech Republic crèches provide care to less than 1% of children under three. Given the institutional path dependency that established the interruption of female work careers due to childcare as a norm, it is no surprise that there was no public protest against canceling subsidies to crèches. Czechs and Slovaks were convinced that it was better for children under the age of three to stay in their mother’s care. Moreover, the legacy of relating childcare institutions for young children to the domain of healthcare persists so that even today, private child-minders are required to have a medical certificate to be allowed to care for children under the age of three.

However, it is unlikely that path dependency completely determines future development. Within established institutions, actors have some room to maneuver. Thus, some differences emerged between the Czech Republic and Slovakia after the two countries

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15 West Germany introduced parental leave in 1986. It was extended to three years in 1992. There was a flat rate payment for up to two years until 2007.
16 A similar situation occurred in the other countries of the Visegrád Group (which consists of the Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland) that established the dual-earner model with women’s interrupted career (Szikra 2010).
separated. Since the new leaders in the Czech Republic feared growing unemployment, they decided to encourage mothers to stay at home by further extending the childcare allowance for full-time mothers of children even up to the age of four in the mid-1990s. In Slovakia, the previous policy remained unchanged, providing a paid leave for children up to age three. As a result of the extension of childcare allowance in the Czech Republic and in light of the decline in childcare facilities and growing unemployment, Czech mothers prolonged their absence from the labor market due to childcare during the 1990s. More than 25% of mothers stayed home for more than three years, while the majority stayed home for three years. Recently, only half of Czech mothers returned to their previous workplace. In a European comparison, the negative impact of motherhood on women’s employment was most pronounced in the Czech Republic followed by Slovakia and Hungary (European Commission 2008). Since the childcare allowance was extended to up to four years, while the reinstatement rights remained limited to three years, mothers partly misunderstood the discrepancy between the two time limits and lost their jobs after their child’s third birthday. Others who had to give up their job after the three year leave period because they were unable to obtain a place in a daycare facility, did not receive unemployment support as the status of “being in unemployment” remained effective until their eligibility for maternity leave ended with the child’s fourth birthday.

Based on the institutional legacy, one can witness how the work-care policy path previously chosen and the related dual earner model with interruptions in women’s careers negatively influenced mothers’ employment when centrally planned economies transformed into market economies. While mothers were used to interrupt their employment for rather long periods under the impact of an extended maternity leave, they did not have to fear unemployment under conditions of a centrally planned economy. In the market economy the interrupted dual-earner model weakened the labor market position of mothers in particular.

Yet another factor contributes to the negative impact of motherhood on women’s employment that has arisen from the state socialist legacy. Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia have a culture of long working hours and full-time employment. This is typical of countries of the former Eastern Bloc. The percentage of women working part-time in the Czech Republic is about 10% while the percentage of men working part-time is about 3% (Czech Statistical Office 2010). In Slovakia the overall percentage of those working part-time did not exceed 5% for women or 2% for men in the last decade (Gerbery 2010). In fact, mothers in the two countries can choose from only two options, which were the same two choices available during the state socialist regime: either to stay at home full-time or to return to work full-time. This results in the fact that in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia women who continue to work after childbirth often do not reduce their working hours, while women who do take a temporary leave tend to change their employer quite frequently. Interestingly, this pattern, which is quite common in the Visegrád countries (also including Hungary and Poland) deviates from most other European countries, where woman return to the same employer but tend to reduce their working hours after childbirth (Riedmann et al. 2006). Although the GDR established a dual-earner model, which was also extensive in terms of working hours, East German institutional arrangements enabled more mothers to work part-time even during the state socialist regime. East German mothers returned to work earlier than Czechoslovak mothers and they returned to
work part-time more often than Czechoslovak mothers during the state socialist regime. After 1989, the Czech Republic and Slovakia sustained their previous policy of long-term maternal leave and their institutional arrangements on the company level continued the legacy of full-time employment. In contrast, East German women gained more opportunities for part-time work since a federal law promotes part-time work, though some women work part-time involuntarily.\footnote{With 48\% of all East German mothers with a child aged 14 or younger working part-time (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008), it is up for debate whether East Germany has begun to move from a dual-earner model towards a one-and-a-half-earner model. Data, however, suggest that there is a tendency toward more differentiation among couples. It seems that earner models have diversified meanwhile (Klenner 2009).} Czech and Slovak mothers substantially increased the time spent at home taking care of their children full-time after 1989.

Moreover, the work-care policy path previously chosen and the related work-care model can even help us understand the following contradiction. While the former Eastern European countries departed from the male breadwinner model earlier than the rest of Europe, attitudes toward combining paid work and motherhood remained rather conservative in a significant number of these countries. The institutional legacy helps us explain why, in a European comparison, these countries, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, show the highest levels of agreement with both of the following types of statements: “Both women and men should contribute to household income” and “A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works”.\footnote{Source: ISSP surveys 1994 & 2002: http://www.issp.org/} In contrast, of all Europeans, East Germans have the most positive opinions of combining mothers’ gainful employment and care for preschool children (Klenner/Hašková 2010). These results correspond to East Germany’s institutional legacy, which led to a dual-earner model with continuous female employment trajectories and an extensive use of childcare facilities for children of all ages. On the other hand, the Visegrád countries’ institutional legacy, established a dual-earner model with interrupted work careers of women who take responsibility for full-time care at least for the first three years of their children’s lives.

Similar results could be observed when testing agreement with a statement reflecting the traditional division of gender roles: “A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the family”.\footnote{Source: ISSP surveys 1994 & 2002: http://www.issp.org/} The most traditional attitudes toward gender roles are found in those former state socialist countries where the dual earner model with interrupted women’s careers had developed as the dominant work-care practice as well as the norm. The exception that East Germans represent in the former Eastern Bloc with regard to their attitudes toward gender roles (they are the most modern in Europe) can be explained by their distinct institutional legacy. The East German dual-earner model with uninterrupted female employment trajectories has diminished the differences in women’s and men’s life courses. Consequently, it also weakened the belief in separate gender roles. In contrast, the dual-earner model with interrupted female careers has strengthened the discourse on the conflict between mothers’ work and small children’s interests.

To conclude, the example of crèches in the Czech Republic and Slovakia shows how institutions can influence values, norms and beliefs and hinder other institutions from being established based on the logic of appropriateness and institutional path. If crèches had
not been legally defined as healthcare institutions in the 1950s and if they had not been the only facilities providing day care for children under the age of three, the belief that non-family care for young children has to be provided by healthcare professionals would not have emerged. In the latter case, private alternatives to crèches would have been able to be established more easily in Czechoslovakia and, subsequently, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia after 1989.

In the case of East Germany, we showed how, based on the logic of appropriateness, once established, work-care policy hindered policy change on the state and community level when familialist policies were applied on the federal level. Once established, East German work-care policy affected East Germans’ work-care related values, norms and practices, and thus the leaders did not dare to reduce support to childcare facilities on the state level. On the state and company level, East Germany continued to follow the policy path previously chosen and resisted the “foreign” familialist tendency. In contrast, the Czech Republic and Slovakia also continued to follow the policy path previously chosen that had already included the familialist tendency. On the level of work-care models, East Germans continued the practice of mothers taking relatively short career breaks, relatively high usage of crèches and an increasing number of mothers working part-time under the new conditions after 1989. Czechs and Slovaks, on the other hand, continued the practice of mothers taking increasingly long career breaks and low usage of crèches, which became almost non-existent under the new conditions after 1989.

Last but not least, we even showed how an institutional approach can help answer the question of how it is possible that the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which were among the forerunners in abandoning the male breadwinner/female carer model in Europe, currently display one of the most traditional attitudes toward gender roles. The work-care policy, which firmly established the sequence of women’s life course in Czechoslovakia, revived the discourse on differences between women’s and men’s roles. In contrast, in the GDR, the policy and practice of the dual-earner model with continuous women’s careers weakened the belief in separate spheres.

Post-1989 opportunities for institutional change

In line with the traditional institutionalist approach, we focused on the continuity in work-care policies in the previous section of this article. However, we showed that exogenous shocks do not necessarily cause substantial institutional changes. Despite the 1989 revolution, dissolution of Czechoslovakia and unification of Germany, work-care policies on the state and company level continued to follow the policy paths previously established in Czech, Slovak and East German societies. In contrast to the classical institutionalist studies, in this section of this article, we will show that substantial institutional changes in the realm of work-care policies occurred in the three societies after 1989 in a time of relative stability, independent of the exogenous shocks experienced around 1989.

The extensive interrupted dual-earner model contributed to a steady rise in long-term unemployment and economic inactivity among mothers in the Czech Republic and Slovakia after 1989. During the EU accession process, the two countries were criticized
for their neglect of an active and effective employment policy. To fulfill the EU accession requirements but also because of internal factors like growing pressure from women’s organizations and the economic need to promote continuous employment of highly qualified mothers, the Czech and Slovak governments introduced active employment policy measures. Moreover, the 2002 Barcelona agreement, which requires all European countries to ensure access to care services for one-third of children under three and 90% of preschool children from the age of three, started to be discussed in these countries. After 1989, newly established feminist groups started to use the EU discourse strategically to lobby for their goal of protecting mothers from long-term unemployment. However, their demand that state financial support for crèches be reinstated was strongly denied by the Czech and Slovak governments and conservative women’s groups, which emerged after 1989.

While feminists were not successful in their claims for state funding of crèches, Czech feminists succeeded in implementing several modifications to the childcare allowance when Social Democratic governments were in power (1998-2006). Czech feminists established very close ties to these governments. Consequently, the childcare allowance for a full-time carer (usually the mother) was modified gradually so that a parent receiving the childcare allowance is permitted to have an unlimited income from gainful work activity and to use childcare facilities for a limited number of days or hours a month. These modifications were made to enable mothers to attend requalification courses, find a new job, maintain contacts with their previous employer, work from home or on short-term projects while childcare facilities take care of their children. Moreover, two other modifications to the childcare allowance were made during the subsequent right-wing government. In 2007, the real value of the allowance, which had decreased, was increased to 40% of the average wage in the public sector, making it easier for some parents to afford private childcare. In 2008, a three-tier system of parental leave was established based on the idea that the shorter the leave (two, three or four years), the higher the pay per month. However, even if mothers want to return to work earlier, they have few possibilities of doing so since virtually no places in crèches are available. Since private child-minders of children under three are too expensive for most, this measure seems aimed at the more affluent. Despite these shortcomings, the modifications to the childcare allowance show how small gradual corrections of an established institution may result in a complete redefinition of the institution. In other words, small changes that seemed to be just small corrections within the chosen policy path brought about a completely different philosophy of the childcare allowance. While the allowance was introduced in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s as a financial contribution to full-time mothers to enable women to segment their life into reproductive and paid work periods, today the allowance functions as a financial contribution to care for small children provided on a private basis without regard to parents’ current economic (in)activity.

Similarly to the Czech gradual redefinition of the childcare allowance, the Slovak government introduced a completely new childcare allowance in 2008. Only parents who work or attend a secondary school or university and provide childcare with the help of other persons, private entities or child-care facilities can apply for the new allowance. This means that in Slovakia parents can currently choose between being on paid parental leave full-time until the child reaches the age of three or working in the labor market and
receiving the new allowance, which covers part of the non-family paid childcare. According to Gerbery (2010), similarly to the Czech Republic, the problem of long-term unemployment of mothers played a major role in introducing the new childcare allowance. The introduction of the new childcare allowance in Slovakia and the modification of the allowance that had been previously established in the Czech Republic show that both governments decline to invest in public childcare for young children and both governments rely on the increasing supply of private child-minders. In contrast to public childcare, the idea of private child-minders is in accordance with the ingrained belief that children under three should be cared for at home.

Yet even Germany changed its federal childcare policy in 2007 to keep mothers in the labor market because of the fear that the workforce will decline due to demographic changes. The previous three-year parental leave accompanied by the means-tested flat-rate allowance was replaced with a Swedish-type income-related 12+2 month parental leave, which includes two additional months if “the other parent” (usually the father) stays at home for at least two months. Moreover, the federal government promised to increase support for daycare to fulfill the 2002 Barcelona agreement. The shift in the EU bodies that began to push forward women’s employment because of the declining workforce due to demographic changes contributed to these radical changes in childcare policy in Germany, which had already been the goal of both western and eastern German feminists as well as of several influential female politicians for many years. Both changes were accompanied by massive attacks from conservative politicians, however. This shift in policy moved Germany closer to the East German dual-earner model and further from the West German specialization model. The West German specialization model proved to lead to low employment rates among mothers and a high percentage of childlessness. The Swedish-type parental leave in Germany resembles the East German income-related Babyjahr. However, it includes incentives for fathers to participate in childcare, an aspect that was missing in the East German state socialist work-family policy. Addressing fathers and promoting the shared responsibility of both parents for childcare was a long-standing objective of the women’s movement.

All three national cases need more space to discuss arguments on the interplay between established work-care institutions, norms and values, and practices, which, together with changing structural conditions (e.g., population aging) and influential actors, brought about the described institutional changes, which seem to privilege the more affluent families. The economic need for highly qualified women combined with the fear of economic sustainability being undermined in an aging Europe may strengthen class differences in work-care practices in all three societies. Although an explanation of how and why the changes mentioned above happened is beyond the scope of this article, all three cases show that post-1989 important institutional work-care changes did not occur as a result of exogenous shocks. On the contrary, they happened during a time of relative stability and were brought about by influential actors that seized selected problems and discourses.
Conclusion

In the popular paradigm, the state socialist period is often depicted as homogenous in de-valuing full-time mothers and celebrating working mothers. Despite the fact that Czechoslovakia and East Germany shared many similarities and had the same work-care policies in the first phase of the state socialist regime, our analysis showed that – once contradictions of the modernized gender model emerged and started to be discussed in the 1960s – the Czechoslovak and East German governments employed different policies to deal with these contradictions. Consequently, fundamental differences in work-care practices arose and different work-care policy paths were established in Czechoslovakia and East Germany in the 1970s. These then affected their populations’ work-care related values, norms and beliefs, such as notions of good childcare and even attitudes toward gender roles.

The establishment of the same work-care policies in the late 1940s and early 1950s in Czechoslovakia and the GDR could be explained by the establishment of the state socialist regime, which in the first period implied transformations of all institutions according to the Soviet model. However, to explain why, when and how the two distinct work-care policy paths and work-care models developed in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, we had to develop a framework inspired by current discussions within institutionalist studies. While traditional institutionalist studies have tended to focus on explaining institutional continuity rather than change, and while change has usually been explained as a result of an exogenous shock, recent studies have increasingly sought to endogenize causes of institutional changes (Thelen 2004; Streeck/Thelen 2005). This has often meant a turn to actors and discourses (Pfau-Effinger 2005; Schmidt 2010). In our framework, we also stressed the role of influential actors and discourses. However, we added the effect of structural conditions and emphasized the interplay between a) work-care institutions (as constructs and outcomes of work-care policies and as structures that affect future policies), b) work-care related norms and values expressed in ideologies, beliefs and dominant discourses, and c) work-care practices. In our framework, these three elements directly or indirectly influence each other and constitute a prevalent work-care model. Structural conditions and influential actors further affect the model. The actors may strengthen specific discourses based on their ideas and bring about institutional change.

More specifically, in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, we identified the important difference in structural conditions regarding the necessity for increasing the workforce and influential actors who were able to promote different discourses in the 1960s. This difference in the structural conditions and influential actors (e.g. Schmidt-Kolmer and Institute for Social Hygiene in the GDR and Government Population Commission in Czechoslovakia) contributed to the establishment of different policies to solve the problems resulting from the modernized gender model. Czechoslovak policy focused on extending maternity leave, leading to sequencing women’s life course. In contrast, the policy in the GDR focused on extending and improving public childcare as well as on slightly reducing the working hours of employed mothers. Moreover, in contrast to Czechoslovakia, the GDR enabled more mothers to work part-time. This led to women’s continuous participation in employment in the GDR. The many years of the two distinct work-care practices within the context of distinct work-care policies then translated into radically distinct work-care related values and norms among the populations of the two countries. The well-accepted
public childcare in the GDR and the three years of home-based paid childcare provided by mothers in Czechoslovakia became the social norms in the respective countries. Thus, the extensive dual-earner model with continuous women’s careers was established in the GDR in the 1970s, while the extensive dual-earner model with interruptions in mothers’ careers emerged in Czechoslovakia.

By applying the institutionalist approach, we explained the overall continuity of the two distinct work-care models despite the revolutionary changes that the countries experienced during the post-1989 transformation. Although the establishment of the Czech and Slovak Republics contributed to open up room for creating differences in work-care policies and practices, the policies continued to follow the policy path previously chosen and the work-care practices remained quite similar in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and the closest to each other in a European comparison. Similarly, in the case of East Germany, we showed how, based on the logic of appropriateness (expressed in the belief that not only mothers and the society but also children benefit from crèches), work-care policy hindered a policy change on the state and community level toward familialist policy after 1989 and rather followed the policy path previously chosen and the deeply rooted work-care model.

Institutionalist studies tend to explain how, based on the logic of appropriateness and institutional path, institutions create constraints for changing these institutions or establishing new policies. However, we also showed that establishing crèches as healthcare facilities and the norm and practice of home-based childcare for children under the age of three contributed to the abolishment of crèches in the Czech and Slovak Republics after 1990. The case of Czech and Slovak crèches shows that institutional path dependency can even explain why an established institution, like crèches, disappears.

Last but not least, in contrast to traditional institutionalist studies, which have explained institutional change as coming primarily from the outside as a result of exogenous shocks, we point out that current institutional changes in the sphere of work-care policies in the three countries did not happen as a consequence of the 1989 revolutionary period. The introduction of a new childcare allowance in Slovakia, the radical transformation of the old childcare allowance in the Czech Republic and the replacement of the old childcare allowance with Swedish-type parental leave on the federal level in Germany happened during a period of relative stability. More research is needed to explain why and how these recent institutional changes occurred.

