Completion to Chapter 5, *Case descriptions*:

Chapter 5 of the book (*Case descriptions*) includes only those elections that are part of the case selection and thus of the *Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (see section 3.2., *Case selection*). To enable the use of all of the data for other purposes, this supplement includes a presentation of the additional elections and government formation processes in the eight Central and Eastern European countries in the period under investigation (early 1990s up to 2010).

Each country chapter starts with a rough description of the regime change and the basic features of party competition. The subsequent descriptions of individual elections contain

- a short description of the general background (such as the main development of the previous government and changes in the party system)
- information on the electoral campaign (overview on the topics that dominated the electoral campaign and a description of the positions of the relevant parties)
- a data table with the electoral results of those parties that passed the electoral threshold, including information on the fragmentation of the party systems (Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties, Laakso and Taagepera 1979)
- a description of the process of government formation and its outcome.

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1 Only those governments regularly formed after elections are included.
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1. Bulgaria

1.1. General background

Regime change

Compared to the other Central and Eastern European countries, the Soviet communist regime imposed on Bulgaria was stronger and more stable. It never faced a strong opposition; any sign of resistance was violently suppressed (Spirova 2005, p. 602). The Bulgarian Communist Party was totally subordinated to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, in their typology of communist regime types, Kitschelt, Mansfeldová and Markowski (1999, p. 40) assign Bulgaria to the countries that experienced “patrimonial communism”, marked by a high degree of repression. As a consequence, democratic transition in Bulgaria was not induced by a strong opposition but by an internal coup initiated by a faction of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Kitschelt et al. (1999, p. 40) describe it as a “pre-emptive strike of elements within the political elites.” Democratisation took place as transformation “from above” (Merkel 1999, p. 405; see also Malinov 2010). In November 1989, Todor Živkov who had been leader of the Communist Party and head of state of Bulgaria for thirty-five years, was removed from power (Curtis 1992). After the end of the Živkov regime, a round-table for negotiations between representatives of the government and the opposition was established (Riedel 2010, p. 678). In April 1990, the Bulgarian Communist Party changed its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) (Genov 2010, p. 4 et seq.). Andrey Lukanov, leading member of the reformist wing of the BSP, became Bulgaria’s last communist prime minister. Free elections were scheduled for summer 1990. These changes were, however, minor compared to the dramatic changes that took place in most of the other Central and Eastern European countries in the same period (Curtis 1992). Many members of the old government were left in power. Despite the renaming of the former Communist Party of Bulgaria to the Socialist Party and despite the decision of the party elite to abandon the former ideology, the BSP was still not a western-style socialist party but a party that pursued the economic interests of the former communist elite (Riedel 2010, p. 702).

Soon after the admittance of pluralism, a huge number of parties and alliances appeared (Malinov 2010). The biggest and most influential oppositional alliance was the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), founded in December 1989. It united diverse opposition parties, movements, academic organi-
ations and trade unions, ranging from Marxist to Christian democratic organisations. The first multi-party election took place in June 1990.

Basic features of party competition

The deep regime divide between the post-communist Socialist Party (BSP) and the anti-communist alliance Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) characterised the party system during the first decade after the regime change. Besides these two groups, “myriad smaller political parties struggled for ‘survival between the poles’” (Spirova 2006, p. 617). From 2000 on, the importance of the regime divide decreased; the importance of other issues, especially of economic questions, grew. With the emergence of an influential player besides the two blocs in 2001, the populist National Movement Simeon, bipolarisation ended and party competition became more and more diverse (Ibid.).

Despite the presence of a strong ethnic party representing the Turkish minority (Movement for Rights and Freedom, DPS), ethnic questions did not dominate party competition during the first decade. This changed with the emergence of a relatively strong nationalist party, the National Union Attack (Ataka), before the 2005 election. It was also the emergence of Ataka that introduced a new dividing line that can be classified as ‘nationalism versus Europeism’ (de Nève 2002; Stoyanov 2006).

1.2. Bulgarian Election 1990

Background

The first not fully-democratic but multi-party election was held in June 1990. Forty parties and alliances took part in the election but only some of them had the chance to gain seats in parliament (Malinov 2010). The two main contenders were the post-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the oppositional Union of Democratic Forces (SDS). The very diverse members