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Back to the kitchen? Gender role attitudes in 13 East European countries

Abstract:
This paper explores the determinants of gender role opinions in 13 post-communist Eastern European societies using survey data from the project EUREQUAL. Our main findings consist of two parts. First, contrary to the expectations of scholars who emphasize the lack of gender/feminist consciousness in Eastern Europe, we argue that gender indeed is an important determinant of gender role opinions in post-communist societies: as elsewhere women express more liberal attitudes than men. Second, we argue that the interaction of other determinants of gender role opinions with gender also follows patterns described in the literature for more developed capitalist countries. In this respect, therefore, East European countries seem to fit the general trends of gender role opinion formation. As explanation we point to a connection between women’s material conditions and their gender role attitudes, not denying the importance of cultural difference – if primarily as exception – to this process.

Key words: gender, gender role attitudes, Central and Eastern Europe, post-communism, gender inequality

Zurück in die Küche? Einstellungen zu Geschlechterrollen in 13 osteuropäischen Ländern

Zusammenfassung:

Schlagwörter: Gender, Einstellungen zu Geschlechterrollen, Zentral- und Osteuropa, Postkommunismus, Geschlechterungleichheit
Researchers have demonstrated emerging differences in gender role attitudes between Eastern and Western European countries: a growing liberalization in Western Europe and what may be construed as a conservative anti-feminist turn in attitudes in much of the post-communist region (Einhorn 1993; Panayotova and Brayfield 1997; Takács 2008). Indeed, in an opinion survey conducted by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) in 2002, the percentage of people who agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “A man’s job is to earn money, a woman’s job is to look after the home and the family” ranged from about 8-30% in Western European countries, and from 30-58% in post-communist East European societies.

How people feel about the appropriate position of women and men in society is consequential for their behavior in all walks of life. Gender ideologies have been shown to be important in understanding emerging new and persisting old types of inequalities in Eastern Europe (Gal/Kligman 2000). New political regimes have used references to gender roles to indicate a break with the communist past and to legitimate their own rule (ibid). In different contexts “gender cultures” have been shown to correlate with a variety of institutional arrangements (Pfau-Effinger 1988), particularly welfare regime types (Haas 2005; Adler/Brayfield 2006), as well as with women’s “individual” and “rational” choice to work for wages or not (Duncan/Edwards 1997). In post-state socialist Eastern Europe in particular, the conservative turn in gender role attitudes has been blamed for the declining number of women in the labor force, the unequal division of labor in the household, and the low level of political representation of women in parliament. Researchers have particularly noted a strong opposition to the concept of feminism and a lack of political action and organization for women qua women (Einhorn 1993; Funk/Mueller 1993).

In this paper we explore the determinants of these conservative gender role attitudes in 13 Eastern European countries from the perspective of gender difference: Is there a gender gap in gender role attitudes in post-communist societies? Or do men and women agree on what women’s role should be in the workplace and in the family? If women’s ideas about their role in society coincide with those of men then gender is not a salient basis for political mobilization for gender equality. Researchers have claimed this to be the case in post-communist Eastern Europe (Einhorn 1993). If, however, men and women differ significantly in how they imagine women’s and men’s relationship to paid and unpaid work then perhaps a lack of feminist action in many East European countries may be less due to women’s own desires and motivations, and more due to their perceived opportuni-

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1 Here we use the term “Eastern Europe” with a capital E to designate not a geographical area, but the thirteen, formerly state socialist countries included in our project: Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine. “Western Europe”, similarly refers not necessarily to a geographical area but to developed, historically capitalist countries in Europe and North America. This latter designation which ignores geography is not unique to this paper: One of the five regional commissions of the UN, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) also includes the United States and Canada as its member states.

2 Figures based on authors’ calculations using data from various waves of the ISSP’s relevant modules and the website: http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp. Note that East Germany is an exception to this with one of the lowest agreement rate (15%) with the statement above, while West Germany is at the higher end of the scale for a Western European society (at 23%).
ties or individual interests. We therefore explore gender differences in gender role opinions in order to highlight potential fields of political action towards gender equality in a region that has – arguably – been plagued by a lack of feminist consciousness and mobilization since the end of World War II.

While in this paper our primary focus is the effect of a person’s gender on his/her ideas about women’s and men’s place in society (what we will call “gender role opinions/attitudes”) in post-communist Eastern Europe, we also explore a number of other individual level factors (and their intersections with gender) that might shape – in indirect ways – people’s gender role opinions. Additionally, we briefly examine cross-country variations in the level of gender role opinions in the gender opinion gap because we suspect that these may be significant within the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region. We also contemplate the usefulness of macro-level factors explaining the above variations. For reasons we will explain later this is not the main focus of our analysis, but previous research has shown these macro-level factors to be of significance and possibly interacting with individual level gender difference (Baxter/Kane 1995; Brooks/Bolzendahl 2004).

We begin this paper with a brief overview of changes in gender role attitudes in Eastern Europe and continue by discussing what is known about its determinants from research on Western Europe. We develop our hypotheses from here. We also note the findings of the very small number of studies that used data from post-state socialist societies. Next, we move on to discuss our data and analytical strategy and continue with the analysis. We finish the paper by discussing the broader implications of our findings.

**Gender roles and gender role attitudes: The legacy of state socialism**

While in Western European countries the turn of the century witnessed a growing percentage of women entering the labor market and the promotion of social policy – if somewhat hesitantly – preparing to support this change (Esping-Andersen 2009), the opposite trend is widely noted in Eastern Europe after 1989. Women’s labor force participation rates declined by approximately 20 to 25% in each of the thirteen countries observed, while party programs and policy makers distanced themselves from the state socialist emancipation project, which had emphasized the importance of paid work for all (Einhorn 1993).

Before 1989, most women of working age were in gainful employment in Eastern Europe work was an expectation of, occasionally a requirement for, state socialist citizens. Men’s wages were not sufficient to support a family, and social benefits were often tied to labor force participation (Fodor 2003; Zimmermann 2010). Actual rates of employment varied. Occasionally this was simply a consequence of the particular definition of who counts as being part of the labor force or the “working age population”, or due to the exact nature of parental leave policies and retirement age thresholds. Nevertheless, in general, women coming of age after 1949 were expected to spend most of their adult lives in paid full-time labor, with occasional breaks for having – an increasingly smaller number of – children. In most fields jobs were plentiful and the concept of open unemployment was non-existent. Comprehensive maternity leave policies allowed for breaks for childbirth, and guaranteed jobs upon return. Researchers argue that communist policy makers promoted the worker-mother ideal for women, where women’s worker status was
guaranteed and protected but expected to be at an inferior level compared to those of men (Fodor 2003; Ghodsee 2005; Weiner 2007). Women increasingly found work as low-level professionals in largely underpaid and undervalued jobs. The wages these jobs provided were a significant contribution to the family budget and the work hours were flexible enough – formally or informally – to allow taking time off for care work (Fodor 2003).

When the market replaced the state as the key agent allocating work, many of these positions disappeared and some were taken over by men. For example, the percentage of men employed in higher level positions in the financial sector grew as wage levels in this field started to increase. Overall, women’s labor force participation rates declined and their general labor market position became more vulnerable, while balancing domestic and paid-work obligations has become harder to manage (UNIFEM 2006).

These trends were accompanied by a distinct change in mainstream gender ideology in the early 1990s as represented by policy makers and party leaders in power (Rueschemeyer 1998). The emphasis communist elites had placed on paid work as an important arena for women’s contributions to society was replaced by arguments about the need for women’s presence in the home and women’s natural difference. The growing presence of the Catholic Church and right-wing conservative parties in political life also pushed public opinion in this direction in several countries. Newly minted post-communist politicians tended to distance themselves from the old regime by emphasizing their rejection of the women’s emancipation agenda (Gal/Kligman 2000). Indeed, state policies followed these trends and researchers describe processes of welfare state re-traditionalization (Glass/ Fodor 2007) in a number of post-state socialist countries, which stands in sharp contrast to de-familialization trends observed elsewhere in Europe. The voices that called women to paid work seemed distant and lacking true political force – coming primarily from the European Union and other international agencies.

The change in “gender culture” has been tracked through examinations of gender role representations in magazines or political party programs in a variety of countries (Rueschemeyer 1998; True 2003). Here, however, we are concerned with how everyday women and men describe how they think about gender roles, whether these positions are different and how gender interacts with other factors in producing these views. In the next section, we describe patterns observed in historically capitalist countries as well as some recent studies from post-communist societies. On this basis, we develop the main research question as well as other hypotheses which will be tested.

**Theoretical considerations and the key hypothesis**

Researchers have identified a broad shift towards more liberal views on gender roles in numerous countries in the world (Inglehart/NoRris 2000). “Liberal views” in this context mean that people are less likely to believe in the need for a sharp gender division in domestic and paid labor and are willing to grant a wider range of social choices for women. Proponents of “conservative views” would argue for strictly limited choices for both genders: women’s primary role is naturally in the home, whereas men should act as breadwinners and providers for their families. Previous findings from around the world show a growing gender gap in gender role attitudes: women have become significantly more lib-
eral than men and are increasingly more likely than their male counterparts to favor broadening opportunities outside the home as well as reducing gender inequality (Davis/Robinson 1991; Davis/Joshi 1994; Panayotova/Brayfield 1997).

This gender gap in opinions is largely due to women's growing understanding of their own self-interest in changing traditional gender norms tied to their changing life situations. Baxter and Kane (1995) argue that while men in general have an interest in maintaining gender inequality and traditional gender roles, women who are less dependent on men are more likely to hold liberal views (see also Banaszak/Putzer 1993). Specifically, women who have higher educational attainment and better employment opportunities, as well as those who live in countries where state support is available for the maintenance of households independent of men, have an interest in liberalizing gender roles as these help their chances of social advancement in their own right. As women are becoming less and less dependent on men financially, and more educated in general, we expect to see more support for liberal gender roles among them. While some men may also enjoy the advantages of the resources working wives bring to the family (Bolzendahl/Myers 2004), it is women who are expected to benefit more directly and thus to be more likely to express liberal gender roles.

Similar predictions about a gender gap in opinions follow from the hypothesis that rather than self-interest, exposure to specific life situations – such as discriminatory behavior or networking among other women – has contributed to the liberalization of attitudes among women (ibid). Women, when participating in education and the labor market, may become aware of these problems, and are exposed to a wider range of attractive opportunities available. Hence, the trend towards the liberalization of gender roles is expected to be spearheaded by women's changing attitudes.

The above arguments are based on research conducted in Western European countries. Our central research question is whether or not a similar gender difference (or gender gap) exists in opinion formation around gender roles in post-state socialist societies. This question has a number of theoretical implications of which we will discuss two related ones below: the salience of gender as a factor in gender role attitudes and the question of whether a convergence is observable in European (as well as in other developed) societies in their cultural predispositions in this regard (Inglehart/Norris 2003).

Researchers have noted a trend towards gender role conservatism rather than liberalization in at least some of the post-state socialist countries (Blaskó 2005). This phenomenon is in line with the hypothesis which expects the gender gap to be larger in countries which allow a higher degree of independence for women. As a large number of women lost their jobs and withdrew from the labor market in CEE after 1990 their dependence on their families grew. With this their interest in the domestic "patriarchal bargain" may have increased and their attachment to liberal gender roles decreased. Many women may have understood that the family, rather than the state or the labor market offers the best protection against destitution. In this sense, a growing conservatism in general, and a convergence in the opinion of men and women in particular may be understandable in Eastern Europe, even though the opposite has been found elsewhere.

Central and Eastern European women have repeatedly been blamed for not developing an interest and a political consciousness distinct from that of men. Feminist political observers started to ponder the lack of a "feminist consciousness" immediately after the collapse of the communist regimes (Funk/Mueller 1993). Indeed international activists
and researchers were dissatisfied with the fact that women in Eastern Europe seem to have taken the growing waves of open discrimination lying down: only a small number of civic organizations were formed with the goal of fighting for women’s increased social participation and even fewer of these called themselves feminists (Einhorn 1993). Women seemed to be reluctant to recognize shared interests (especially beyond those involving reproductive rights), and have been slow to mobilize around issues related to the workplace or political power (Matland/Montgomery 2003). Women’s representation in public office is strikingly low in some of the countries in the region (ibid). Certainly, when asked in interviews, Hungarian female politicians in the early 1990s vehemently denied the significance of being women and the usefulness of gender as a political category (Eva Fodor’s interviews in Hungary in the early 1990s).

Indeed, existing research does not explicitly show “convergence” between East and West European countries in terms of gender role opinions and in the gender gap in gender role opinions. Adler and Brayfield (2006), for example, have found that US attitudes have not converged to those held by Germans over the past years and – more importantly for our purposes here – while some convergence was observable, East German’s and West German’s gender role opinions were still quite far apart from each other.

Importantly, similarity in cultural positions (“convergence”) may come about in different ways. When political observers or financial institutions use this term, the general idea is for East Europeans to “catch up” with the West in terms of institutional and economic development. Yet, the little longitudinally comparative data which exist raise the possibility of a different kind of convergence in gender role attitudes. The International Social Survey Program conducted a wave of surveys on gender role attitudes in 1988 before the collapse of the communist regimes, albeit only with a single East European country, Hungary, participating. A similar survey was repeated in 1994 and 2002. It is instructive to compare how Hungarians responded to questions on women’s role in society compared to Western Europeans (Tóth 1997; Blaskó 2005). While Hungary is in no way representative of all state socialist countries, this is the only reliable historically comparative dataset available, which may be used to explore the phenomenon of “convergence” in gender role attitudes.

In 1988, Hungarians were significantly more likely than people in participating Western European countries (Austria, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Ireland and Italy) to agree that “A woman and her family will all be happier if she goes out to work”. This is not surprising: Hungarian women’s labor force participation rates were significantly higher than that of the women in the other participating countries. In addition, Hungarians were somewhat less likely than westerners to believe that preschool children will suffer if their mothers are working and more likely to feel that both husband and wife should contribute to the family income. Hungarians were also less likely than westerners (at least compared to those from Germany, Austria, Great Britain and the Netherlands) to say that women with preschool children should stay at home and not work for wages. Again, these were reflections of the realities Hungarian women and men faced before 1989: most mothers of preschool children worked full time, children after age 3 spent a full day in state-subsidized kindergartens and families could by no means get by on a single income of men alone.

Fourteen years later, in 2002 the difference between Hungarians and Western Europeans looked quite different: Westerners expressed more liberal views than Hungarians.
This, however, is not only or not primarily because Hungarians have changed their views, but because westerners did. There is thus convergence but primarily due to changes in attitudes in Western European countries. In 1988, 52% of Hungarians believed that moms with preschool kids should stay home. In 2002, 46% did, a less than 10% decline. Yet in 1988, 72% of Austrians, 76% of Germans, 70% of Britons and 56% of Dutch held this opinion, while in 2002 only 49%, 45%, 52% and 29%, respectively, did. No doubt, Hungarians have changed, but westerners changed a great deal more. Similarly, while 85% of Hungarians believed in 1988 that both husband and wife should contribute to the household income, 80% did in 2002. But in Austria, for example, while 66% of the sample agreed in 1988, a whopping 82% did in 2002. The change is smaller but still quite sizable in the other Western European countries, too.

As a result, in the 2002 ISSP survey there is little systematic difference between East and West in opinions held on whether or not mothers of preschoolers should stay at home or if both husband and wife should contribute to the household income. In some areas people from Hungary and other East European countries from which data are available in more recent waves of the ISSP\(^3\) are indeed more conservative: they are, for example, more likely than westerners to believe that “a man’s job is work, a woman’s is the household” and even that “what women really want is a home and children.” But it is the opinion of Western Europeans that changed significantly towards a more liberal bend between 1988 and 2002, Hungarians did not or only barely express “more conservative” gender views than prior to 1989. This means that the effects of the collapse of state socialism – rather than contributing to a change in gender role opinions – in fact did the opposite: it froze gender role attitudes at the point of collapse. At the same time, major changes reshaped how people think about men’s and women’s role in society in developed capitalist countries, moving gender ideologies closer, rather than farther from each other. Indeed, this suggests convergence – albeit through somewhat different processes than usually described – between different regions of Europe in terms of overall gender role attitudes. At the same time, this also allows for the possibility that the gender gap in opinions did not converge and women are more or just as conservative as men in Eastern Europe – no matter how men’s and women’s opinions may have changed in the West – the question of our primary interest in this paper.

At the same time there are some good reasons to expect that changes in gender role expectations have taken place at least in some of the countries since the early 1990s in Eastern Europe also. Even though the rhetoric of women’s emancipation kept gender conflict and the expression of feminist ideas at bay under communism, women may nevertheless have grown to identify economic interests different from that of men. After 1990 while women’s dependence on families grew, the precariousness of this dependence also became clear. Marriage rates are lower than ever in all of the countries in the region, single motherhood and out-of-wedlock births are on the rise. Men’s life expectancy has not kept up with the growth in women’s and has in fact declined in some of the countries. In such a context women may recognize a growing interest in the spread of more liberal gender roles, which normalize and encourage their full participation in the labor market.

\(^3\) Findings from other surveys, such as the European Social Survey are largely similar, although show a higher degree of conservatism in some areas in post-state socialist countries.
and public life. The emergence of feminist groups as well as the increasing number of women in political positions (for example in Poland, where over 20% of members of parliament are women) may be a sign of these changes.

Our central question addresses the empirical and theoretical dilemma described above: Is there a gender gap in how men and women think about women’s and men’s role in society in Central and Eastern Europe? Additionally, do the same factors shape gender role opinions in post-communist societies as the ones which have been found relevant in post-industrial Western Europe?

**Additional hypotheses**

What factors in addition to gender explain variations in how people think about gender roles? Our hypotheses, based on existing literature, are described below.

Education and labor force participation are expected to have a positive impact on gender role liberalization in East European societies (Bolzendahl/Myers 2004). Both of these are expected to put men and women in touch with a diverse set of opinions as well as empower them to aspire for independence which, in turn, is better represented by liberal gender role opinions. Women may be affected more by these factors than men (Davis/Robinson 1991; Davis/Joshi 1994; Panayotova/Brayfield 1997).

Younger people (or more recent cohorts) are likely to hold more liberal views. Some researchers argue that this is due to a difference in their value socialization, others argue for differences in the social context in which they grew up (Brooks/ Bolzendahl 2004). Either way, age is expected to be a significant factor for both genders. Religious people are likely to hold more restricted opinions on women’s role in society, especially if they belong to the Catholic Church, whose position on women may influence people towards conservatism more than other religions (Voicu/Voicu/Strapcova 2008). Women are often more influenced by religion than men, thus we expect this factor to push women into a conservative direction more than men.

Family status will also be correlated with gender role attitudes. Single people, independent of age, are more liberal than married ones, especially married people with children (Bolzendahl/Myers 2004). The marriage conservatism effect is expected to be more pronounced for women than men (Baxter/Kane 1995). This may be so because women’s higher degree of dependence on men might be a cause, rather than the effect of marital status. The expectation about the effect of children is more mixed. Women may turn towards more conservative attitudes once they have children as their dependence on men increases. Moreover, the presence of children has been found to create a context in which women expect more participation from their spouses, thus opening the possibility of conflict and a move away from more traditional gender roles (Bolzendahl/Myers 2004). Finally, the location of residence has been found important: those living in rural environments are likely to support more conservative gender roles than those living in urban areas (Frieze/Ferligoj et al. 2003). This is expected to be similar for both men and women (Bolzendahl/Myers 2004).
Data and methods

Data, variables

The data for this paper came from the project EUREQUAL, a thirteen-country international comparative dataset, funded by the European Commission’s FP6 framework program. Using the same questionnaire, local research agencies collected representative data in 2007 from Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine with N’s around 1000 in most countries, except for Russia (n=2000) and Ukraine, Poland and Romania (where the sample size is around 1500), total n=15,648. The questionnaire primarily contained questions about people’s views on politics and social inequality as well as on their own position in the social hierarchy.

The dependent variable for this project is called “liberal gender role opinions.” This variable is a scale constructed by calculating the simple mean of answers to four questions, often employed in surveys to measure gender role opinions. Respondents had to decide whether or not they agree or disagree with the following statements using a scale of 1 to 5: “Both men and women should contribute to the family budget”; “A man’s job is to earn money and a women’s job is to look after the household and the family”; “Men should do more housework than they do now”; “Men should do more childcare than they do now”. The scale’s values range from 1 to 5 with a mean of 3.58 and a standard deviation of .59. (Cronbach’s alpha is .61.)

Among the independent variables, education was coded as a set of three dummy variables; low level education, secondary education and tertiary level education completed. We first used local coding for the education variable, which then was translated into the international coding scheme ISCED-97. About 20% of the international sample had higher education, about 50% medium level and 30% lower level or less (see Table 2). Note that there is almost no difference between men and women in the level of education attained. Age was coded in years and ranged from 15 to 94 years, with a mean over 47 years. We constructed dummy variables to distinguish urban and rural residence using the characteristics of each country. Over 68% of our respondents live in urban areas.

Religiosity, or, rather, church going was also coded as a dummy: if a respondent claimed to attend church at least once a month s/he was considered religious, otherwise not. Women proved to be much more active church-goers than men: over 35% of women but fewer than 25% of men claimed to be going to church regularly.

Marital status was coded as 1 if the respondent was married or living in a consensual union with a partner, and 0 if single, separated or divorced. Men are more likely to be married in our sample, reflecting differences in mortality rates and life expectancy. We are interested in the effect of the presence of children in the household, so a variable meas-
quares the number of children under 16 who live together with the respondent. A further dummy variable was constructed to measure the respondents’ labor market status: we differentiated those who claimed to be working for wages from those who did not. A larger percentage of men (61%) than women (49%) are employed in our samples. In addition, we attempted to measure the respondents’ level of perceived economic vulnerability by using a subjective indicator. If a respondent claimed that his/her family did not always have enough money to eat or to buy clothes when needed, we coded the family as “poor”\(^6\). We used dummy variables for each country and constructed interaction effects for the countries and gender to be used in some of the models described below.

Data analysis and discussion

Does gender matter?

Table 1 provides a preliminary answer to our main research question and it allows us to address the question of cross-national comparisons as well. The average score of liberal gender role opinions varies between 3.51 and 3.75. Countries where people in general hold more conservative views are Moldova, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia and Bulgaria, while countries with more liberal opinions include the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine. The gender gap varies even less: women are about 4 to 10% more likely than men to support liberal gender roles in each of the countries, with Moldova showing the smallest and Slovakia, Russia, and Poland the largest gap. If we exclude Moldova, where people seem to hold conservative views and there does not seem to be much difference between men and women in this regard, we find very little cross-country variation in the gender opinion gap. Indeed, our initial goal was to model – in hierarchical linear models, simultaneously with individual factors – macro-level determinants of cross-country variations in the gender difference (gender gap) in gender role opinions but we found very little variation to model. The interclass correlation (ICC) turned out to be a meager 3% in the Null model during our hierarchical linear modeling attempts. Thus, we decided to focus on individual-level determinants only.

It is still instructive to take a brief look at cross-country variations in the mean level of gender role liberalism if only to gain ideas for future studies with larger datasets and better specified dependent variables\(^7\). A number of hypotheses have been put forward to

\(^6\) We opted to use this measure of socio-economic status instead of the more usual class–based classification because we did not have reliable and comparable income data in this dataset. Other class classifications are based on a person’s job and since we only had information about the respondents’ current job titles we would have excluded too many people from the analysis. This is also the reason why we do not include the respondents’ occupation in the models. In any case, we believe that, especially in the countries we study, the combination of employment status with educational attainment is a good approximation of one’s socio-economic status.

\(^7\) There are only a handful of studies examining cross-country differences in gender role attitudes which include East European countries as well, but at least one study, comparing Hungary and the United States found significant differences in the direction predicted by the economic development hypothesis (Panayotova/Brayfield 1997). Another study comparing Croatia, Slovenia and the US has more mixed findings but at least Croatia, the least developed of these countries, was found to be
explain similar cross-country variations in other contexts. Inglehart and Norris (2003), for example, have shown levels of economic development to correlate with how people think about gender roles. They argue, based on an examination of data from the World Values Survey, that more developed post-industrial societies exhibit a tendency towards more liberal gender roles, although not necessarily a larger gap between men and women. This hypothesis is supported by our data as well, especially if we remove Hungary, a major outlier, from the dataset. The countries with higher levels of economic development do exhibit more liberal gender role opinions. In the countries we examined there is no systematic variation between level of economic development and women’s educational attainment, i.e. it is not true that women are more likely to be engaged in paid work in more economically advanced societies. Thus, the association between economic development and liberal gender role opinions is possibly explained by other factors. These could include easier access to liberal/feminist ideas in countries with a higher level of development or the perception of a wider range of opportunities there. To the extent that the generosity of welfare spending is associated with economic development, it is also possible that better state subsidies in richer countries may allow more women to establish independent households who would, in turn, be more likely to support the increase of public sphere opportunities for women.

In addition to the level of economic development we also found the level of religiosity (with the exception of Poland) and the level of welfare spending to correlate with liberal gender role opinions: in less religious countries and in countries with higher welfare spending people tend to hold more liberal gender role opinions. These results, however, are only based on a first glance at the cross-country variations in this dataset, which is too small for rigorous multi-level analysis. They are simply presented here to familiarize the reader with the dataset, and to offer ideas for further analysis.

Regression models: the impact of gender in a multivariate context

Shifting the focus of our analysis to the examination of whether there is a gender difference – net of other factors – in gender role opinions in the 13 countries of our study, Table 3 presents three linear regression models with liberal gender role opinions as the dependent variable. A high value on this scale, which ranges from 1 to 5 with an overall mean of 3.58 (S.d. .59), means more liberal gender role attitudes.

Model 1 describes the effect of gender without regard to any other factor except dummy variables for the countries. Moldova, which has the lowest mean score and the lowest gender gap in liberal gender role attitudes, is the omitted category. This model explains 7% of the variation in the dependent variable, women on average score .26 higher than men on the attitude scale. This confirms our findings in Table 1 that in post-state socialist Eastern Europe there is in fact a gender gap in gender role opinions with women holding more liberal views than men.

8 This is based on the examination of simple scatterplots of the means of liberal gender role opinions with GDP per capita in each country.
Model 2 includes all the control factors and the dummy variables for each country (except the excluded one, Moldova). This model explains somewhat more, about 9.5% of the variation. The issue of interest here is that gender is still positive and significant: women, net of other factors, still score .26 higher than men on the liberal gender role opinion scale. We should point out that we ran the same model separately for each of the countries and the variable gender turned out to be significant everywhere. This is to reject the possibility that large gender gaps in some countries „wash out“ a lack of gender difference elsewhere.

In addition to gender, several other variables are also significant and work in the directions expected. People with higher education tend to hold more liberal views, as do people who live in cities, are younger, and are employed. Conversely, those who have more children in the household tend towards more conservative gender role attitudes. These variables are significant net of other factors, including the country averages. Feeling poor and being married (net of children) or attending church regularly does not make a difference.

Even with all the variables included, the explanatory power of these regression models is quite small. Previous research has usually managed to achieve an R square of around 20%, i.e. they explain about twice the variation that the models in this article do (e.g. Baxter/Kane 1995, or Bohlzendahl/Myers 2004). This could be due to the omission of potentially important factors (such as, for example, details of employment characteristics or macro-level determinants of cross-country variations) or lack of detail on some variables (such as the type of religion a person identifies with or the exact character of family status, i.e. if the person is married or cohabiting in a consensual union, etc.).

It is important to observe the country level differences as shown in the coefficients associated with the country dummies. People in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia score significantly higher than Moldovans (the excluded category), while Hungarians are not significantly different from Moldovans statistically. These patterns will be familiar from the descriptive discussion above.

Model 3 in the same table includes interaction terms between gender and the country dummies. This is to assess the gender gaps in each country, controlling for all other factors. Moldova, with the smallest gender gap in the descriptive tables is omitted again. We find the results of our first analysis (Table 1) confirmed here: aside from Estonia, Latvia and Hungary, the interaction terms for all the other countries are significant with gender, meaning that their gender gaps are significantly larger than the one found in Moldova even net of all other factors. The impact of gender nevertheless remains significant as a main effect as well. It should also be noted that the model’s fit is not improved by the addition of the country and gender interactions, supporting our point about the lack of cross-country variation in this regard.

**Interaction effects**

Finally, Table 4 describes similar regression models ran separately for men and women, examining whether or not the same predictors work in similar ways for the two gender groups in order to estimate gender role opinions. We did not include country dummies in the tables (even though they were included in the model with Moldova as the omitted
category), since the country level gender gaps have been described in the models in Table 3 and in Table 1. Now we focus on how gender interacts with the main independent variables in the models.

We find some interesting differences in how the usual determinants of gender role opinions work for men and women. First, employment is associated with more liberal opinions among women but not among men. This may be simply explained by the fact that the causal arrow runs in the directions opposite to what is usually posited. In post-state socialist countries, women who have conservative gender role opinions may choose not to work for wages or may classify themselves as non-working when asked by surveyers. More liberally minded women may do the opposite. Obviously, this association does not work for men. Alternatively, the differences could be due to the exceptionally liberating experience of working for wages for women as described in the literature (see above).

Second, and also in line with findings from Western European countries marriage seems to move women into the conservative, men into a more liberal direction. The effect for women may be explained by the level of dependence marriage sometimes produces for women, while men may become more liberal as they encounter themselves the problem of domestic work and childcare in their own families.

Finally, going to church regularly seems to push women towards more conservative values (or more conservative values seem to push women towards going to church), while the same impact cannot be discerned for men. Again, the causal arrow is unclear here but the association is clearly visible.

Overall, the model for women explains more of the individual level variation than the model for men, so the social factors included are better predictors of women’s gender role opinions than those of men.

Conclusion

We started this paper wondering if gender is a salient predictor of gender role attitudes in post-state socialist societies. Previous researchers have argued that Eastern Europe is a special case in this regard: the legacy of forty-plus years of the communist emancipatory project led to a situation in which gender – while an important dimension of inequality – nevertheless does not function as a dimension of political interest formation and political action. Indeed, the term “feminism” is considered pejorative and feminist organizations are rare to be found in the region (Šiklová 1993). Neither are there strong lobbying groups promoting women’s issues or even party-affiliated women’s groups with their own agenda for the betterment of women’s position in society.

Our data, however, show that men and women do express different opinions on their proper role in society. Even after controlling for compositional factors, women in each country support women’s wage earning and extra-domestic activities more strongly than men do. In addition, women more than men would favor a redistribution of domestic responsibilities, so not only do they find it legitimate for women to participate in public life, they also favor men’s increased presence in the domestic sphere.

While this general trend is true for all the countries (except Moldova), we also found some variation across the countries in the level of gender conservativism and – less so –
in the size of the gender opinion gap. We found that, with some exceptions, the level of economic development and the average level of religiosity are associated with gender role attitudes: on average both men and women in richer and less religious countries tend to exhibit more liberal gender role attitudes. This phenomenon, as well as the impact of gender and the other independent variables in our models, are in line with findings from developed capitalist societies. In this respect, therefore, Eastern Europe does not seem to form a unique region on the European continent but fits the general trends found elsewhere. While women may not call themselves “feminists” when asked by researchers, they – more than their fellow countrymen – would opt to work for wages and share domestic work with their husbands. These views, as anywhere else, can be the basis of political mobilization on the basis of gender in the future.

In fact, gender proved to be a salient dimension of political opinion formation in the 13 countries not only with respect to gender roles but also regarding other types of political views more typically considered “political” by researchers. In regression models not presented here but conducted by using data from the same dataset, we found East European women to be more likely than men to support a stronger role for the state and to reject neoliberalism. They were also more likely than men to support abortion rights and tended to place themselves more to the left on a left-right political scale. These differences further suggest that gender operates as an important dimension of political opinion formation in a number of areas not just gender roles.

The fact that political parties, lobbying groups and civil activists have not managed to mobilize women as a political group is thus not simply due to women’s lack of understanding of their gender-specific interest, but rather to the ways and the processes through which political lobbying and mobilization has been taking shape in Eastern Europe.

Our research raised a number of questions, which would warrant further analysis. Most importantly, the question of cross-country variation in the mean level of gender role conservatism/liberalism should be explored in a dataset where more than 13 cases are available for analysis on the macro level, or where a larger set of questions could tap gender role attitudes in a more nuanced ways. It would be instructive to see if our initial findings about the role of economic development, welfare state support and Catholic ideology are indeed associated with a higher degree of conservatism. Secondly, in this paper we assumed that there is a connection between gender role opinions and at least the potential of political mobilization for (feminist) action. The nature, shape and potentials of this connection should also be studied, since, by identifying the determinants of gender role opinions, our goal has been less to describe particular political cultures in post-communist societies, but more to identify opportunities for feminist action in a region where this is not generally expected.

References


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Appendix

Table 1. Distribution of dependent variable across countries and overall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Liberal gender role scale means (s.d.)</th>
<th>Gender gap in liberal gender role opinion (women's score/men's score)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>3.59 (.54)</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>3.51 (.65)</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>3.75 (.57)</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1049</td>
<td>3.55 (.54)</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1028</td>
<td>3.43 (.62)</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>3.61 (.55)</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>3.49 (.51)</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>3.41 (.52)</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1497</td>
<td>3.72 (.64)</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1484</td>
<td>3.60 (.59)</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3.52 (.59)</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1026</td>
<td>3.65 (.58)</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1499</td>
<td>3.64 (.60)</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>15,542</td>
<td>3.58 (.59)</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EUREQUAL 2007, data weighted for each country separately.

Table 2. Percentages, means, and standard deviations of independent variables in the models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (total)</th>
<th>S.d. (total)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean/ s.d. for women</th>
<th>Mean/s.d. for men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (% women)</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15,643</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (mean)</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>15,635</td>
<td>47.7 (17.8)</td>
<td>46.2 (17.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15,611</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15,648</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-level education</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15,648</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active church-goer</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12,889</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15,642</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children in household</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>15,537</td>
<td>.51 (.82)</td>
<td>.44 (.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working for wages</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>14,684</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feels poor</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15,313</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N’s for each of the thirteen countries:

Source: EUREQUAL 2007, data weighted for each country separately.
Table 3. Linear regression coefficients and standard errors predicting liberal gender role opinions, 13 post-state socialist societies, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>.27** (.009)</td>
<td>.27** (.011)</td>
<td>.12 ** (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.000* (.000)</td>
<td>-.000* (.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural location</td>
<td>-.08** (.011)</td>
<td>-.08** (.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have higher education degree</td>
<td>-.14** (.02)</td>
<td>-.14** (.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have secondary educational degree</td>
<td>.08** (.01)</td>
<td>.08** (.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-.01 (.011)</td>
<td>-.01 (.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children in the household</td>
<td>-.02** (.01)</td>
<td>-.02** (.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working for wages</td>
<td>.05** (.012)</td>
<td>.05** (.013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling poor</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active church-goer</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
<td>-.01 (.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>.10** (.025)</td>
<td>.12 ** (.03)</td>
<td>.00 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>.37** (.025)</td>
<td>.35** (.03)</td>
<td>.26 ** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>.16** (.025)</td>
<td>.07* (.03)</td>
<td>.03 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>.03 (.025)</td>
<td>.02 (.03)</td>
<td>-.04 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>.21** (.025)</td>
<td>.14 ** (.03)</td>
<td>.09* (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>.11** (.025)</td>
<td>.06** (.03)</td>
<td>.03 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>.33** (.023)</td>
<td>.32** (.03)</td>
<td>.19** (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>.19** (.023)</td>
<td>.18** (.03)</td>
<td>.08 ** (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>.25** (.025)</td>
<td>.24 ** (.03)</td>
<td>.11** (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>.13** (.022)</td>
<td>.06** (.02)</td>
<td>-.06 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>.22** (.023)</td>
<td>.16** (.02)</td>
<td>.04 * (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender* Belarus</td>
<td>.18** (.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender* Bulgaria</td>
<td>.17** (.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender* Czech Rep.</td>
<td>.14** (.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender* Estonia</td>
<td>.06 (.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender* Hungary</td>
<td>.09 (.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender* Latvia</td>
<td>.07 (.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender* Lithuania</td>
<td>.13** (.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender* Poland</td>
<td>.21** (.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender* Romania</td>
<td>.16** (.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender* Slovakia</td>
<td>.20** (.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender* Russia</td>
<td>.20** (.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender* Ukraine</td>
<td>.18** (.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.25** (.019)</td>
<td>3.37** (.038)</td>
<td>3.46 ** (.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>15,542</td>
<td>15,542</td>
<td>15,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R square</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** significant at the p<.001 level; * p<.05

Source: EUREQUAL 2007, data weighted for each country separately.
Table 4. Linear regression coefficients and standard errors predicting liberal gender role opinions, for men and women separately.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural location</td>
<td>-.07**</td>
<td>-.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td>(.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have higher education degree</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High secondary level education</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>.03*</td>
<td>-.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children in the household</td>
<td>-.03**</td>
<td>-.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working for wages</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling poor</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active church-goer</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.04**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.40**</td>
<td>3.67**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6810</td>
<td>8822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R square</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: country dummies have been omitted from the table but were included in the model. Country dummies for men’s models are significant for the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, in these countries men score significantly higher than men in Moldova (the omitted category).