---

2 The ODS consisted of the Club for Glasnost and Democracy (CGD), the Ecoglasnost, the Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights (NAZChP), the Independent Labour Confederation, the Committee for the Defense of Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience, and Spiritual Values (CZRS), the Club of the Repressed after 1945 (CR), the Federation of the Independent Student Societies (FnsD), the Civic Initiative (GI), the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BsDP), the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union-’Nikola Petkov’ (BZms-NP) plus later on two additional parties, the Radical Democratic Party (RDP) and the Democratic Party (DP) (Malinov 2010, p. 4).
of the SDS were held together by their shared desire to introduce political and economic reforms and to establish a functioning democracy (Ibid., p. 4; Riedel 2010, p. 702). Outside of these, only two additional parties had managed to establish themselves as relatively influential players, the Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS) and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BZNS) (Malinov 2010, p. 5; Curtis 1992). The Movement for Rights and Freedom, representing the Turkish minority that considered itself a liberal party, emerged in the late 1980s as an opponent of the communist regime and its anti-minority politics of “Bulgarization” (Stoyanov 2006, p. 195). At the beginning, the legal status of the party was not clear; in October 1991, 93 members of the National Assembly asked the constitutional court to declare the DPS unconstitutional because article 11.4 of the constitution forbids the formation of parties on an ethnic basis. In April 1992, the petition was rejected (Krastev 1997, p. 99). The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BZNS) had been the only political party that existed besides the Communist Party during the communist regime. It represented agrarian interests (Riedel 2010, p. 705).

Campaign

The deep divide between post-communist and post-oppositional forces spanned the whole campaign (de Nève 2002, p. 301). The main issues were the organisation of the new political system, the question of how to implement the necessary reform process and the role of the (post-) communist elites in the new system. While the opposition parties opted for a clean break with the past, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) advocated moderate changes (Curtis 1992).

Results

Table 1: Bulgarian Election 1990; Election date: 10/06/1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Democratic Forces (SDS)</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS)</td>
<td>05.8</td>
<td>08.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BZNS)</td>
<td>04.0</td>
<td>06.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data sources: European Election Data Base, http://eed.nsd.uib.no (last access: 20/07/2014); Malinov 2010
Only four parties passed the 4% threshold. The clear winner of the election was the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), with an absolute majority of seats. It was followed by the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) (36% of the seats). In addition to the parties of the two big blocs, two parties made it into parliament: the Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS) and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BZNS).

One of the main reasons why the post-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) was able to win the elections shortly after the fall of the communist regime was its established infrastructure and well-equipped party organisation, compared to the limited financial resources of the opposition parties (Malinov 2010, p. 5).

Government formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Premier</th>
<th>Formateur</th>
<th>Coalition Partner</th>
<th>% seats total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning</td>
<td>Andrei Lukanov</td>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With an absolute majority, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) was the clear winner of the election. A huge section of the leaders and supporters of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) did not, however, accept the election outcome. They claimed that the elections were unfair; they accused the BSP, which still controlled the state apparatus, of having dominated and even manipulated the elections (Malinov 2010, p. 6). Despite the protest of the opposition, the BSP built a single-party government.

1.3. Bulgarian Election 1994

Background

The minority government of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), which was built in 1991, soon lost the support of the Turkish minority party, the Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS). The main reason was the government’s decision to reconstitute the old ownership structures and to dissolve all cooperatives: huge parts of the Turkish-speaking minorities were lease-
holders of cooperative societies and thus lost their property (Riedel 2010, p. 688). In December 1992, as a consequence of an arms-deal affair, Premier Dimitrov called for a vote of confidence and lost it (Riedel 1993). Because neither the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) nor the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) was able or willing to form a new government, the small DPS was charged with government formation. A government led by Liuben Berov, a Prime Minister without party affiliation, was built. The government depended on the support of alternating majorities (Riedel 2010, p. 689). Its overall performance was rather weak. The privatisation process stagnated, the currency depreciated and unemployment grew (Crampton 1995, p. 237). Corruption was an omnipresent problem. The government managed, however, to stay in power for two years; it survived six votes of no confidence, before it had to resign in September 1994. After a number of attempts to form a new government failed, the president nominated a caretaker government led by Reneta Indžova (cofounder of the SDS). New elections were scheduled to be held in 1994 (Riedel 2010, p. 689).

The composition of the party system underwent some changes (Crampton 1995). While the BSP remained relatively stable, the SDS (Movement) disintegrated. The larger parties claimed more influence within the alliance (Ibid.). In autumn 1994, the influential Democratic Party (DP) and an agrarian group left the SDS and built the Bulgarian People’s Union (BNS). A second new party emerged, the Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB), a centrist party representing commercial interests.