In the second model all country coefficients except for the one for Hungary and Estonia are significantly higher than in Moldova, i.e. women in all but these two countries score higher on the liberal gender role opinion scale than those in Moldova (the omitted category).

** significant at the p<.001 level; * p<.05

Source: EUREQUAL 2007, data weighted for each country separately.
Heather Hofmeister, Lena Hünefeld & Celina Proch

The role of job-related spatial mobility in the household division of labor within couples in Germany and Poland

Die Rolle berufsbezogener Mobilität in der Hausarbeitsteilung in Partnerschaften in Deutschland und Polen

Abstract:
This paper will examine the self-reported division of housework and childcare in Germany and Poland considering the job-related spatial mobility within dual-earner couples who are living in a household together with a partner, using 2007 data from the Job Mobility and Family Lives in Europe Project. We find that men who are spatially mobile for work often report shifting housework to their partners. Polish couples show a stronger tendency toward an egalitarian division of labor than German couples do, especially in terms of childcare. But the central finding of this research is, gender trumps national differences and spatial mobility constraints. Polish and German women, whether mobile for their work or not, report doing the majority of housework and childcare compared to their partners.

Key words: job-related spatial mobility, gender, division of household labor, childcare, cross-national comparison Germany and Poland

Zusammenfassung:

Schlagwörter: berufliche räumliche Mobilität, Gender, Hausarbeit und Kinderbetreuung, nationaler Vergleich Deutschland und Polen

1. Introduction

In the last decades across Europe, rapid changes in technology, travel possibilities, and labor markets, among other factors, have increased the rate of spatial mobility (Limmer 2005; Hofmeister/Blossfeld/Mills 2006; Sennett 2000; Haas/Hamann 2008; Beck-Gernsheim 1995). In this paper we examine data on partnered men and women in Poland and Germany to ask whether frequent circular (regularly occurring) mobility has an effect on the division
of household labor in couples, considering national context and family status. Circular mobiles are either “long-distance commuters,” defined as those who need at least 120 minutes a day to get to and from work and do so at least three times a week, or “overnighters,” those who spend at least 60 nights in the last year away from home on job-related business (Limmer/Schneider 2008). Within this context, questions of interest are: Is a high level of repeated spatial mobility for the job related to new patterns in the typically-gendered housework division and in childcare? Does a parent confronted with job-related spatial mobility do less housework than a parent who is not job-related spatially mobile? How does gender mediate this division? And do national cultural norms have a noticeable influence on the way the housework and childcare are divided? What effect have 40 years of socialism had on the way couples divide their labor at home, with attention to the influence of the commuting or frequent overnight business trips of one or the other partner?

A body of research on spatial mobility – to relocate for the job, to commute a long distance, to spend frequent overnights away from home for business, or to have a partnership in which both partners work in different cities – has focused on work and family relations (Schneider 2005; Jürges 2005; Hagemann-White/Hantsche/Westerburg 1996; Bonnet/Collet/Maurines 2006, Schneider/Meil 2008; Schneider/Collett 2010). These findings show that aspects of mobility can cause difficulties in reconciling job and family. For example, men are more likely to be mobile for their jobs, which reinforces women’s task allocation to childcare and housework (Schneider/Limmer/Ruckdeschel 2002). Furthermore, mobile women remain childless more often than mobile men do (Schneider/Meil 2008). While the mobility of men is largely independent of family status, parenthood has an influence on the mobility of women: in a recent study, women reported that their mobility had an influence on their timing of children, and results also indicate that the mobility of mothers is far below that of women who are not parents (Ruppenthal/Lück 2009).

The national context of spatial mobility has been an important research topic. The first analysis of the project Job Mobilities and Family Lives in Europe suggests that nearly every second European has experience with job-related spatial mobility over his or her active working years (Schneider/Meil 2008). But the results have shown a strong differentiation in the likelihood to be mobile by gender and by nationality.

For this paper, we compare Germany and Poland as countries which are close neighbors but have quite different cultural, political, and historical backgrounds which influence gender relations, family organization, and spatial mobility. We analyze how job-related mobility, family, and gender interact within the different national contexts. Especially with regard to the influence of mobility on gender relations in society as well as in intimate relationships, we are interested in the way gender roles could be reinforced or transformed by mobility. Our analysis focuses on three key questions:

- In what ways have national contexts, including the legacies of socialism, the religious influences of Catholicism, and economic challenges, left an imprint on the daily division of labor and child care in Poland compared to Germany, regardless of job-related mobility? Here we establish a baseline before moving on to questions about mobility effects.

---

1 Our sample size for the federal states that belonged to the former East Germany is too small to allow an analysis on German East-West differences. The majority of the German sample is from the western states.
Does job-related spatial mobility reinforce or transform the traditional task allocation regarding housework and childcare between women and men in Germany and in Poland?

Are childless women and men more likely to be recurrently job-mobile than mothers and fathers are? Is there a detectable nation-specific influence on the role of parenthood in affecting mobility?

2. Theoretical framework/background

2.1 The cultural context of Germany and Poland

Although Germany and Poland share a border, they are two differing countries with diverse ideas regarding the roles of women and men in society. Polish national culture in the early 21st century shows a cleft between the interests of the state and the church. From 1945 to 1989, Poland was under socialist rule. Women were required by law to participate fully in the labor market. The church, on the other hand, holds steadfast to the traditional role of women as homemakers and mothers (Rudolph/Klement 2006). Since the dissolution of socialism in 1989, the influence of the church has grown, but so has the financial pressure on families, which, in turn, encourages women’s full-time employment. This duality of women’s roles is also reflected in the coexistence of two contrasting overall models of women: the sustainable impact of the image of the “socialist woman,” who takes part in the labor force, versus the “Matka Polka” (Polish Mother), whose responsibility lies in reproduction and family care (Keinz 2008: 97). Family is considered to be the building block of Polish society (Fodor et al. 2002: 480).

Thus two diverging ideologies reign in Poland, exposing women to ambivalent expectations. In times of socialism the “socialist woman” was favored. However, since 1989 a renaissance of traditional values has come along with the process of democratization (Binder 2003: 675). In the first decade of the 21st century, images of women function to project traditional values, to symbolize a constant factor in times of social change. This is also seen in the political sphere, especially in several party platforms where women are expected to concentrate on family issues and not act as public and political persons (Choluj/Neusüß 2004: 187). Since the fall of the socialist system, the social environment, including economic relief for families, has changed, and state childcare facilities have been reduced. This situation confronts women with ambivalence in everyday life: On the one hand they need to support the family financially, but on the other hand, the primary family work is ascribed to them.

Since 1949, Germany has regularized a legal equality of women and men in the constitution wherein both sexes should have equal access to education as well as opportunity to actively participate in the labor force. Yet the life course remains different for men and women (Hofmeister 2009; Hofmeister/Witt 2009). Judging from structural as well as cultural factors, such as very limited public childcare, short school hours, limited or non-existent after-school care for children, and tax policies that favor one main earner, blending paid work and family in Germany is easiest for couples who divide the responsibilities among an “earner” and a “caregiver” (Grunow/Hofmeister/Buchholz 2006; Sauer 2004). Additionally, although the proportion of women participating in the labor market increased,
the majority of couples still practice a role distribution whereby the man earns the money while the woman takes care of home and family (male bread-winner model) (BMFSFJ 2004; Grunow/Hofmeister/Buchholz 2006; Hofmeister/Baur/Röhler 2009; Buchholz/Grunow 2006). Another common belief in Germany is that mothers working for pay are uncaring mothers (Sauer 2004: 121). These beliefs are changing slowly; however, the image of the employed mother as a bad mother persists (Ruckdeschel 2005). These contradictions in part illustrate the cleft among legal, structural, and cultural social organization in Germany.

One part of Germany shares similar historical characteristics with Poland. From 1949 to 1990, East Germany (German Democratic Republic) was a socialist state which promoted full-time female and male employment. East Germany had a norm of fulltime-employed mothers, which it supported through collective childcare. However, the equality of men and women was not followed through to its logical conclusion: while women were fully integrated into working life, they did not experience a substantial reduction of responsibility for the familial and especially the household sector. Men were not integrated equally into housework and childcare, though their actual participation was higher than among men in West Germany (Sauer 2004: 118).

Since German reunification in 1990, the West German political system has predomi-
nated, as the majority of the current German population lives in former West Germany with 65.541 Million residents compared to 16.461 million in former East Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008). Having the same legal framework and policies for the last twenty years, one can find more similarities than differences between the realities of women and men in East and West Germany (Rosenzweig 2000).

Although a separate consideration of East and West Germany would be of interest, a low number of East-German respondents (only 34 out of 689 German respondents were born in the former GDR) prevents a separate analysis. We include residents of East and West Germany together in the German sample.

Looking at the 2007 employment rates of women and men in Germany and Poland, in both countries the men constitute the majority of employees (in Germany 75%; in Poland 64%) (Eurostat 2009). The female employment rate is slightly lower, with 64% of German women employed, compared to 51% of Polish women. National differences concerning the demands on roles of women are also reflected in the scope of work. Focusing on part-time employment, 46% of employed German women and 9% of employed German men work part-time, whereas in Poland only 13% of employed women and 7% of employed men are part-time employed. Aside from the fact that more Polish women are employed full-time, the amount of working hours is higher in Poland than in Germany (Eurostat 2009). In Germany, part-time work of women serves to help reconcile competing demands of work and family, but in Poland, the question arises how full-time workers, especially women, combine the demands of the labor market with those of their families.

2.2 The division of labor between partners in the domestic sphere

Despite the increasing participation of women in the labor market, the gendered division of household labor between men and women persists, whereby women carry the heavier
load at home (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2007, Treas/Drobnic 2010). Results from the Fourth European Working Conditions Surveys reveal that more women working for pay than working men devote time outside of work to family responsibilities such as childcare, housework, or cooking. Indeed, on average, men have worked more hours per week than women in their paid jobs, but when paid and unpaid hours are added together, it is women who work the most hours. However, men are more likely to increase their share when their wives work outside the home compared to men whose wives are not employed (Shannon/Greenstein 2004).

For the unequal distribution of domestic work, generally three reasons are cited: first, women are culturally expected to be the primarily responsible person for family duties (Ostner 1993, Fenstermaker et. al 1991; West/Zimmermann 1987). Second, from an economic point of view, women’s lower earnings and resulting financial dependency on men means that women’s housework is a compensation for men’s paid work (Becker 1981, 1995a, 1995b). And finally, longer working hours of men compared to women (Sauer 2004: 130) leave the housework to the person with more time available for it.

In contrast to economic approaches (Krebs 2002; Becker 1995b), sociological theories underline the influence of social values and institutional environment. Especially the “gender display” approach emphasizes that, in most cases, the division of time between partners spent for housework doesn’t happen in a benefit-oriented way, but rather as expression of the individual’s own gender identity (Berk 1985; Greenstein 2000; Hochschild/Machung 1993). That is, no matter what might be most rational for a specific distribution of labor, the meaning of the housework and the individual’s sense of self-expression around performing or avoiding housework play strong roles in determining who will do the work.

In Germany, household chores, family work and gainful employment are not distributed equally among men and women. Women spend 2.3 times more time on household and family care than men do, an expenditure of time that rises with the presence of children in the household (Gershuny 2003). A child increases the time spent on housework for women, in comparison to men, by about half an hour, two children by about one hour, and three or more children by about 2 hours per day (Gershuny 2003). However, the amount of time used by men for household chores is independent of children being present or not (Buchebner-Ferstl/Rille-Pfeiffer 2008).

In Poland, the specific historical and cultural conditions affect gender equality in the workplace differently from how they are experienced in West Germany. Women in socialist times were employed full-time, although cultural tradition prescribed housework also to women. Public childcare services assisted with some of “the double-burden,” but husbands did not step in to do half of the housework (Choluj/Neusüß 2004: 182). Although labor market work was expected from both men and women, policy makers did not intend to transform the men’s role within their housework duties and activities (Michon 2009; Fodor et al. 2002: 479-481). Women’s overproportional housework has persisted over the transition in 1989 and has even been intensified by the closure of hundreds of public kindergartens and crèches since 1989 (Michon 2009; Fodor et al. 2002: 479-481). By limiting childcare for under-3-year-olds and providing parental leave over a longer period for mothers only, state policies enforced a clear pattern of the gendered division of domestic and parenting work (Fodor et al. 2002: 480). In spite of the difficult
circumstances like underdeveloped childcare support and low wages, female labor force participation is often necessary for the family’s well-being. As a result, women shoulder a double burden by working inside and outside the home as well as caring for their children. This can also be illustrated by the results of a Polish study conducted in 2006, where people living with their partners in one household, regardless of employment, have been questioned about cleaning duties. According to the answers of the respondents, 6% of the cleaning is done by men, 61% by women and 33% jointly (CBOS 2006: 2).

To conclude, women are culturally expected to invest their time in both employment as well as household and care work (Klammer 2001). The fact that job-related spatial mobility further limits the available time raises the question if spatial mobility means an additional burden for women or an equal or at least more balanced division of housework duties between partners.

2.3 Job-related mobility

Limmer defines job-related mobility “as spatial movement that takes people on their way to work outside their social surroundings” (cf. Limmer 2005: 97). We assume that mobility needs to hit a certain level of intensity before the influence on work and private life reaches a significant magnitude. That, in turn, will determine the selection of a threshold value of mobility.

Job-related spatial mobility can be divided into two main categories: residential mobility and circular mobility (Schneider/Meil 2008). Residential mobility, or relocation mobility, means a singular event that takes only a short period of time. Circular mobility describes types of mobility that repeat themselves after certain periods of time, such as long distance commutes, overnighters, and the maintenance of long distance relationships.

Circular mobility is three times more frequent than residential mobility in Europe, based on results from the Job Mobility and Family Lives in Europe study, consisting of 7,220 Europeans from six countries interviewed in 2007 (Ruppenthal/Lück 2009). These data also indicate a higher mobility of men compared to women in all countries of the study (all types of mobility considered together). In total, Germans are more mobile than Poles, with 22% in Germany to 14% in Poland (Schneider/Meil 2008). But men in both countries are more mobile than women: 24% of the German men but only 16% of German women were mobile; in Poland 17% of the men and 11% of the women were mobile. Furthermore, the analyses indicate that parenthood plays a significant role in reducing mobility: of the childless respondents, German women are more likely than German men to be mobile, but German mothers are less mobile than German fathers. In short, women who are mobile for job-related reasons are less often mothers (30%), and mothers are less often mobile. These findings indicate a difficulty for women, but not for men, to combine parenthood and mobility requirements (Schneider/Ruppenthal/Lück/Rüger/Dauber 2008).

In Poland, as in Germany, the family status has a significant influence on the mobility of women, while there is no such effect for men. However, in contrast to Germany, among the mobile women in Poland, mothers are more mobile than non-mothers (Poleszczuk/Stec 2008). And Polish mothers are more mobile for occupational reasons than German mothers (Schneider/Meil 2008). Many studies already confirmed that in Germany as well as in Poland, traditional gender roles are predominant and mainly the
women are responsible for household and childcare (Haberkern 2007; Sauer 2004; Tarkowska 2002). That leaves the question how Polish mobile mothers cope with the requirements of mobility and family needs.

In general, job-related mobility has consequences on the life course (Hofmeister 2002, 2005, 2009; Viry/Hofmeister/Widmer 2010). The time needed to commute to and from work is on top of existing working hours. This expenditure of time is therefore necessarily taken from private life (Hofmeister 2002). Apart from the time expense, mobility requires organization to integrate all everyday demands and to master the schedule. With this in mind, time “lost” to mobility more often than not is compensated for by strictly organizing private life (Schneider 2005).

Furthermore, house and family work require much time (Statistisches Bundesamt 2001/02). A person who needs to be mobile has three major options to meet those time requirements: find a partner who will take care of family and household, reduce or eliminate his or her family bonds to avoid time conflicts between occupation and family, or suffer deficits in one or another life sphere (sleep, free time, family time, or work time) compared to people who have no mobility demands. Schneider (2004: 30) found that one third of the partners of mobile employees perform the family and household duties all alone. The probabilities of choosing these options are gendered: men more often can and do choose the first option, because the supply of female partners willing to care for the home and family is greater than the supply of male partners willing to do so; women are left more often with options 2 and 3 (Schneider 2005). Prior research indicates that mobile men often have partners who relieve them of household tasks completely (Limmer 2005).

Based on the results of previous studies, our hypotheses are:

1. Even in cases where both men and women in a relationship work for pay, we hypothesize that women still do the majority of family responsibilities in (1a) housework and (1b) childcare both in Germany and in Poland.
2. The division of (2a) household labor and (2b) childcare is different in Germany and Poland, with Polish families exhibiting a more equal division of labor.
3. The division of (3a) household labor and (3b) childcare is affected by circular mobility in Germany and Poland, meaning that partners who are circularly mobile reduce their housework in comparison to the non-mobile partner.
4. If the woman is the partner who is circularly mobile, an equalization or more balanced sharing of the division of (4a) household and (4b) childcare is more likely.
5. Circular mobility carried by the man in the partnership is likely to be associated with an imbalanced sharing of the division of (5a) household and (5b) childcare, with the man doing much less than his non-mobile female partner.