Campaign

The campaign was relatively “lacklustre” (Crampton 1995, p. 238). The main contenders were all in favour of the continuation of economic reform as well as for measures against corruption. They differed, however, in their position on the desired speed of change and in their priorities. While the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) saw the fight against inflation as its most important task, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) mainly pointed to high unemployment. Being the main supporter of the outgoing minority government, the BSP had had much influence on the government and was thus also responsible for the reform stagnation. It was, however, perceived as an opposition party by the electorate: it managed to present itself as an advocate of those who suffered from the consequences of the economic reforms (Ibid.). The SDS accused the outgoing Berov government and the Socialists (BSP) of postponing necessary reforms (Riedel 2010, p. 689).
Results

Table 2: Bulgarian Election 1994; Election date: 18/12/1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Democratic Forces (SDS)</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian People's Union (BNS)</td>
<td>07.5</td>
<td>06.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS)</td>
<td>06.3</td>
<td>05.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB)</td>
<td>05.4</td>
<td>04.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effective number of parliamentary parties: 2.7. Data sources: Döring and Manow 2012; Essex Election Database, Popescu and Hannavy 2001, http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections (last access: 20/07/2014)

The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) won an absolute majority of seats. The Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) finished second, far behind: it won only 28.8% of the seats; a dramatic decline compared to the 1991 election where it won more than 45% of the seats. The DPS was unable to live up to its good result in the previous election but passed the threshold (6.3% of the seats). The two new parties, the Popular Union (BNS) and the Popular Union (BNS), managed to pass the threshold.

Government formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Premier</th>
<th>Formateur</th>
<th>Coalition Partner</th>
<th>% seats total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning</td>
<td>Zhan Videnov</td>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1.4. Bulgarian Election 1997

Background

The parliamentary term that started in 1994 was marked by a dramatic collapse in Bulgaria’s economy (Malinov 2010, p. 13). The incumbent government of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) was blamed for spending huge sums on subsidies for inefficient enterprises instead of implementing the necessary reforms (Crampton 1997, p. 560). The government had insulated Bulgaria economically and had created a climate hostile to foreign invest-
The system was highly corrupt. The government acted in favour of its clientele, the former communist elite (‘nomenklatura’), and at the expense of the population (Riedel 2010, p. 689). Living standards decreased dramatically. Zhan Videnov, premier minister and leader of the BSP, announced his resignation on December 1997 (Harper 2003). The BSP formed a new executive committee. It was, however, composed of nearly the same personnel as before. This provoked mass protests and a series of strikes, “bringing the country to the brink of civil war” (Harper 2003, p. 336). Finally, the government agreed to call for early election, planned for April 1997. Transitionally, a caretaker government was formed, led by Stefan Sofiyanski, the mayor of Sofia (Crampton 1997, p. 561).

While the party system was still structured by the regime divide, the composition of the party system had completely changed since the last election. The major change on the post-oppositional side was the formation of the United Democratic Forces (ODS) in 1996. It comprised the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP), the Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS) and the Bulgarian’s People Union (BNS) (Crampton 1997, p. 561). There were also reshufflings on the left side of the party system. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) together with Eko-glasnost, one of the founders of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) in 1989, formed the Democratic Left (DL). In 1996, the reformist wing of the BSP left the party and built the Euro-Left Coalition (KE) (Riedel 2010, p. 703). Besides the two big blocs, other changes also occurred: the Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS) surprisingly – and despite resistance within the party – merged with different monarchist groups into the Union for National Salvation (ONS). The former President Zhelyu Zhelev formed a new liberal party, the Liberal Forum (LF) (Crampton 1997, p. 562).

Campaign

The campaign was relatively unspectacular and quiet, mainly for two reasons: first, the parties as well as the population were preoccupied with the economic crisis. Second, it was clear from the beginning that the incumbent BSP would not be able to stay in government and that the ODS would win the election (Crampton 1997, p. 561). The dominant issue of the campaign was the disastrous state of the Bulgarian economy. Virtually all opposition parties campaigned against the incumbent government, which they blamed for the actual situation (Crampton 1997).
Results

Table 3: Bulgarian Election 1997; Election date: 19/04/1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Forces (ODS)</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Left (DL) (includes the BSP)</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for National Salvation (ONS)</td>
<td>07.9</td>
<td>07.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euroleft Coalition (KE)</td>
<td>05.8</td>
<td>05.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB)</td>
<td>05.0</td>
<td>04.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effective number of parliamentary parties: 2.5; Data source: Döring and Manow 2012

The United Democratic Forces (ODS) won an absolute majority of seats. The Democratic Left (DL), comprising the BSP, finished – far behind – second with 24.2% of the seats. This meant a dramatic decline for the BSP, which had won an absolute majority in the previous election. The Union for National Salvation (ONS), including the Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS), won less than 8% of the seats. This was a relatively poor result compared to the results the DPS achieved on its own in the preceding election. The newly formed Euroleft Coalition (KE) as well as the Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB) managed to pass the threshold.

Government formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Premier</th>
<th>Formateur</th>
<th>Coalition Partner</th>
<th>% seats total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning</td>
<td>Ivan Kostov</td>
<td>ODS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The United Democratic Forces (ODS), controlling an absolute majority, built a single party government. Ivan Kostov, the leader of the leading force inside the ODS, the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), became Prime Minister (Crampton 1997, p. 563).
2. Czech Republic

2.1. General background

Regime Change

The Czech transformation process took place within the framework of the federal Czechoslovak state that persisted up to the foundation of two separate republics, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, in 1993.

Following Kitschelt et al. (1999, pp. 35 et seq.) the communist regime imposed on the Czech Republic has to be classified as ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian communism’ that is characterised by the experience of high repression during the communist regime, a “sudden implosion of the regime” and a “short but sharp protest wave” (Ibid.) Indeed, the overthrow of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia took place very quickly. It was triggered by the violent repression of a student demonstration in November 1989 that was followed by further demonstrations and a general strike (Gabal 1996a, p. 13). Many members of the Communist Party went over to the opposition (Merkel 1999, p. 415). One week later, the communist regime abandoned power and ceded. The main opposition force in the Czech part of the country was the Civic Forum (OF), the counterpart to the Slovak movement, Public Against Violence (VPN). The Civic Forum was founded by members of the Charter 77 dissident movement and led by the well-known dissident Václav Havel (Novák 2003b, p. 38). Very soon, on the basis of round table negotiations, a new government led by Civic Forum and Public Against Violence was formed; its main aim was to establish ‘the rule of law’ and to pave the way for free elections (Gabal 1996a, p. 16 et seq.). On 29 December 1989, Václav Havel was elected President of Czechoslovakia by the still existent communist parliament (Merkel 1999, p. 416). The first free parliamentary elections were called for June 1990. Three assemblies had to be elected: the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, the Czech and the Slovak parliaments. Different parties ran for office in the two parts of the federation; only some of them competed in both parts. The election resulted in an overwhelming success for the anti-communist movements (Gabal 1996b).

Basic features of party competition

From the beginning, the Czech party system was dominated by two parties: the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), one of the splinter groups of the opposi-
tional Civic Forum, and the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD). This dichotomy is partly reflected in the regime divide that dominated the first years of party competition. The ČSSD is, however, not a ‘classic’ post-communist party transformed into a Social Democratic party (as is the case in most of the other Central and Eastern European countries); although the ČSSD is partly composed of former communists, it has diverse roots and is historically mainly social democratic party (see Novák 2003b, p. 36). The Czech case exhibits a second particularity: it is the only Central and Eastern European country with a strong and successful unreformed communist party, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). Seen as a “pariah party” (Kopecký and Mudde 1999, p. 418) without coalition potential by the other parties, its presence often complicated government formation and for a long time prevented the left-parties from coming into power.4

The regime divide that dominated the very first years of party competition was soon replaced by an economic divide.5 Already in the early 1990s, “the now dominant Left-Right divide started to crystallize and replace an amorphous cultural conflict centred on the communist/non-communist divide” (Kopecký 2006, p. 128).6

2.2. Czechoslovak Election 1990 (Czech part)

Background

In June 1990, the first free elections for the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, as well as the Czech and the Slovak parliament, took place. Most of the parties that ran for office competed either in the Czech or in the Slovak part of the federal state. Thus, two relatively autonomous party systems appeared. The following description of the Czechoslovak 1990 election is therefore concentrated on the Czech part of the federation.

The dominant force in 1990 was the Civic Forum (OF), which united several anti-communist parties and alliances. In addition, some small anti-communist groupings had appeared, most of them as a loose part of the Civic

---

4 “In fact, the Czech Republic was the only one [country] in Central Europe in which a comparatively strong and to a certain extent dogmatic communist party prevented a healthy alternation of government for quite a long time” (Novák 2003b, p. 31).
5 In detail see: Brokl and Mansfeldová 2003; Mansfeldová 2004.
6 The exact differentiation of the economic cleavage changed, however, over the years: while in the early 1990s, the shape of economic reform and the privatisation process stood in the centre, since 1996, the question of what role the state should play in economic matters combined with social security issues became more important (Brokl and Mansfeldová 2003, p. 23 et seq.).
Forum, such as the Green Party (SZ), the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), the Christian Democratic Party (KDS) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDS). ODA and LDS had run in the 1990 election “on the ticket of the OF” before they became independent parties soon after the election (Novák 2003b, p. 37). The main adversary of the Civic Forum was the unreformed Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). Unlike most of the other communist parties in the Central and Eastern European countries, which soon converted into social democratic parties, the KSČM did not change its profile (Novák 2003b, p. 35). The second left-wing party, the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), is not easy to classify: forbidden after the Communists came into power in 1948 and re-established after the regime change in 1990, it was composed of exiled party members, of former deputies of the left wing of the Civic Forum and of liberal, reform-oriented former members of the KSČM (Novák 2003b, p. 36). Besides these main parties and alliances, two small parties with specific foci appeared: the Movement for Autonomous Democracy – Society for Moravia and Silesia (HSD/SMS), which had a regional focus and claimed regional autonomy (Mansfeldová 2004, p. 226), and the radical anti-communist party Rally for the Republic/Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSC), which had a nationalist-extremist profile (Fitzmaurice 1996, p. 576).