3. Sample and Methods

We analyze the responses of 1106 participants out of 7220 from the Job Mobility and Family Lives in Europe survey, which interviewed residents of six European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, Spain and Switzerland. The study was led by Norbert F. Schneider at the University of Mainz and funded by the EU 6th Framework Pro-
gramme. In May to August 2007 a total of 7220 interviews were conducted in Germany by phone and in Poland face-to-face, targeting residents aged 25 to 54. The goal of the study was to gain representative data on the distribution of mobile living and to assess advantages and disadvantages of different kinds of mobility. Due to a planned and targeted oversampling of mobile people, and typical overrepresentation of demographic groups in survey data, data we use in the analyses are weighted, calculated per nation (Huynen/Hubert/Lück 2010). The descriptive data we present are unweighted. We focus on persons who are living in a household together with a partner and where both are working for pay to ensure that both partners invest time in paid work and therefore the time available for domestic work is limited for both of them. One or both partners could be recurrently (circularly) mobile. Recall that circular mobiles are either “long-distance commuters,” whom we define as commuters travelling at least 120 minutes a day to get to and from work at least three times a week, or they are what we call “overnighters,” spending at least 60 nights in the last year away on job-related business trips (Limmer/Schneider 2008). Figure 1 describes graphically which groups from the total sample in the Job Mobility and Family Lives in Europe survey are in our analysis.

Figure 1: Sample Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jobmob</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2765</td>
<td>1102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1663</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not in this study

Singles or people in partnerships with only one earner or not living together

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N = 1659</th>
<th>D = 974</th>
<th>PL = 685</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Respondent is circular mobile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>men</th>
<th>women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondent is non mobile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>men</th>
<th>women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Job Mobility and Family Lives Survey 2007 (unweighted data).

---

3 Only one of the partners in each couple has participated in the survey.

4 We are interested in examining the degree to which recurring mobility creates challenges to combine working demands and private needs. When we speak of mobility later in the text, we are always referring to circular mobility.
The divisions of household and childcare within the couple were measured by the self-report of the respondent to the questions “Who of you spends time in handling housework?” and “Who cares for children” with the following five parameter values: only you (=1), mainly you (=2), you and your partner equally (=3), mainly your partner (=4), or only your partner (=5). The scale indicates that the higher the value, the more intensely the partner is involved in housework or childcare compared to the respondent. These are our dependent variables of interest. We test whether, in both nations, women handle more of the family duties than men, whether mobile persons are less active in housework and childcare than non-mobile persons, and whether the distribution of housework and childcare is different in Germany and Poland, using mean comparison tests.

We use OLS regression analyses to examine which influence circular mobility has, controlling for relevant socio-demographic variables, on men’s and women’s division of housework and childcare in Poland and Germany. In the regressions, we tested the interrelation between the dependent variables intensity of partner doing housework and intensity of partner doing childcare and the independent variables, as follows: Circular mobility (1=circular mobile), gender of respondent (1=female), parental status (1=parent of at least one child under age 16 living in the home), highest level of education completed (1=tertiary educational level), weekly work hours (1= 43 or more hours) are tested. We also consider the effect of cohort in two age groups (0=25-35, 1=36-54). We conclude our analyses with a brief examination of the connection between the actual division of labor and the attitudes toward men’s and women’s roles in each country.

4. Results

At the time of the survey, in Germany, 19.4% of the men and 7.0% of the women living in dual-earner households in our sample were circularly mobile for work. In Poland, 12.6% of the men and 9.0% of the women were circularly mobile. Among circular mobile persons in Germany, the significant majority are men, at 74% (p<.001) (only 26% are women). The men are also more mobile than women in Poland, though the difference is not as large, with men comprising 53% of the Polish mobile group and women 47%. We further examine the socio-demographic distributions among mobile and non-mobile workers living in dual-earner couples in Table 1 and Table 2, separately by country.

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5 Regressions modeling childcare were performed only for parents in the sample.
6 Members of the first cohort aged 25-35 were younger than 18 when they experienced fall of the Iron Curtain, whereas persons who are in the second cohort (36-54) experienced at least their first 18 years within a socialist system. We have chosen these specific cohorts because it can be expected that these cohorts grew up in different systems of norms and values which can affect the internalized gender roles (Watson 1992).
Table 1: Frequencies of German men and women, living in partnerships, by mobility status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Non mobile</th>
<th>Circular mobile</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(child under 16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(137)</td>
<td>(169)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(169)</td>
<td>(177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(141)</td>
<td>(151)</td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(176)</td>
<td>(167)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sum %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
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<td>(320)</td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(345)</td>
<td>(344)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men p=.823 / women p=.066</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
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<td>72</td>
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<td>(11)</td>
<td>(219)</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>(6)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(12)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total sum %</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>n</td>
<td>(261)</td>
<td>(309)</td>
<td>(65)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(326)</td>
<td>(332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men p=.536 / women p&lt;.05</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Part-time (17-34h)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>(19)</td>
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<td>(2)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(25)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(156)</td>
<td>(122)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Excessive (43+)</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sum %</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>n</td>
<td>(268)</td>
<td>(309)</td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(332)</td>
<td>(332)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age / cohorts in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-year categories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(49)</td>
<td>(65)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(73)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(121)</td>
<td>(137)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(142)</td>
<td>(146)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>(118)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(139)</td>
<td>(125)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sum %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>(275)</td>
<td>(329)</td>
<td>(66)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(341)</td>
<td>(344)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men p=.119 / women p=.317</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Job Mobility and Family Lives Survey 2007, employed men and women living in partnerships (unweighted data).

Table 1 illustrates that mobile German women differ significantly from the non-mobile women in the areas of parental status, education, and work hours. Mobile German women are less likely to have children, more likely to have tertiary education, and tend to work longer hours than non-mobile women. Men do not statistically significantly differ by mobile status in these characteristics. For Poland, there is no statistically significant difference between the mobile and non-mobile groups (by gender). The tables indicate the need to look at within-category gender comparisons, which we turn to next.
Table 2: Frequencies of Polish men and women, living in partnerships, by mobility status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Non mobile</th>
<th>Circular mobile</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(child under 16)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>60 (67)</td>
<td>61 (87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>40 (45)</td>
<td>39 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sum</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100 (112)</td>
<td>100 (142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td>(112)</td>
<td>(142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men p=.786 / women p=.272</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non mobile</th>
<th>Circular mobile</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40 (44)</td>
<td>27 (38)</td>
<td>35 (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36 (41)</td>
<td>46 (71)</td>
<td>35 (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 (27)</td>
<td>27 (38)</td>
<td>29 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sum</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100 (111)</td>
<td>100 (141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td>(111)</td>
<td>(141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men p=.893 / women p=.553</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Work hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non mobile</th>
<th>Circular mobile</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time (17-34h)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 (5)</td>
<td>18 (23)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time (35h-42h)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44 (41)</td>
<td>56 (71)</td>
<td>31 (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excessive (43+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51 (47)</td>
<td>26 (33)</td>
<td>69 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sum</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100 (93)</td>
<td>100 (127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td>(127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men p=3.81 / women p=.657</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age / cohorts in 10-year categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non mobile</th>
<th>Circular mobile</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>31 (34)</td>
<td>35 (50)</td>
<td>44 (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>32 (35)</td>
<td>37 (53)</td>
<td>38 (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>38 (42)</td>
<td>28 (39)</td>
<td>29 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sum</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100 (111)</td>
<td>100 (142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td></td>
<td>(111)</td>
<td>(142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>men p=3.11 / women p=.632</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: Job Mobility and Family Lives Survey 2007, employed men and women living in partnerships (unweighted data).
4.1 Bivariate analyses

Table 3: Intensity of partner’s participation in housework and childcare (high value = more done by partner) by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who handles housework?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s reports</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s reports</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p&lt;.001</td>
<td>p&lt;.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who cares for children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s reports</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s reports</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p&lt;.001</td>
<td>p&lt;.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parameter values: only you (=1), mainly you (=2), you and your partner equally (=3), mainly your partner (=4), only your partner (=5)

Data: Job Mobility and Family Lives Survey 2007, employed men and women living in partnerships (unweighted n presented; weighted data used for significance tests.)

In both countries, women tend to be more responsible for handling housework and childcare, whether as indicated through the women’s self-reports of what they do or men’s self-reports of what their partners do (see Table 3). The higher averages of men in comparison to women’s averages indicate that men are more likely to shift their housework to their partners, whereas women are more likely to do housework and childcare themselves rather than shift it to their partner.

The percentage distribution shows that male and female responses to their share of the housework are not consistent in Germany. Whereas 50% of German men answered that they share housework equally with the partner, only 35% of German women saw the division that way. Previous studies have indicated that men tend to overestimate their own share in housework (Ecarius 2007: 101; Kreimer 2009: 52; Lee/Waite 2005). In contrast, responses of Polish men and women to the equal participation in housework were roughly consistent (53% and 49% respectively). The similarity of answers between men and women in Poland may be a result of national context, or the consistency in Poland could be related to the face-to-face interview format. The answers of Polish respondents could be affected by social desirability (Tourangeau et al. 2000) and the possible presence of a spouse in the vicinity of the interview.

Furthermore, the national comparison in Table 3 shows that partners of Polish women are more involved in housework as well as in childcare than partners of German women. Accordingly, Polish men participate significantly more in childcare duties than German men. In addition, it can be seen that the gap between the averages of Polish men and women is smaller than between German men and women. Polish men, on average, report significantly more involvement in childcare than German men.
Figure 2: “Who of you spends time in handling housework?” by nation and mobility

Data: Job Mobility and Family Lives Survey 2007, employed men and women living in partnerships. Unweighted number of cases: Germany n=687, Poland n=414 (weighted data used in analysis).

Figure 3: “Who cares for children” by nation and mobility

Data: Job Mobility and Family Lives Survey 2007, employed men and women living in partnerships. Unweighted number of cases: Germany n=255, Poland n=199 (weighted data used in analysis).
With regard to mobility, not yet controlling for gender, in both countries mobile persons get more support in housework (see Figure 2) and childcare (see Figure 3) by their partners than non-mobile persons. Looking at mobility and housework by gender, we find that this result is due to the predominance of men in the mobile group and women in the non mobile group, and not due to a statistically significant report of the shifting of housework from mobile people to their partners. However, we observe that men and women in both countries are less involved in childcare if they are mobile, whereas again the strongest difference between mobile and non-mobiles is seen for Polish women ($\bar{X}$: mobile: 2.88; non-mobile: 2.53). Partners of mobile women in Poland participate more in childcare than partners of non-mobile women.

### 4.2 Multivariate Analyses on the division of housework and childcare

In the hypotheses 3a and 3b, we postulated that the mobility of women is associated with a reduction in differences between women and their partners in the division of household and childcare, whereas mobility among men leads to their female partners doing more. To test the hypotheses, we use regression analyses, looking at women and men from Poland and Germany separately.

The following table (4) shows two different models for each country, one without interactions (Model 1) and one with interactions (Model 2) between the gender of respondent and (1) circular mobility, (2) work hours, (3) cohort, and (4) child under 16 years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Regression Analyses to predict the intensity of partner’s participation in housework (high value = more done by partner)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circular mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex of respondent (f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child under 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (tertiary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours (43h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (36 to 54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex * circular mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex * works hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex * cohort (36 to 54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex * child under 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001

Data: Job Mobility and Family Lives Survey 2007, employed men and women living in partnerships. Unweighted number of cases: Germany n=687, Poland n=414 (weighted data used in analysis).
All models are significant as models, but in both countries, gender is the strongest predictor in each model. Men report, more often than women, that their partners do more of the housework. Women report that they themselves do more. Testing the effect of mobility combined with socio-demographic variables, the results of both regression models reveal no significant relationship between mobility and the participation in housework for both countries when controlling for other contextual factors. Whereas in Poland the only significant predictor of the housework division is gender, in Germany work hours is also statistically significant, with men – but not women – working more hours receiving more help from their partners. One would expect that a person working excessive hours (more than 43 a week) may receive support from a partner, but women in Germany working excessive hours do not report the support of their partner in doing more housework. An additional component determining the division of labor in German households is parenthood. Mothers are more likely to report that they do more of the housework; fathers report that their partners do more of the housework. The German social context, with limited external childcare, probably plays a role in this finding. Due to the limitations on external childcare, many employed mothers in Germany work part time.

Table 5: Regression Analyses to predict the intensity of partner’s participation in childcare (high value = more done by partner)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany Model 1</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Poland Model 1</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circular mobile</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex of respondent (f)</td>
<td>-1.58***</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-1.35***</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>-.79***</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.79*</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (tertiary)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours (43+h)</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohort (36 to 54)</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex * circular mobility</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex * work hours</td>
<td>-.73</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex * cohort (36 to 54)</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.48*</td>
<td>.21</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>76.81</td>
<td>47.85</td>
<td>13.46</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001

Data: Job Mobility and Family Lives Survey 2007, employed men and women living in partnerships. Unweighted number of cases: Germany n=255, Poland n=199 (weighted data used in analysis).

The most remarkable finding is the lack of effects in Poland. While this may be due to the relatively lower sample size (half that of Germany), we hypothesize that the processes determining who does housework and childcare are likely different in Poland compared to Germany. The historical background and current economic situation in Poland create reason to believe that the processes determining whether partners do more are, indeed, dif-
ferent. However, one similarity to Germany can be found as a trend effect in parenthood and especially in the interaction between gender of respondent and child under 16. Also in Poland, mothers tend to be more involved in housework than fathers, an effect that is likely to be statistically robust with a larger sample size.

As in the case of division in household labor, regression models predicting childcare are significant. For both countries, the results of Model 1 show that gender has the highest explanatory power for the variance on the dependent variable “Who cares for children”. An influence of mobility on childcare division could not be determined by these models.

Concerning Model 2, for the predictors of childcare, no factor predicts the predominant caregiver better than motherhood. In Poland, we find statistically significant effects for gender in interaction with age. This effect indicates that Polish mothers aged between 35 and 54, who came of age during socialism, report a more evenly distributed childcare with their partners than Polish mothers who came of age after socialism. Whether the socialist background accounts for the difference or whether other life stage effects are at play is impossible to assess with the data available.

It is remarkable that work hours and commuting do not influence the division of childcare for parents in either country. These results could be related to the relatively small sample size. Further research is necessary to establish whether mobility influences engagement in childcare.

4.3 Level of attitude in comparison to level of behavior

After focusing on the division of work in the domestic sphere, we now turn briefly to examine attitudes towards the division of household work. Interviewees were asked to what degree they agree with the following statement: “In your opinion it is usually better for the children if the man is the main provider and the woman takes care of the home and the family.” The results show that nation, more than mobility or gender, is the strongest predictor of agreement with this statement (p<.001). Whereas only 25% of the German fully or somewhat agreed to that statement, 64% of Poles were in agreement that it’s better if the man earns the money and the woman takes care of the home. Yet attitude does not predict behavior in either country: no significant correlation could be verified between the attitude and division of housework (Germany: r=-.009, p=.814, Poland: r=-.051, p=.402), nor between the attitude and childcare (Germany: r=-.105, p=.243, Poland: r=.027, p=.748) (results not shown but are available upon request).

5. Conclusion and discussion

The results of our research confirm a number of established findings and add new ones: First, women outperform men in housework within couples in Poland and Germany, according to self-reports of both men and women. Second, Polish couples show a stronger tendency toward an egalitarian division of labor (though still being far from dividing the

---

7 Regression models concerning childcare include only parents.
work equally) than German couples do, especially in terms of childcare. And, third, there is some evidence that partners who are spatially mobile for work often shift housework to partners who are not mobile, though this effect is strongly mediated by gender.

The central finding of this research is gender trumps national and mobility differences. Men shift housework to their female partners regardless of mobility; women rarely do. And even though Poland and Germany differ, gender is a stronger unifying force predicting involvement in household activities than national context: a Polish woman and a German woman experience more in common with their division of labor and housework than a Polish woman and Polish man. Gender also is more predictive of differences in household work than education, age, and parenthood differences. In short, regardless of whether Polish or German, parent or non-parent, mobile or not mobile, highly educated or not, within employed couples the most dominant trend is that the woman does more housework and childcare. This finding has been seen in the literature before, though here it is tested with regard to job-related spatial mobility and is nonetheless robust. It is striking that, despite the physical absence of mobile employed women from the home, they nonetheless estimate that they do more housework. We examined simple averages for different groups of non-parents to confirm the trend among non-parents. German mobile women report doing more than non-mobile German women by half a point, and more than all German men in the sample: mobile German women average a 2 on the scale, “housework is done mostly by me” and non-mobile German women average nearly half a point closer to “housework is done equally.” German men, whether mobile or non-mobile, average between “housework is done equally” and “my partner does most” (3.2 for both, no difference by mobility of the man in Germany). Polish mobile women (non-mothers), at 2.6 on the scale (between “done mostly by me” and “shared equally”), are reporting more housework than non-mobile Polish men (average of 3.4, or between “shared equally” and “mostly my partner does it”) and than mobile Polish men (who average 3.6).

We thereby find evidence for our first hypothesis: for Germany and Poland women assume more of the housework and childcare, even though Polish women are more likely full-time employed than German women. Furthermore, our second hypothesis is supported, that the division of housework and childcare in Germany and Poland is organized differently. The Germans have a more traditional division of responsibilities in the domestic sphere with women bearing the brunt of these activities. Polish women and men more often share the childcare equally than Germans do. With regard to the third hypothesis about the influence of mobility, mobility seems to have an influence on the division of household labor and childcare within intimate relationships in Germany and Poland, but only because the mobile partner is more likely to be a man.

In Poland, a clear visual association can be found between mobility and (4a) housework as well as (4b) childcare for women, but without a statistically significant basis, likely due to the small sample size. We observe that a shift in housework and childcare to the partner takes place for Polish women when they are mobile. Male circular mobility does not seem to influence (5a) the division of household labor or (5b) childcare in Germany and in Poland. This means that the existing division of gender roles within housework is maintained even when the man is highly mobile.

Testing the effect of mobility on the division of labor in the domestic sphere by controlling for gender and other factors (parental status, education, work hours and age), the re-
gression shows no statistical significance of circular mobility. To summarize: circular mobility seems to have an influence on the distribution of household tasks and childcare in Germany as well as in Poland at least for men when viewed with binary analysis, but multivariate analysis demonstrates that gender is the primary determinant of who does what, and not circular mobility, work hours, or education. In particular, motherhood predicts most strongly who will report the highest share of housework and childcare in both countries.

Polish couples tend to share domestic duties at least more equally than Germans do, which may be a practical response to the longer legacy of full-time female employment in Poland. In Poland, not only the men but also the women are more often employed full-time, which takes a considerable budget of time. This raises the question for Poles, even without being confronted with mobility, how paid and unpaid work can be managed in a limited time budget. One solution is that work is split between two people to handle everything. As it was shown, this tendency toward equal division of labor increases when mobility is added.