Campaign

The 1990 election was more a plebiscite against communism than “an arena for partisan conflicts” (Mansfeldová 2004, p. 226). The main antagonists were the oppositional alliances Civic Forum (OF) on the one side and the unreformed Czech Communist Party (KSČM) on the other (Vodička 2010, p. 289).

Results

Table 4: Czechoslovak Election 1990 (Czech part); Election date: 09/06/1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Forum (OF)</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Autonomous Democracy – Society for Moravia and Silesia (HSD/SMS)</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech People’s Party/Christian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL)</td>
<td>09.5</td>
<td>08.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effective number of parliamentary parties: 2.2; Data source: Döring and Manow 2012
The clear winner of the election was the Civic Forum (OF) (63.5% of the seats). It finished far ahead of the Communist Party (KSČM) (16%). Only two other parties gained seats: the Movement for Autonomous Democracy – Society for Moravia and Silesia (HSD/SMS) (11%) and the Czech People’s Party/Christian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL) (9.5%).

Government formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Premier</th>
<th>Formateur</th>
<th>Coalition Partner</th>
<th>% seats total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>Petr Pithart</td>
<td>OF</td>
<td>HSD/SMS, KDU-ČSL</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Civic Forum (OF) formed a surplus majority coalition with the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL) and the Movement for Autonomous Democracy – Society for Moravia and Silesia (HSD/SMS), led by Petr Pithart. The cabinet was dominated by the overwhelming winner of the election, the OF (Gabal 1996b, p. 132).

2.3. Czechoslovak Election 1992 (Czech part)

Background

The 1990 election had been more a plebiscite against communism than a regular parliamentary election with party competition (Mansfeldová 2004, p. 226). New elections were scheduled for 1992. In the Czech and the Slovak part of the federation, two relatively separate and distinct party systems appeared. Although the 1992 election took place under the framework of the federation, it was run relatively separately within the two systems. The following description is concentrated on the Czech part. Since the 1990 election, the composition of the party system had become more diverse. The diversification was mainly due to splits from the Civic Forum (OF). There was growing disagreement between the right and the left wing of the Forum about the shape of the political and the economic transformation process (Novák 2003b, pp. 37, 39; Mansfeldová 2004, p. 227). In April 1991, the OF divided into the right-wing, pro-market Civic Democratic Party (ODS) led by Václav Klaus and the liberal Civic Movement (OH), led by Jiří Dienstbier, which was more oriented to the left (Mansfeldová 2004, p. 227). A third party which appeared out of the OF was the right-wing Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA). There were only nuanced differences between the ODS and the ODA. The ODA was more oriented toward intellectuals and especially focussed on cultural issues. It was more pro-European than the ODS. At least
rhetorically, the ODS was more open for a rigid free market (Fitzmaurice 1996, p. 577). The Greens (SZ), the Czechoslovak Socialist Party (ČSS) and an agrarian party built a party alliance, the so-called Liberal Social Union (LSU) (Mansfeldová 2004, p. 227). The unreformed communist party, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), took part in the election as the dominating party of the so-called Left-Bloc (LB), composed of several leftist, communist parties. The Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) had begun to transform itself into a successful social democratic party (Ibid.).

Parallel to the dissolution of the Civic Forum in the Czech part of the federation, the main opposition movement of the Slovak part, Public Against Violence (VPN), disintegrated before the 1992 election. The main group that split off was the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), led by Vladimír Mečiar (Rybár 2007, p. 150).

**Campaign**

The main issue of the 1992 election in the Czech division was the shape of economic reform (Mansfeldová 2004, p. 228). The positions of the parties can be summarised as follows: the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Civic Movement (OH) and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) campaigned for a pro-market policy and a rapid liberalisation process; the parties of the Left Bloc (LB) for the exact opposite. The Greens (SZ), the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Liberal Social Union (LSU) campaigned for a position in between, with the LSU and ČSSD leaning to the left (Novák 2003b, pp. 37, 39; Mansfeldová, 2004, p. 227). The right-wing extremist party Rally for the Republic/Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSC) used nationalist rhetoric. Its economic standpoint was not, however, far from that of the parties of the Left Bloc (Novák 2003a, p. 37).

**Results**

Table 5: Czechoslovak Election 1992 (Czech part); Election date: 06/06/1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Democratic Party (ODS)</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc (LB)</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats (ČSSD)</td>
<td>08.0</td>
<td>06.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Social Union (LSU)</td>
<td>08.0</td>
<td>06.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Union / People’s Party (KDU-CSL)</td>
<td>07.5</td>
<td>06.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 In the Slovak part of the federation, not economic questions, but the future of the Federation stood in the centre of the campaign before the 1992 election (Mansfeldová 2004, p. 228).
The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) led by Václav Klaus finished first (38% of the seats). Otherwise, only one other splinter group of the former Civic Forum made it into parliament: the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), which gained 7% of the seats. The unreformed communist parties, united in the Left Bloc (LB), were surprisingly successful: they finished second (17.5%). This time, the Social Democrats (ČSSD) also made it into parliament (8%), gaining approximately the same proportion of seats as the Liberal Social Union (LSU) and the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-CSL). The right-wing extremist party, Rally for the Republic/Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ), and the regional the Movement for Autonomous Democracy (HSD/SMS) also became part of the parliament.

**Government formation**

Parallel to the success of the main split-off of the Civic Forum, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech division of the federation, the main split-off of the Slovakian movement Public Against Violence (VPN), the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), won the election in the Slovak division of the federation. The leader of the ODS, Václav Klaus, asked the leader of the HZDS, Vladimir Mečiar, to form the federal government together. Mečiar refused. Instead, Klaus and Mečiar became Prime Ministers of the Czech and the Slovak governments, respectively (Novák 2003a, p. 152). Klaus built a minimal winning coalition with the other liberal and conservative parties, the Czech People’s Party/Christian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL) and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) (Novák 2003a, p. 153).
3. Estonia

3.1. General background

Regime change

Like the two other Baltic States, Estonia had been forcibly annexed to the Soviet Union in 1940. The major steps to independence since the late 1980s took place “within the framework of the existing Soviet-based institutions” (Mikkel 2006, p. 37; see also, Iwaskiw 1995a; Lagerspetz and Maier 2010). This corresponds to the characterisation of Kitschelt et al. (1999, p. 41), who describe the regime change in Estonia as an “essentially negotiated transition that allowed former communists to compete credibly within the new democratic frameworks.”

The first opposition to the communist regime emerged in 1987/88 in the form of ecological protest against a phosphorus-mining project that soon turned political (Iwaskiw 1995a). In April 1988, the Estonian Popular Front (R) was founded. It was a heterogeneous umbrella movement advocating greater autonomy from Moscow (Ibid.). The independence conflict dominated the whole transition process and stood at the centre of the first free election to the Supreme Soviet of Estonia in 1990. Three main groups competed in the election (Report U.S. Commission 1990): first, there were those parties and movements associated with the Popular Front (R) that were in favour of independence. The second bloc was composed of largely Russian alliances strongly against independence, united under the name of the Committee for the Defence of Soviet Power and Civil Rights. The communist parties running under the banner of ‘Free Estonia’ built the third bloc. Their aims were ambiguous. They mainly advocated independence but in cooperation with the Soviet Union. Besides these three blocs, there were the national radicals, pledging to restore independence and com-

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8 Kitschelt et al. admit that the three Baltic States cannot clearly be assigned to one of the three regime types they describe. All three Baltic States come closest to a mixture of national-accommodative communism and patrimonial communism (Kitschelt et al. 1999, p. 39).

9 This ambiguity is reflected in the composition of the main force of this camp, the Estonian Communist Party. It was about evenly divided between Estonians and Russians – and thus between advocates of independence and pro-Moscow loyalists (Report U.S. Commission 1990, p. 6).
pletely bypassing the Soviet System. They refused to participate in the Supreme Soviet election.

The clear winner of the 1990 election was the Popular Front (R).\(^{11}\) It formed a government led by its popular leader, Edgar Savisaar. Soon after the election, the Front started a series of economic reforms (Report U.S. Commission 1990, p. 4; Iwaskiw 1995a).

In March 1991, the Estonian population clearly opted for the independence of the country (more than 70% in favour). On August 21, 1991, Estonia’s independence was declared and accepted soon after by the Soviet Union and the Western countries. The path to independence was thus predominantly peaceful (the ‘singing revolution’). After independence was regained, a constitution was created and accepted by the population via referendum on June 28, 1992 (Lagerspetz and Maier 2010, p. 79).