The long tradition of female employment in Poland has likely had some cultural effect on current generations’ divisions of childcare and housework. Polish men and women witnessed their own mothers employed full time and were more likely expected to help around the house as children or to have seen their fathers participate in housework and childcare than (West) German children, especially boys. This difference in the cultural upbringing may account for some of the more egalitarian behavior of Polish couples, especially Polish couples in the earlier birth cohort, compared to German couples, and deserves further investigation.

In Germany, however, even despite full-time employment for both partners and in cases where women experience job-related circular mobility, the woman is the one who is mainly responsible for the household. In contrast to an economic rationality for the division, the cultural prescriptions about gender seem to have a stronger influence on the division of household labor, lending support to the “gender display” approach that emphasizes the division of time use as an expression of gender identity (Berk 1985; Greenstein 2000; Hochschild/ Machung 1993).

The discrepancy between the household division itself and the attitudes towards it suggests the disconnection between idealized life organization and the daily realities. That Polish pairs find it better if mothers stay home and fathers participate in paid work may come as no surprise in a culture strongly influenced by the values of the Catholic Church and by the association of women’s paid employment with forced socialism. The willingness of Polish men to participate more in childcare than German men do could indicate the family values orientation of Polish couples, or it could also be an indicator of the social construction of gender in Poland being organized along very different lines from the ways it is organized in Germany. In other words, it could be that German men demonstrate their masculinity partly by avoiding “feminized” work like childcare and housework (Baur/Hofmeister 2008), whereas Polish men use alternative gender constructions. For example, participating as a father in caring for children could be part of Polish masculinity, or else the avoidance of it is not important for defining masculinity. Or, Polish father’s involvement is simply essential to family functioning, because of the high levels of employment of Polish mothers. Further research, particularly qualitative research, is needed to understand the constructions of Polish masculinity in family life.
In Poland, it is a common phenomenon that a single salary is not high enough to support a couple or a family sufficiently. This financial pressure increases with the presence of children, and is a likely explanation for the higher mobility of Polish mothers compared to Polish non-mothers or German women. In comparison to Germany, Polish couples enter parenthood at a relatively early age, which confronts them with financial challenges in early years (in 2004 the average age of German women at parenthood was 28.9 whereas Polish women were on average 25.6 when they had their first child) (Mynarska 2010). Mobility serves in Poland, above all, as a survival strategy (Giza-Poleszczuk/Stec/Komendant/Rüger 2009). The resulting question is how Polish women combine mobility requirements and family needs. As the analysis has shown, mobile mothers in Poland are supported more by their husbands in childcare than non-mobile mothers. The support from both partners allows the family, despite a limited time budget, better to reconcile mobility and family.

The current study has some limitations. First, our sample of the mobile population was rather small, which limits the statistical significance of the results. Precondition of the participation in the survey in Germany has been the possession of a landline phone, and in Poland, being at home in the summer of 2007 (Huynen/Hubert/Lück 2010). These restrictions mean that mobile persons are probably underrepresented in the sample.

A second restriction of the data is that we only have self-reports and not the reports of both persons who are doing the housework. Most individuals, particularly men, overestimate their own share of housework (Ecarius 2007: 101; Kreimer 2009: 52, Lee/Waite 2005), and so it is difficult to say to what degree the reports measure an objective reality. On the other hand, we have no reason to believe that this self-report bias should be different for mobile and non-mobile people. Further research that could measure the actual time spent in housework, by direct report from each partner, would more objectively measure the division of household labor. These data exist, including overnights away due to work and commuting time (Moen et al. 1999), but they are collected nearly 10 years ago and not in the European context.

One further limitation of the study could be the stringent definition of circular mobility. Those who would consider themselves circularly mobile and behave accordingly but commute just under one hour, or who are away overnight 59 nights a year, are nonetheless in our sample grouped in the non-mobile category. The precise tipping points for a distinction between mobile and non-mobile, if such a point can be identified, requires further research.

Furthermore, the regression model does not capture the processes in Poland, or else the sample size in Poland is too small for effects to be significant. Further research is needed to establish what predicts the distribution of household labor and childcare in modern-day Poland, and how age, period, and cohort may play a role. And this brings us to the final point: mobility occurs to varying intensities and durations across the life course. Earlier mobility experiences are very likely to affect later-life behaviors (Viry/Hofmeister/Widmer 2010). We do not have, in our data, whether the household division of labor of non-mobiles has been shaped by earlier mobility experiences, which could very well be the case. We also could as easily imagine that some mobile people are only recently mobile, but still dividing housework based on pre-mobile lifestyle without having yet adjusted their division based on the new reality of time use and physical absence in the household. Further research that recognizes the life course dynamics of mobility would make an important contribution to our understanding of mobility within family life.
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Employment around first birth in two adverse institutional settings: Evidence from Italy and Poland

Abstract:
This paper analyses women’s employment behaviour around first birth in Italy and Poland. These two countries have much in common as far as their cultural and institutional frameworks are concerned. However, they also display key differences that allow us to better investigate how the country-specific factors mediate women’s employment behaviour around the first birth. Our findings reveal substantial differences in women’s behaviour across educational groups and between the two countries. We conclude that conditions for combining work and family, although important, are not the only determinants of women’s fertility and employment decisions, and that other country-specific factors are also highly influential.

Key words: Women’s employment, first child-birth, Italy, Poland, event history analysis

1. Introduction

The labour market participation rates of women are lower than those of men everywhere in Europe. This fact has often been attributed to the disproportionate participation of
women and men in childbearing and childrearing. While the gender gap in employment is country-specific, it is often larger in countries with lower fertility than it is in countries with higher birth rates. The economic theory of fertility and of women’s labour supply attributes this phenomenon to cross-country differences in the opportunity costs of childbearing, such as the income lost during the non-participation period, but also future earnings foregone due to non-accumulation and depreciation of human capital (Gustafsson 2001; Walker 1995). These costs are larger in countries with rigid labour markets and a pronounced insider-outsider divide, and in countries that lack safety nets and family policies oriented towards supporting the successful balancing of motherhood and paid work (Esping-Andersen 1999; Matysiak/Vignoli 2008).

Recent micro-level research has, however, challenged conventional wisdom on fertility and women’s labour supply by showing that, in some countries, employed women are more likely to give birth to a child, even if there are strong institutional barriers to combining work and family. This evidence mainly comes from the post-socialist countries (Robert/Bukodi 2005; Matysiak 2009a; see also Kreyenfeld 2010 for a more general discussion), and suggests that, in some country contexts, women’s employment may function as a precondition to childbearing. These findings call for a deeper investigation into how the country-specific factors mediate the interrelationship between childbearing and women’s labour supply.

Comparing highly similar countries that also display some specific and well-recognised differences has recently been recommended by Neyer and Andersson (2008) as a meaningful strategy for analysing the influence of country-specific factors on the studied phenomena. In this paper, we follow this approach by comparing Italy and Poland. On the one hand, these two low-fertility countries have much in common as far as their cultural and institutional frameworks are concerned. Religiosity, strong family ties, the fundamental importance of marriage, rigid labour markets, as well as institutional lags that impede the reconciliation of work and family are perhaps the most important factors uniting Italy and Poland. Both countries are also characterised by low levels of employment among women. However, the labour force participation of women aged 25 to 44 is much higher in Poland than in Italy, which might be seen as an indicator of the greater determination of Polish women to participate in economic activity.

In our study, we focus on women’s employment at a certain stage in a woman’s life course; namely, around the first birth. We find that particular stage in a woman’s life course to be important for two reasons. First, strong work-family tensions may lead to fertility postponement, and, as a result, to smaller family size or even childlessness. Second, difficulties with (re-)entering the labour market after first childbirth may seriously discourage further childbearing. The paper thus sets out to investigate how employment influences the transition to motherhood in the two analysed countries, as well as how having a small child influences a woman’s decision to (re-)enter employment. Our study provides further evidence that conditions for combining work and family, although important, are not the only determinant of women’s fertility and employment decisions, as other country-specific factors are also highly influential.

The paper is structured as follows: The next section describes the context in which Italian and Polish women make their employment and reproductive choices. The macro-level developments in first-order fertility and women’s labour supply in the two countries
are presented in the next step. In the following section, we present the results of our empirical investigation of employment around first birth in Italy and Poland. The paper concludes with a summary and a discussion of the findings.

2. Italian and Polish context

Italy and Poland represent an opportunity for comparison that has, as yet, been largely unexplored. There are strong similarities between these two societies that set them apart from much of the rest of Europe, including the still-low rates of cohabitation, non-marital childbirth and marital disruption (Hantrais 2005). The delayed diffusion of new family behaviour is often linked to the pressure imposed by the Catholic values prevalent in the two countries (De Rose et al. 2008; Kotowska et al. 2008). Only recently have the countries started to experience a slight weakening of ties with the Church. This process is particularly visible among the younger generations, and is manifested in an increase in separation and divorce (Vignoli/Ferro 2009), as well as in cohabitation (Matysiak 2009b).

Additionally, both societies are characterised by strong family and intergenerational ties (Dalla Zuanna/Micheli 2004; Mai et al. 2008; Stankuniene/Maslaukaite, 2008). Parents support their children after leaving the parental home by helping them to establish an independent household and by later providing care for their children. In turn, they receive financial and emotional support in old age (De Rose et al. 2008).

Strong involvement of family members in providing care and support to each other, as well as the commonly shared conviction that families are the most relevant source of social aid, have been accompanied by very little state intervention. Weak public support provided to working parents leads to strong conflicts between work and family that seem to be particularly pronounced in Poland. The availability of public childcare for the youngest children, aged 0-2, is very low in both countries. In addition, the supply of childcare facilities for pre-schoolers is far from sufficient in Poland (see Table 1). Instead of using public childcare facilities, mothers can make use of maternity and parental leave entitlements. In both countries, these entitlements are offered to all working mothers irrespective of their work record, but Poland is much more generous than Italy in terms of leave duration. In Italy, a five-month maternity leave is followed by an optional parental leave of six months, which gives mothers the opportunity to stay at home with the child for up to 11 months without forfeiting their work contract. In Poland, by contrast, a mother can stay home for almost 3.5 years by opting for a three-year parental leave after taking a 16-week maternity leave. Furthermore, if she delivers another child during that time the mother becomes entitled to another maternity leave as well as parental leave on equal terms with a working woman. In both countries, parental leave can be taken by both the mother and the father until the child is eight years old. In the great majority of cases, however, it is taken by mothers directly after the maternity leave. While the financial compensation during maternity leaves is rather high (80% in Italy and 100% in Poland),

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1 These regulations were in force until the end of 2007. Since the beginning of 2008, some changes have been introduced into the parental leave system. We do not refer to them in this paper because the data we use in our empirical investigation was collected in 2006.
the parental leave benefits are rather low (see Table 1). Moreover, in Poland, only mothers who meet certain income criteria are entitled to a parental leave benefit. For those mothers who decide to work, family members constitute an important source of childcare. The Eurostat survey “Reconciliation between work and family life” has shown that around 40% of working mothers receive help from other family members.

The work-family tensions are further exacerbated by rigid working hours, strong barriers to labour market entry, as well as the relatively high degree of uncertainty of employment contracts. These are reflected in low numbers of part-time jobs, high unemployment rates, and the prevalence of temporary contracts among the youth, relative to many other European countries (Table 1). Again, the rigidity of working hours, as well as job instability, seems to be higher in Poland than in Italy.

Table 1: Contextual indicators, Italy and Poland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Poland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Childcare provision a)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children aged 0-2</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children aged 3-6</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parental leave b)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>36 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit</td>
<td>30% of monthly earnings in private sector, and 80-100% in public sector</td>
<td>means-tested, flat rate at around 15% of the average wage in the national economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of working mothers with children up to age 14 who receive childcare support from kin c)</strong></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour market structures d)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% part-time employed among employed, persons aged 25-49 in 2006</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployment rate among the youth (aged 15-24) in 2006</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% temporarily employed among employed, persons aged 15-24 in 2006</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Finally, the attitudes toward working mothers in both of the analysed countries are very traditional, and the gender division of tasks is highly asymmetric (e.g., Mencarini/Tanturri 2006; Muszyńska 2007; Philipov 2008). The viewpoint that women should withdraw from the labour market when children are young also prevails in Poland, despite the fact that the state ideology strongly encouraged the labour force participation of women during the socialist period. Even during that era, women were perceived to be the main homemakers and care providers, while also being expected to work in the market (Sie- mieńska 1997).

2 For more information on the survey see Eurostat (2005).
3. Macro-level developments in first-order fertility and women’s labour supply

Despite the strong position of the Catholic Church, the attachment to the family, and the prevalence of traditional family forms, Italy and Poland have experienced a marked decline in childbearing, and are currently among the European countries with the lowest fertility levels. Younger generations increasingly opt for late entry to parenthood, and the proportion of childless adults has increased substantially in both countries.

The process of fertility postponement is illustrated in Figures 1a-b, which display the cohort first birth age-specific fertility rates. Note that the time series for Italy are shorter than for Poland because of the data limitations. In Italy, the postponement is observed starting with the cohorts born in the mid-1960s. Figure 1a clearly shows the decline in first birth rates at ages 20-25, and an increase thereafter. In Poland, the same processes started later, with cohorts born in the 1970s (Figure 1b). As a result of these changes, the mean age at first delivery in Italy increased from 25 in the early 1970s, to 29 in 2007. In Poland, it rose from 23.3 in 1989 to 25.8 in 2007.

Women not only delay the transition to motherhood; they also increasingly remain childless. In Italy, the proportion of childless women rose from 10% among the 1955 cohort, to 20% among the 1965 cohort (Figure 2). In Poland, this process started slightly later, with the percentage of women who had no children jumping five percentage points from 1960 to 1965 cohort, to 15.4% for the latter cohort.


Source: Observatoire Démographique Européen and computations by Krzysztof Tymicki for Poland for the years 2004-2007, based on the Polish Birth Register.
The massive fertility postponement and increasing childlessness observed in the two countries have often been linked in the literature to the strong tensions between fertility and women’s work. Interestingly, despite the fact that the conditions for combining work and family are generally considered to be poor in both countries, Italy and Poland display substantial differences in the current level of women’s labour force participation (see Figure 3). Even larger differences emerge when past developments in women’s economic activity are taken into account. Italy has always been described as a country with low levels of employment among women (e.g., Salvini 2004). Currently the employment rate of females aged 25-44 stands at 61%, which is around 11 percentage points lower than the EU average. It is notable, however, that in the early 1970s the proportion of women employed was half as large, which points to a considerable increase. Single-earner, male-breadwinner couples are still seen as the most suitable environment for childbearing and childrearing in this country (Vignoli/Salvini 2008).

In contrast to Italy, the economic activity of women in Poland was already high in the 1960s, when over 60% of women aged 25-44 participated in the labour force. By the end of the 1980s, nearly 80% of Polish women were working. This high level involvement of women in economic activity was the result of the country’s labour-intensive economy, low productivity and low wage policies; as well as the communist ideology that sought to achieve full employment. The conflict between paid work and childbearing was generally low at that time, due to the strong job guarantees, the right-to-a-job ideology, and public childcare provision. The situation changed dramatically after the centrally planned economy had been replaced by the capitalist system. Employment was no longer guaranteed, job security was undermined, public childcare deteriorated, and the importance of education in earning a good income and achieving personal success rose substantially. As a re-
sult, a strong increase in work-family tensions was seen, and the employment rate of women aged 25 to 44 fell by around 12 percentage points at the beginning of the 1990s, and did not subsequently recover. Currently, Poland is among the countries with the lowest employment rates for women in Europe, with a rate that is only slightly higher than that of Italy (68.1% versus 60.9% in 2008). Interestingly, young women in Poland have not responded to the growth in work-family tensions by reducing their economic activity, which remained high relative to Italy.

Figure 3: Labour force participation and employment rates (LFPR and EMPR) of Italian and Polish women aged 25-44, 1970-2007

Note: In Poland all persons who were economically active before 1989 were employed, hence LFPR equals to EMPR.


4. Employment around first birth in Italy and Poland: Empirical investigation

4.1. Data and sample selected

In our empirical investigation, we made use of retrospective data stemming from the Household Multipurpose Survey Family and Social Subjects (FSS), corresponding to the Italian Generations and Gender Survey, and the Polish Employment, Family and Education Survey (EFES). The Italian survey was conducted by the Italian National Statistical Office (Istat) in November 2003 on a sample of about 24,000 households and 49,451 in-
individuals of all ages. The Polish survey was prepared at the Institute of Statistics and Demography of the Warsaw School of Economics, and was carried out in November and December 2006 on 3,000 women born 1966-1981.

We were interested in comparing Italy and Poland after the onset of fertility postponement. For this reason, we selected for Poland the cohorts born between 1970 and 1981. These women were aged eight to 19 in 1989, which means that most started their reproductive careers under the new political and economic conditions (see also Figure 1b). Using the same cohorts for Italy would mean following the Italian women for a period that is three years shorter than the period for Poland. For this reason, we chose for Italy cohorts born in the years 1967-1978. Selection of younger cohorts for Italy is additionally justified by the fact that fertility aging started in Italy earlier than in Poland (see Figures 1a and 1b). As a result, in both cases the analysed women were aged 25-36 at the time of the interview. Women who reported having twins at the first delivery were excluded from our samples. The Polish final sample includes 2,300 respondents (cohorts 1970-1981), while the Italian sample includes 4,238 respondents (cohorts 1967-1978).

4.2. Employment before the first birth

In the first step, we modelled the transition to the first birth. To this end, a piecewise linear intensity regression was applied. Each woman was observed from the age of 15 until first conception (measured seven months prior to birth) or the date of the interview. Our main explanatory covariates were women’s employment status, as well as woman’s educational attainment. Additionally, we standardised for the educational level of woman’s parents. Unfortunately, we were not able to account for the employment situation of the partner due to lack of such information in the Polish dataset.

Women who had finished their education were classified into three groups: low, medium and high. The first category consists of women who completed only compulsory education (eight years in both countries), as well as those who continued with basic vocational education, which lasts three years in Italy and two years in Poland. The medium-educated are those who completed at least four years of education at the upper-secondary level, as well as those who were enrolled in post-secondary, but non-tertiary, education. Women who received a bachelor’s or a master’s degree were classified as high-educated. Details on the method applied as well as full model estimates are available in the Appendix.

Our findings clearly demonstrate that, in Italy, the role of women’s employment for childbearing is substantially different from that in Poland. While employed women in Italy are less likely to give birth to a first child, no significant differences between the employed and non-employed women are observed in Poland (see Table 2). Our findings therefore suggest that employed women in Italy are in general more likely to defer childbearing than their Polish counterparts.
Table 2: First birth risk by employment status, Italy (cohorts 1967-1978) and Poland (cohorts 1970-1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coeff. (st.error)</td>
<td>relative risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment ref=non-employment</td>
<td>-0.42 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.66***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Significance level of coefficients: *=10% ; **=5% ; ***=1%. The results are standardised by calendar period, woman’s age and educational attainment, as well as by women’s and parents’ education.


However, this general effect of employment on first birth risk hides differences in the role of employment between various educational groups (see Figures 4-5). After interacting educational level with women’s employment status, we find that tertiary-educated women stand out from this general pattern. In contrast to low- and medium-educated women, they are more likely to conceive their first child if they have a paid job. This means that, for this group of women, finding a job is an important precondition for becoming a mother. This effect can be observed in both countries analysed, but it is more pronounced in Poland. In contrast to the high-educated, the medium- and the low-educated women in Italy are more likely to conceive their first child while out of employment. In Poland, no significant differences between employed and non-employed women in these two educational groups are observed.

Figure 4: First birth risk by employment status and educational attainment, Italy (cohorts 1967-1978). Piecewise linear intensity regression.

Note: Significance level of coefficients: *=10% ; **=5% ; ***=1%. The results are standardised by calendar period, woman’s age and the educational level of the woman’s parents.

4.3. Employment after first birth

In the second step, we addressed the timing of women’s employment (re-)entry after the first birth. The most straightforward solution to this problem would be to apply event history techniques in observing a woman from childbirth onwards. This approach was not appropriate in our case, as women on parental leave were coded as employed in the Italian dataset. Consequently, it was not possible for us to know the date when they decided to finish parental leave and to re-enter paid work. Given that mothers in Italy can be out of paid employment no longer than 11 months following birth without risking to lose their work contract, we decided to observe each woman starting with the first birthday of the first child. Descriptive event-history analysis techniques were used. Women were followed until the date of employment (re-)entry with censoring at second conception or the time of the interview, whichever came first. The resulting Kaplan-Meier estimates of survival curves were adjusted on the basis of the proportions of women at work one year after the first birth. Women who delivered more than one child at first birth were excluded from the analysis.

Although employment seems to hinder the transition to motherhood in Italy, but not in Poland, Italian mothers resume employment after their first birth more quickly than Polish women. Half of Italian mothers, but only one-third of Polish mothers, were working one year after the birth. This difference in re-entry rates can be due to differences in
parental leave regulations. In fact, it turns out that the intensity of employment entry in Poland starts to exceed that of Italy after the child reaches 3.5 years of age, which is precisely the time when parental leave expires (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Timing of the (re-)entry to employment after first birth. Kaplan-Meier survival curve estimates.

It turns out, however, that the intensity of employment entry in Italy strongly depends on whether a woman was employed at least for some time before the first conception (see Figure 7), which points to a strong polarisation in behaviour. Almost 90% of Italian women who had some work experience entered employment one year after giving birth. Of those women who had never worked before they conceived, no more than 10% were employed one year after first birth, and only 20% were on the job three years later. Such a degree of strong polarisation was not observed in Poland, although women with some work experience were found to be more likely to enter paid work after childbirth than those who had never worked.

Figure 7: Timing of the (re-)entry to employment after first birth, by women’s work experience at first conception. Kaplan-Meier survival curve estimates.


Figure 8: Timing of the (re-)entry to employment after first birth by educational attainment. Kaplan-Meier survival curve estimates.

Disentangling the survival curves by women’s educational attainment gives us a deeper insight into the cross-country differences in the patterns of employment entry after the first birth. It turns out (see Figure 8) that high-educated women in Poland are nearly as likely to enter employment as their Italian counterparts. This means that they attach more importance to the accumulation of on-the-job skills than lower-educated women. By contrast, the low- and medium-educated women in Poland seem to make use of the parental leave to a much larger extent, and to enter employment much later than similarly educated women in Italy. It is notable, however, that the proportion of mothers who entered employment after first birth in Poland following the expiry of the parental leave is similar to the proportion found for Italy.

5. Concluding discussion

In this paper, we looked at women’s employment transitions around first birth in Italy and Poland. Although our research has some limitations due to the failure of controlling for the partner’s employment situation, two important conclusions can be drawn from our study. First, we found important educational differentials in the way women’s employment affects transition to motherhood, as well as in the intensity of employment entry after first birth, with tertiary-educated women displaying visibly different behaviour from low- and medium-educated women. Second, we also established clear cross-country differences in women’s employment transitions around first birth, particularly for women with low and medium education. These differences were apparent despite the fact that one of the common features of these two countries is low public support for working parents, and the consequent tensions between work and family. They cannot be fully explained by differences in parental leave regulations in the two countries. The paper therefore demonstrates that conditions for combining work and family, although important, are not the only determinant of women’s decisions regarding work and family. What also matters are other country-specific factors related to the cultural or economic frameworks, as well as women’s attitudes regarding work and family. Below we briefly summarise and interpret these findings in greater detail.

We found that in both countries tertiary-educated women are more likely to conceive their first child if they are employed. It therefore seems that, for this group of women, finding a job is an important precondition for becoming a mother. These women also tend to (re-)enter employment quickly relative to low- and medium-educated women. The intensity of employment entry is only slightly higher in Italy than in Poland despite much longer leave entitlements in the latter country. Thus, it is clear that employment is an important life goal for tertiary-educated women in both countries, and that they seek to combine having a career with motherhood, despite the difficulties they are very likely to encounter.

For medium- and low-educated women, the findings were different. In Italy, employed women in this educational group were found to be less likely to enter motherhood. In Poland, employment does not seem to affect first birth intensity. Interestingly, low- and medium-educated women in Italy tend to (re-)enter employment more quickly after childbirth than in Poland. We attribute this finding to the differences in parental leave regula-
tions, which allow mothers in Poland to stay at home around 2.5 years longer than in Italy without forfeiting their work contract. It is notable, however, that even the low and medium educated women in Poland do not wait till the end of the parental leave but gradually enter employment. When the child approaches the age of 3.5 years, the proportion of mothers in Poland who have entered work draws near to that of Italy. This means that Polish women are not more likely to abandon their jobs than Italian women; instead, they only make use of parts of their generous parental leave entitlements and try to enter employment afterwards, despite the possible depreciation of their human capital during the career break.

Additionally, our study revealed a strong polarisation pattern between working and non-working women in Italy: namely, we found that nearly all women who accumulated some work experience prior to their first conception swiftly re-entered paid work, often as early as one year after childbirth. By contrast, women who had never worked before first conception were more likely to remain out of the labour market after becoming mothers. These two distinct life-course trajectories seem to be predetermined by the decision whether to participate in the labour market at all, made after graduation at the latest. Such a polarisation pattern in employment entry after first birth in Italy has already been identified in previous research (see e.g., Saurel-Cubizolles et al. 1999; Gutiérrez-Domènech 2004), although only for the older cohorts. For Poland, the difference in the intensity of employment entry for women with some work experience and the intensity for women who have never worked is also visible, but it is far less pronounced than in Italy.

Overall, our results suggest that, despite similarly poor public support for working parents in Italy and Poland, paid employment and motherhood tend to be combined more often in the latter country. First, Polish women are more likely to give birth to their first child while employed than Italian women. Second, they do not make full use of the generous parental leave entitlements available, but gradually take up jobs before the leave expires. The most plausible explanation for these findings is that Polish women are much more attached to the labour force. This explanation is consistent with other research confirming the strong determination of Polish women to participate in the labour force (Kotowska/Sztanderska 2007; Matysiak/Steinmetz 2008). Since the parental leave system of Poland hardly offers any incentives to gather substantial work experience before first birth and to (re-)enter work before a second child is born, the sources of this strong determination of Polish women to participate in the labor force have to be searched elsewhere. Economic reasons are certainly one of the important factors. The average disposable income of Polish families is certainly far below the EU average while unemployment among men ranks among the highest across Europe. A study conducted by Matysiak and Mynarska (2010) shows, however, that, apart from financial aspects, employment is important for women also for other reasons. Being a housewife is generally not appreciated while participation in the labour market gives Polish women an opportunity to escape the limitation of domestic chores, to expand social contacts and personal development, and to do something more interesting and challenging than housework. This high priority of Polish women to participate in paid work might be a heritage of the socialist past, and its template of the full-time working woman. This ideal might have been transmitted from mothers to their daughters, and women might now be socially accepted as income providers. Future research is required to test this hypothesis as well as to better investigate reasons
behind the differences in women’s attachment to the labour market in Italy and Poland. Further studies could also look into how the employment entry after first birth affects the transition to a second child.

Acknowledgement

This research was conducted while Anna Matysiak and Daniele Vignoli were staying at the SUDA – Demography Unit, Department of Sociology, Stockholm University. The authors are grateful to Jan Hoem and the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Rostock for providing financial support.

References


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Appendix

In the first step, a hazard regression was applied in order to model differentials in first birth risk by women’s employment status. Among the control variables we included parents’ education, calendar period and respondent’s educational attainment interacted with time since leaving education. The baseline duration (namely the time from the age of 15 until first conception or the date of the interview, whichever comes first), calendar period and time since leaving education was specified on basis of a piecewise linear spline instead of a more common piecewise constant specification. Since splines are functions which are linear within an a priori defined interval, the rationale behind this choice is that with sufficient bend points this specification allows us to capture efficiently any log-hazard pattern in the data (Lillard, 1993). In a second step, we interacted women’s employment status with women’s educational attainment.
Table A1: Transition to first birth, basic model estimates

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Forschungsbeiträge

Matthias Pollmann-Schult

Wenn Männer Väter werden – Über die Auswirkungen der Vaterschaft auf Freizeit, Lebenszufriedenheit und familiäre Beziehungen

When men become fathers – The effects of fatherhood on leisure activities, life satisfaction, and family relations

Zusammenfassung:

Schlagwörter: Vaterschaft, Stiefvaterschaft, Lebenszufriedenheit, Freizeitaktivitäten, familiäre Beziehungen.

Abstract:
This study uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to analyze the effect of fatherhood on different aspects of the everyday life of men. The results indicate that fatherhood positively affects men’s life satisfaction, civic engagement, religious participation, and the closeness of the relationship between men and their families of origin. These findings extend past research, which primarily called attention to the negative effects of fatherhood, such as increased psychological strain, reduced marital satisfaction and limitations in leisure activities. Distinguishing between biological fathers and stepfathers shows that the effect of fatherhood differs between both types of fathers with respect to their civic and religious engagements as well as to their relation to their parents.

Key words: Fatherhood, stepfatherhood, life satisfaction, leisure activities, family relations.

1 Ich bedanke mich bei Edith Busse und zwei anonymen Gutachtern für ihre hilfreichen Kommentare.
1. Einleitung


Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die Auswirkungen der Vaterschaft auf die Lebenszufriedenheit, auf verschiedene Freizeitaktivitäten sowie auf die Beziehung zur Herkunftsfamilie und erweitert den Forschungsstand in mehrfacher Hinsicht.


Zweitens werden die unterschiedlichen Formen von Vaterschaft in früheren Studien kaum thematisiert. Hier dominiert zumeist implizit das Leitbild des biologisch-sozialen Vaters, womit vernachlässigt wird, dass sich im Zuge steigender Trennungs- und Scheidungsarten biologische und soziale Vaterschaft zusehends entkoppeln. Die Zunahme nicht-


Viertens werden die Auswirkungen der Vaterschaft auf das Wohlbefinden, die Frei- zeitaktivitäten und die Beziehung zur Herkunftsfamilie anhand eines prospektiven De- signs untersucht. Frühere Studien sind häufig querschnittlich angelegt (Fthenakis/Minsel 2002) oder verzichten auf eine Vergleichsgruppe bestehend aus kinderlosen Männern (Fthenakis et al. 2002; Werneck 1998), wodurch Rückschlüsse auf die Kausalrichtung der beobachteten Zusammenhänge kaum möglich sind.

2. Theoretische Überlegungen


Ausgehend von diesen Überlegungen werden im Folgenden mögliche Auswirkungen der Vaterschaft auf das Wohlbefinden, die Freizeitaktivitäten und die Beziehung zur Herkunftsfamilie diskutiert. Hieran anschließend skizzieren wir Unterschiede zwischen biologischen und sozialen Vätern sowie zwischen ehelichen und nicht-ehelichen Vaterschaften. Abschließend wird beleuchtet, inwiefern das Geschlecht des Kindes die Auswirkungen der Vaterschaft beeinflusst.

**Lebenszufriedenheit, Freizeitaktivitäten und familiäre Beziehungen von Vätern**


**Freizeitgestaltung:** Im Zuge der Familiengründung ist eine Umstrukturierung der Freizeit in verschiedener Hinsicht zu erwarten. Einerseits schränkt der Übergang zur Vaterschaft die Möglichkeiten der Freizeitgestaltung ein, da mehr Zeit für die Hausarbeit und Kinderbetreuung verwendet wird. Gerade junge Eltern verbringen einen Großteil ihrer Freizeit zu Hause, wodurch außerhäusliche Sozialkontakte und die Teilnahme am kulturellen Leben nachlassen (Rost/Schneider 1994).

Andererseits aber ergeben sich im Zuge der Familiengründung Gelegenheitsstrukturen für neue Sozialkontakte und soziales Engagement. So erfordert die institutionelle Einbindung des Kindes in den Kindergarten, die Schule oder den Sportverein oftmals ein bürgerliches Engagement der Väter und Mütter und schafft neue Kontaktmöglichkeiten zu anderen Eltern. In der Tat weisen US-amerikanische Studien darauf hin, dass Väter...
häufiger in sozialen und politischen Verbänden aktiv sind als kinderlose Männer und sich oftmals an der Elternarbeit beteiligen (Eggebeen/Knoester 2001; Knoester/Eggebeen 2006). Ebenfalls berichten Väter eine höhere Teilnahme an religiösen Aktivitäten als Männer ohne Kinder (Umberson 1987). Wir gehen daher davon aus, dass auch in Deutschland der Übergang zur Vaterschaft eine stärkere Teilnahme an bürgerschaftlichen und religiösen Aktivitäten bewirkt.


**Formen der Vaterschaft**


Geschlecht des Kindes


3. Datenbasis und Methode

Daten


Variablen

Als abhängige Variablen werden die Lebenszufriedenheit, verschiedene Freizeitaktivitäten sowie die Beziehung zu den eigenen Eltern berücksichtigt. Die Lebenszufriedenheit wird anhand einer elfstufigen Skala (0=ganz und gar unzufrieden, 10=ganz und gar zufrieden) erfasst. Der Fragenkatalog des SOEP zum Freizeitverhalten umfasst verschiedene


Da die Lebenszufriedenheit und das Freizeitverhalten vermutlich stärker durch die Altersstruktur der Kinder als durch die Anzahl an Kindern im Haushalt geprägt werden, bilden wir die familiäre Situation anhand des Alters des ältesten Kindes ab. Wir unterscheiden zwischen kinderlosen Männern, Vätern, deren ältestes Kind nicht älter als 6 Jahre alt ist, Vätern, deren ältestes Kind zwischen 7 und 13 Jahre alt ist sowie Vätern, deren ältestes Kind zwischen 14 und 17 Jahre alt ist. In den Analysen zur Auswirkung des Geschlechts des Kindes auf das väterliche Verhalten wird die familiäre Situation anhand von zwei binär kodierten Variablen (1 Junge vs. kein Junge; 1 Mädchen vs. kein Mädchen) abgebildet.

Ferner wird die Form der Vaterschaft berücksichtigt, indem wir zwischen biologischen Kindern und Stiefkindern unterscheiden. Weil im SOEP keine präzisen Angaben zum Verwandtschaftsverhältnis zwischen Vätern und ihren (Stief-)Kindern vorliegen, wird die Art der verwandschaftlichen Beziehung anhand von Informationen über die Entwicklung der Haushaltszusammensetzung und der Ehebiografie beider Partner rekonstruiert. Auf diese Weise lässt sich das Verwandtschaftsverhältnis bei 98 % der Kinder mit hoher Sicherheit bestimmen. Biologische Kinder werden weiterhin dahingehend unter-


Ferner werden verschiedene Kontrollvariablen in die Modelle aufgenommen. Da nichteheliche Familiengründungen und die Stiefvaterschaft in jüngeren Kohorten, die eine modernere Einstellung zur Vaterschaft aufweisen, häufiger auftreten als in den älteren Geburtskohorten, besteht die Gefahr, dass die Effekte der nichtehelichen Familiengründung sowie der Stiefvaterschaft einerseits und die Effekte der kohortenbedingten Unterschiede in der Vaterrolle andererseits konfundieren. Zwecks Berücksichtigung möglicher Kohorteneffekte wird daher die Geburtskohorte (bis einschließlich 1960 geboren vs. später als 1960 geboren) als weitere Kontrollvariable in das Modell aufgenommen.


**Analyseverfahren**


Die FE-Regression unterscheidet sich von der linearen Regression darin, dass die abhängige Variable als auch die unabhängigen Variablen um den individuellen Mittelwert bereinigt werden. Durch die Mittelwertbereinigung greifen die FE-Schätzungen zur Bestimmung der Koeffizienten lediglich auf die intra-individuelle Varianz zurück. Anhand

\(^4\) Männer, die sowohl mit biologischen als auch mit Stiefskindern zusammenleben, werden ab dem Jahr der Geburt des ersten biologischen Kindes als „biologische Väter“ kategorisiert.

dieser Vorgehensweise wird unbeobachtete Heterogenität, die Selektionseffekten zugrun
de liegt und Endogenität zwischen den unabhängigen Variablen und dem Störterm verur-
sacht, eliminiert. Die Koeffizienten der FE-Regression werden auf die gleiche Art inter-
pretiert wie die einer linearen Regression. Bei der RE-Regression erfolgt ebenfalls wie bei
der FE-Regression eine Subtraktion der individuellen Mittelwerte, jedoch wird im Gegen-
satz zur FE-Regression der unbeobachtete Effekt nicht eliminiert, sondern als Zufallsva-
riable geschätzt. Weiterhin unterscheidet sich die RE-Regression von der FE-Regression
darin, dass allein bei der RE-Regression zeitkonstante unabhängige Variablen in das Mo-
dell aufgenommen werden können. Daher wird die Kohortenzugehörigkeit lediglich bei
der Analyse der Freizeitaktivitäten und der Beziehung zu den eigenen Eltern berücksich-
tigt (nicht aber bei der Analyse der Lebenszufriedenheit).