Basic features of party competition

The main dividing lines that structured party competition changed with the different phases of the transformation process (Mikkel 2006, pp. 38-42). In the first phase (1987-1991), the main dividing line was the one between forces for and against independence. The second phase (1991-1995) was characterised by a divide between advocates of a radical break with the past (radical de-communisation) and advocates of a gradual reform process. Additionally, the cultural-ethnic divide between Estonians and Russian speakers was important but did not become as salient as in the other Baltic States. The third phase (since 1995) is not characterised by a single dominant issue anymore, but several issues became salient: a socioeconomic line (social market interventionism versus free market liberalism), and an urban-rural divide as well as a cultural-ethnic divide between Estonians and Russian speakers.

Three main points distinguish the Estonian party system from those of the other two Baltic States: the relatively marginal role of ethnic parties despite the large presence of Russian-speaking Estonians, the poor showing of extremist parties and the underrepresentation and weakness of left-wing parties despite the presence of a high degree of social inequality.\(^{12}\)

\(^{10}\) Instead, they organised an alternative parliament, the Estonian Congress, and called for nationwide elections in February 1990. But most Estonians did not want to abandon the Supreme Court (Taagepera 1995; Report U.S. Commission 1990).


\(^{12}\) The ethnic Russian parties often did not even pass the 5% threshold. This can mainly be explained by the strategy of the major Estonian parties that attracted also the votes of the Russian-speaking Estonians (Mikkel 2006, p. 25).
4. Latvia

4.1. General background

*Regime Change*

For more than fifty years, Latvia was occupied by the Soviet Union. Open demonstration against the communist regime started in 1987 with so-called ‘calendar demonstrations’, commemorating important events such as the 1941 mass deportations of Latvians to the Soviet Union (Taagepera 1990; Iwaskiw 1995b). Several movements and associations occurred that united under the banner of the Popular Front of Latvia (LTF). Its first formal congress was held on October 1988 (Penikis 1996). At the beginning, the Popular Front did not aim to achieve independence from Russia but, rather, more autonomy. There was, however, increasing pressure from the Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK), founded in 1988, which advocated total independence from Russia. This forced the Popular Front also to adopt a pro-Independence position (Merkel 1999, p. 434). The size and importance of the Front grew continually. In 1989, it had de facto become a second government and succeeded in ousting the communists from power (Iwaskiw 1995b; Schmidt 2010, p. 124).

The first free election to the transitional parliament, the Supreme Council, was called for in spring 1990. The Front won the majority of seats (Reetz 1995, p. 302). In May 1990, the Council adopted a declaration of the independence of Latvia, and the country became independent in August 1991. From the beginning, the new state had to face the conflict between the titular nation and Latvia’s ethnic Russians (Pabriks and Šokenberga 2006, p. 54). Only citizens born in the pre-war Republic of Latvia and their descendants automatically obtained Latvian citizenship; the parts of the population that had immigrated during the Soviet regime had the status of foreigners (Schmidt 2010, p. 124; Davies and Ozolins 1994, p. 84).

*Basic features of party competition*  
The Latvian party system is one of the most unstable party systems in Central and Eastern Europe. The parties, which started as loose coalitions, later be-
came relatively small and weak party organisations with little party discipline (Davies and Ozolins 1996). New parties emerged before almost every parliamentary election. In most cases, they were very successful but then lost dramatically. It was only in 2010, when different parties merged, becoming big alliances, that a concentration process of the party system began (Bloom 2011; Pabriks and Štokenberga 2006).

One major conflict dominated the development of the party system from the beginning: the conflict between the titular nation and Latvia’s ethnic Russians (Schmidt 2010, p. 124). The ethnic conflict was particularly important in the 1990s (Bloom 2011, p. 381). Only gradually, with the adoption of laws ameliorating the situation of the Russian-speaking population, did the conflict become less explosive.¹⁴

In addition to the ethnic conflict, questions about Latvia’s economic development – especially about the speed of change – have structured party competition from the beginning (Pabriks and Štokenberga 2006, p. 54). There is a link between the position of the parties in ethnic terms and the position of the parties in political-economic terms: the Russian-speaking, pro-Russian parties are positioned on the left of the party system; while the parties representing mainly ethnic Latvian interests are situated at the centre and right. Reflecting the ethnic (im)balance of power, the conservative and right-wing parties are dominant in Latvia.¹⁵

¹⁴ In 1994, the citizenship law containing language and residence requirements was passed. The prerequisites that had to be fulfilled to become Latvian citizen were, however, still very strict. In June 1998, the government agreed on a substantial reform of the citizenship law that ameliorated the situation of the Russian population. In May 2002, the electoral law was reformed: the knowledge of the Latvian language was no longer a condition for standing as a candidate (Schmidt 2010, p. 129; Pabriks and Štokenberga 2006, p. 54).