4. Empirische Ergebnisse

Lebenszufriedenheit

Wie die Ergebnisse in Tabelle 1 zeigen, wirkt sich der Übergang zur Vaterschaft positiv
auf die Lebenszufriedenheit aus. Ein signifikanter Effekt ist allerdings allein bei Vätern
zu beobachten, deren ältestes Kind maximal 6 Jahre alt ist, wohingegen Väter von Kin-
dern über 6 Jahren kein höheres Zufriedenheitsniveau berichten als kinderlose Männer.
Dieser Befund steht in Einklang mit den theoretischen Annahmen der Zufriedenheitsfor-
schung, die lediglich temporäre Effekte von Lebensereignissen auf das Zufriedenheitsni-
veau prognostizieren. Entgegen unserer Annahme besteht kein signifikanter Unterschied
zwischen Vätern von biologischen Kindern und Stiefvätern, jedoch verzeichnen Väter
von nichtehelichen Kindern ein – schwach signifikant – höheres Zufriedenheitsniveau als
Väter, bei denen die Familiengründung im Rahmen der Ehe erfolgte. Dieses Ergebnis ent-
spricht der oben angeführten Annahme, dass kohabitierte Väter in einem höheren Ma-
ße familial engagiert sind und sich daher die Familienbildung bei ihnen stärker auf das
Zufriedenheitsniveau auswirkt als bei verheirateten Männern. Die Überlegung, dass nicht-
eheliche Familiengründungen aufgrund ihrer häufigen Ungeplantheit mit einer niedrige-
en Lebenszufriedenheit im Vergleich zu ehelichen Familienbildungen einhergehen, wird
dagegen nicht empirisch gestützt.

Jedoch verbirgt sich hinter diesem Befund möglicherweise ein Kohorteneffekt, da
nichteheliche Familiengründungen verstärkt in jüngeren Geburtskohorten auftreten, die
vermutlich aufgrund einer moderneren Einstellung zur Vaterschaft einen stärkeren An-
stieg der Lebenszufriedenheit aus der Familiengründung nach den älteren Geburts-
kohorten. Der positive Koeffizient der nichtehelichen Familiengründung würde demnach
auf einen kausalen Effekt dieser Partnerschaftsform auf die Lebenszufriedenheit hinweisen,
sondern die nichteheliche Familiengründung würde lediglich als Indikator für die
Zugehörigkeit zu einer jüngeren Alterskohorte fungieren. Um diesen Erklärungsver-
such empirisch zu überprüfen, wird die Kohortenzugehörigkeit „konstant gehalten“, in
dem Modell 1 getrennt für zwei Geburtskohorten (Geburtsjahr bis einschließlich 1960
und Geburtsjahr 1961 oder später) berechnet. Wenn der positive Koeffizient der
nicht-ehelichen Familiengründung auf einem Kohorteneffekt beruht, dann müssten beide
Modelle niedrige und nicht-signifikante Koeffizienten für diese Variable hervorbringen. Tatsächlich sind die die Koeffizienten für die nichteheliche Familiengründung in beiden Modellen relativ groß ohne jedoch ein akzeptables Signifikanzniveau zu erreichen, sodass die Existenz eines Kohorteneffektes nicht völlig ausgeschlossen werden kann.

Tabelle 1: Determinanten der Lebenszufriedenheit (Fixed Effects Regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Modell 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Modell 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verheiratet¹</td>
<td>-0,036</td>
<td>0,037</td>
<td>-0,020</td>
<td>0,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ältestes Kind unter 7 Jahren²</td>
<td>0,093*</td>
<td>0,041</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ältestes Kind 7-13 Jahre³</td>
<td>0,073</td>
<td>0,050</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ältestes Kind 14-17 Jahre³</td>
<td>0,018</td>
<td>0,063</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stiefkinder²</td>
<td>0,102</td>
<td>0,096</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nichtehel. Familiengründung³</td>
<td>0,167*</td>
<td>0,098</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junge²</td>
<td>0,176**</td>
<td>0,051</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mädchen²</td>
<td>0,176**</td>
<td>0,051</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teilzeitbeschäftigt⁴</td>
<td>-0,307**</td>
<td>0,059</td>
<td>-0,206*</td>
<td>0,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nichterwerbstätig⁴</td>
<td>-0,901**</td>
<td>0,034</td>
<td>-0,852**</td>
<td>0,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keine Ausbildung⁵</td>
<td>-0,025</td>
<td>0,047</td>
<td>-0,082</td>
<td>0,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fachhochschulabschluss⁵</td>
<td>-0,163*</td>
<td>0,0749</td>
<td>-0,153</td>
<td>0,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hochschulabschluss⁵</td>
<td>-0,030</td>
<td>0,100</td>
<td>0,036</td>
<td>0,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerin teilzeitbeschäftigt⁶</td>
<td>-0,111**</td>
<td>0,028</td>
<td>-0,111**</td>
<td>0,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerin nichterwerbstätig⁶</td>
<td>-0,101**</td>
<td>0,028</td>
<td>-0,090**</td>
<td>0,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konstante</td>
<td>7,592**</td>
<td>0,051</td>
<td>8,890**</td>
<td>0,178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signifikanzniveau: ** = p<0,01; * = p<0,05; + = p<0,1.

Auszüglichungen der abhängigen Variablen: 0 = ganz und gar unzufrieden; 10 = ganz und gar zufrieden.


6 Die Koeffizienten der nichtehelichen Familiengründung betragen: 0,355; T-Wert: 1,16 (geboren vor 1960) und 0,134; T-Wert: 1,29 (geboren 1960 oder später).
Ein signifikanter positiver Effekt der Familiengründung ist lediglich für das Jahr der Geburt des ersten Kindes und das Folgejahr zu erkennen. Die zu beobachtenden Auswirkungen sind zwar angesichts der elfstufigen Skala, die der Messung zugrunde liegt, noch immer nicht sonderlich stark ausgeprägt, jedoch fallen die Effekte deutlich höher aus als jene in Modell 1 und entsprechen ziemlich genau dem von Lucas et al. (2003) ermittelten Effekt der Eheschließung auf die Lebenszufriedenheit7.


Freizeitverhalten

Der Übergang zur Vaterschaft hat restringierende, aber auch positive Auswirkungen auf die Freizeitgestaltung (Tabelle 2). Wenig überraschend zeigen sich in Modell 1a negative Ef-

7 Die Studie von Lucas et al. (2003: 532) basiert ebenfalls auf den SOEP-Daten und berichtet einen Anstieg der Lebenszufriedenheit um 0,23 Punkte infolge der Eheschließung.

Negative Auswirkungen der Vaterschaft sind ebenfalls hinsichtlich der Häufigkeit gegenseitiger Besuche von Nachbarn, Freunden oder Bekannten (Modell 2a) zu beobachten, wobei der Effekt stärker ausfällt, wenn die Familiengründung im Rahmen einer nichtehelichen Lebensgemeinschaft erfolgte. Auch hier zeigt sich mit zunehmendem Alter der Kinder keine Abschwächung des negativen Effektes. Bei der Berücksichtigung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit des Kindes in Modell 2b wird deutlich, dass die Vaterschaft nur dann die Besuchs frequenz signifikant reduziert, wenn ein Mädchen geboren wurde, wohingegen Väter von Jungen ihre Nachbarn, Freunde und Bekannte nicht signifikant seltener treffen als kinderlose Männer.

In Einklang mit den oben formulierten Erwartungen wirkt sich die Elternschaft positiv auf den Kontakt zu Familienangehörigen und Verwandten aus (Modell 3a). Eine signifikant erhöhte Besuchs frequenz ist jedoch nur zu beobachten, solange sich das älteste Kind im Vorschulalter befindet. Auch hier wird die Effektstärke durch das Geschlecht des Kindes beeinflusst: Gemäß den Ergebnissen in Modell 3b berichten Väter von Jungen häufiger Verwandtschaftsbesuche als Väter von Mädchen. Insgesamt betrachtet deuten die Befunde der Modelle 2b und 3b darauf hin, dass die Reduktion der Sozialkontakte bei Vätern von Mädchen stärker ausgeprägt ist als bei Vätern von Jungen.

### Tabelle 2: Determinanten der Freizeitaktivitäten (Ordered Random Effects Regression, Standardfehler in Klammern)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verheiratet¹</td>
<td>-0.390**</td>
<td>-0.438**</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.171**</td>
<td>0.050**</td>
<td>-0.118+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ältestes Kind unter 7</td>
<td>-0.398**</td>
<td>-0.111**</td>
<td>0.159**</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.253**</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahre²</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ältestes Kind 7-13</td>
<td>-0.490**</td>
<td>-0.120*</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.597**</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahre³</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ältestes Kind 14-17</td>
<td>-0.539**</td>
<td>-0.127*</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.176*</td>
<td>0.657**</td>
<td>0.315***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahre³</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schulkinder³</td>
<td>0.182*</td>
<td>-0.148</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>-0.401**</td>
<td>-0.508**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nichteheil. Familien-</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>-0.171*</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.627**</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gründung³</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Jung³                   | -0.441**                               | -0.064                     | 0.097*                 | 0.080                                  | 0.311**                          | 0.153*                   |
|                         | (0.084)                                | (0.087)                    | (0.089)                | (0.084)                                | (0.083)                          | (0.070)                  |
| Mädchen³                | -0.366**                               | -0.156**                   | 0.042                  | 0.017                                  | 0.265**                          | -0.043                   |
|                         | (0.094)                                | (0.098)                    | (0.089)                | (0.085)                                | (0.086)                          | (0.071)                  |

**Signifikanzniveau:** ** = p<0.01; * = p<0.05; * = p<0.1.**

**Fällezahl:** 7227

**Chi² (df=52/49):**

| 645.05** | 509.51** | 377.62** | 300.00** | 405.26** | 221.60** | 122.38** | 315.81** | 204.53** | 155.75** | 121.33** |

Aus Prüfungen der abhängigen Variablen: 5=täglich; 4=mindestens 1mal pro Woche; 3=mindestens 1mal pro Monat; 2=seltener; 1=nie.
1) Referenzgruppe: nichteheliche Partnerschaft; 2) Ref.: kein Kind; 3) Ref.: biologisches Kind mit ehelicher Familiengründung.

**Kontrollvariablen:** Erwerbsstatus, Qualifikationsniveau, Erwerbsstatus der Partnerin, Kohortenzugehörigkeit, Alter (Dummy-Variablen für das jeweilige Lebensalter).

**Quelle:** SOEP 1990-2007, eigene Berechnungen.
Schließlich wird der Besuch von Sportveranstaltungen durch die familiale Situation geprägt, indem Väter mit jugendlichen Kindern signifikant häufiger solche Veranstaltungen besuchen als kinderlose Männer (Modell 6a). Ein positiver Effekt ist allerdings nur bei Vätern von Söhnen zu beobachten, wohingegen Töchter die Besuchshäufigkeit von Sportveranstaltungen nicht signifikant beeinflussen (Modell 6b).

**Beziehung zur den eigenen Eltern**

Gemäß den oben durchgeführten Analysen erhöht sich im Zuge der Familiengründung die Häufigkeit verwandtschaftlicher Besuche (Tabelle 2, Modell 3a). Im Folgenden wird der Frage nachgegangen, ob sich der Übergang zur Vaterschaft nicht nur positiv auf die Kontaktdichte zu Familienangehörigen auswirkt, sondern auch die Beziehung zu den eigenen Eltern vertieft. Wie die Ergebnisse zeigen (Tabelle 3), wird das Verhältnis zum Vater lediglich in den ersten Jahren nach der Familiengründung als enger empfunden (Modell 1a), und auch dieser Effekt ist nur schwach signifikant. Die Beziehung zur Mutter bleibt dagegen gänzlich unverändert (Modell 2a).

**Tabelle 3:** Determinanten der Beziehungsenge zu den eigenen Eltern  
(Ordered Random Effects Regression, Standardfehler in Klammern)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beziehung zum Vater</th>
<th>Beziehung zur Mutter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modell 1a</td>
<td>Modell 1b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verheiratet</td>
<td>0.058 (0.086)</td>
<td>0.068 (0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ältestes Kind unter 7 Jahren</td>
<td>0.152* (0.089)</td>
<td>0.092 (0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ältestes Kind 7-13 Jahre</td>
<td>0.097 (0.097)</td>
<td>0.129 (0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ältestes Kind 14-17 Jahre</td>
<td>0.122 (0.156)</td>
<td>-0.290* (0.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stiefkinder</td>
<td>-0.390* (0.156)</td>
<td>-0.290* (0.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nichtehel. Familiengründung</td>
<td>0.055 (0.094)</td>
<td>0.032 (0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jüngsten</td>
<td>3.623 (2.682)</td>
<td>4.484 (3.331)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mädchen</td>
<td>2.682 (3.331)</td>
<td>3.331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signifikanzniveau: ** = p<0,01; * = p<0,05; * = p<0,1.  
Ausprägungen der abhängigen Variablen: 5=sehr eng; 4=eng; 3=mittel; 2=flüchtig; 1=überhaupt keine Beziehung.

1) Referenzgruppe: nichteheliche Partnerschaft; 2) Ref.: kein Kind 3) Ref.: biologisches Kind mit ehelicher Familiengründung.

Kontrollvariablen: Erwerbsstatus, Qualifikationsniveau, Erwerbsstatus der Partnerin, Kohortenzugehörigkeit, Alter (Dummy-Variablen für das jeweilige Lebensalter).

Die ausgewiesenen Befunde deuten jedoch auf starke Unterschiede zwischen biologischen und sozialen Vätern hin. Männer, die zusammen mit Stiefkindern leben, berichten gar eine Verschlechterung der Beziehung zu den eigenen Eltern. Die Enge der intergenerationalen Beziehung ist jedoch nicht davon abhängig, ob sich die Familiengründung im Rahmen einer Ehe oder einer nichtehelichen Lebensgemeinschaft ereignet hat. Ebenfalls hat das Geschlecht des Kindes keinen Einfluss auf die Beziehungsentwicklung.

5. Diskussion und Zusammenfassung


Hinsichtlich der Freizeitgestaltung zeigen die hier präsentierten Befunde, dass Vaterschaft nicht nur mit einem Rückzug ins Private einhergeht, sondern ebenfalls eine Zunahme bestimmter außerhäuslicher Unternehmungen wie die Beteiligung an bürger- und religiösen Aktivitäten oder den Besuch von Sportveranstaltungen bewirkt. Solche positiven Auswirkungen auf die Freizeitgestaltung, die meist erst eintreten, wenn sich die Kinder im Schulalter befinden, wurden in früheren Studien weitgehend vernachlässigt. Der Übergang zur Vaterschaft impliziert folglich nicht nur eine „Verhäuslichung der Freizeit“, sondern wirkt sich ebenfalls positiv auf die Freizeitgestaltung und das gesellschaftliche Engagement aus.

Ein weiteres zentrales Ergebnis der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist der zum Teil differentialle Effekt von biologischer und sozialer Vaterschaft. So erfahren biologische Väter eine signifikant engere Beziehung zu ihren eigenen Eltern als soziale Väter. Möglicher-
weise führen traditionelle Vorstellungen der Großelterngeneration dazu, dass Familien- 
gründungen außerhalb der klassischen Familienform nicht als solche akzeptiert werden 
und folglich keine Verbesserung der Generationenbeziehungen bewirken. Ebenfalls ist 
denkbar, dass Männer mit einer nur flüchtigen Beziehung zur Herkunftsfamilie eher zur 
Gründung einer Stieffamilie neigen als Männer mit starken familialen Bindungen. Ferner 
berichten soziale Väter ein geringeres ehrenamtliches Engagement und eine schwächere 
religiöse Partizipation als biologische Väter. Die geringere Teilnahme an bürgerschaftli-
chen und religiösen Aktivitäten deutet jedoch nicht zwangsläufig auf eine niedrigere Be-
reitschaft zur Übernahme elterlicher Verantwortung hin, sondern ist vermutlich auch dar-
on zurückzuführen, dass bestimmte Erziehungsaufgaben vom biologischen Vater wahr-
genommen werden oder aber – aus rechtlichen Gründen – von der Mutter übernommen 
werden müssen. Insgesamt verdeutlichen die Befunde, dass soziale Väter ähnliche Aus-
wirkungen der Elternschaft auf die Lebenszufriedenheit und das Alltagshandeln wie bio-
logische Väter erfahren. Auch nichteheliche Familiengründungen unterscheiden sich in 
ihren Folgen kaum von Familiengründungen, die im Rahmen einer Ehe erfolgen.

Schließlich konnte gezeigt werden, dass die Auswirkungen der Vaterschaft partiell 
vom Geschlecht des Kindes abhängen. Väter von Söhnen verzeichnen eine höhere Le-
benszufriedenheit und eine geringere Reduktion der Sozialkontakte als Väter mit Töch-
tern. Dabei stützen die geschlechterdivergenten Auswirkungen auf die Lebenszufrieden-
heit die These einer „Präferenz für Jungen“ seitens der Väter deutlich stärker als frühere 
Studien zum Effekt der Geschlechterkomposition der Kinder auf die Heirats- und Schei-
dungswahrscheinlichkeit. Die vorliegenden Ergebnisse legen die Frage nahe, inwiefern 
weitere Aspekte des familialen Verhaltens, wie etwa die väterliche Beteiligung an der 
Haus- und Familienarbeit durch das Geschlecht des Kindes geprägt werden und machen 
deutlich, dass die Geschlechterkomposition des Nachwuchses, aber auch der Kontext der 
Familiengründung in zukünftigen Untersuchungen ausführlicher als bislang berücksich-
tigt werden müssen.

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