¹⁵ “Ethnic Latvian voters with leftist political views had to either cross the ethnic divide and vote for a Russian minority party, or waste their votes by voting for smaller ethnic Latvian leftist parties with little chance of gaining representation” (Bloom 2011, p. 381).
5. Lithuania

5.1. General background

Regime change

Like the other two Baltic States, Lithuania had been occupied by the Soviet Union for more than fifty years. The regime change was thus closely linked to the struggle for independence. In the course of Gorbačev’s reform policy (perestroika), starting the summer of 1988, a number of oppositional grassroots organisations, parties and movements appeared (Novagrockienė 2001, p. 142). The first oppositional movement was formed as a reaction to environmental problems; the movement of the Greens emerged in 1987. It soon advocated democratic change and sovereignty for Lithuania (Ibid.). In spring 1988, a mass-based oppositional umbrella movement was founded, the Lithuanian Liberation Movement Sajūdis (short: Sajūdis). The movement that from the beginning claimed radical economic and political reforms very soon changed into a national movement that fought for Lithuania’s independence (Ramonaitė 2006, p. 69; Tauber 2010, p. 172).

Not only the oppositional forces, but also (post-) communist groupings were involved in the struggle for independence and the transformation process. This corresponds to Kitschelt et al.’s (1999, p. 41) classification of the regime change in Lithuania as “negotiated transition”.

In December 1989, the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP, since 1990, Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania, LDDP) declared its independence from the Soviet Communist Party and changed into “a normal, parliamentary party” (Novagrockienė 2001, p. 142; see also Ramonaitė 2006, p. 69). Although in a much less radical manner than Sajūdis, it advocated more sovereignty for Lithuania (Novagrockienė 2001, p. 142). A third group appeared: an orthodox communist organisation, also called the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP), which had split from the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP, later LDDP). It saw itself as the successor of the Soviet Communist Party and was against any restoration of Lithuanian statehood (Novagrockienė 2001, p. 143).

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16 “Important communist leaders embraced the struggle for national independence in the late 1980s and engineered an essentially negotiated transition […]” (Kitschelt et al. 1999, p. 41; see also Krupavičius 1998). Kitschelt et al. state that Latvia (like all three Baltic States) cannot clearly be assigned to one of the three regime types they describe. It comes closest to a mixture of the national-accommodative communism and the patrimonial communism (Kitschelt et al. 1999, p. 399).
These three groups and their disputes over Lithuania’s independence dominated the first free election in February 1990. Sąjūdis and its supporters won the election with an absolute majority and formed the government. The reformist Communist Party (LCP) won more than 30% of the seats, while the unreformed LCP finished far behind.\(^{17}\) Sąjūdis and the reformist LCP had thus proven to be the major competing forces (Ibid., p. 145).

In March 1990, the parliament declared the independence of Lithuania. Moscow answered with violence but without success. In autumn 1991, Lithuania was internationally recognised as an independent state (Lukošaitis 2001, p. 28 et seq.; Ramonaitė 2006, p. 78).

**Basic features of party competition**

The contest between the post-communist, reformist Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania, (LDDP) and the oppositional Sąjūdis movement dominated party competition during the first decade after the regime change, alternating control of the single-party government. With no more than four influential parties, party competition was relatively stable (Ramonaitė 2006, p. 70). This changed in 2000 when a number of new parties appeared and the ‘traditional’ parties lost ground (Clark and Prekevičius 2003, p. 548).

In the very beginning, the question of how to receive sovereignty and what the relation to Russia should be like dominated party competition. Later on, in the 2000 election at the latest, the degree and style of economic reform became the main issue dividing parties (Ramonaitė 2006, p. 87). In contrast to the other Baltic States, ethnic questions were never a dominant issue. This can be explained by the low political participation of ethnic minorities and by the way the ethnic divide was integrated into the dominant left-right dimension of the party system.\(^{18}\)

**5.2. Lithuanian Election 1992**

**Background**

After regaining independence in 1991, Lithuania’s main issue was the speed of political and economic transformation and the relation to Russia, expres-

\(^{17}\) After the 1990 election, the unreformed LCP was reorganised as the Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania (LDDP) (Krupavičius 2001, p. 135).

\(^{18}\) The non-Lithuanian population tended to vote for the leftist parties, as in Latvia (Ramonaitė 2006, p. 78).
sed as a divide between Sąjūdis and the Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania (LDDP). The huge economic problems of the country not only divided the two leading forces but also led to the disintegration *inside* Sąjūdis and its split into different factions and parties (Clark and Prekevičius 2003, p. 550). Most of the movement continued to exist under the label Sąjūdis, however (later: Homeland Union). The parties and groups that splintered off were, amongst others, the Centre Union (LCS), the Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU) and the Independence Party (IP) (Novagrockienė 2001, p. 145). In addition to the two main competitors, a number of "traditional parties" (Ibid., p. 143) had (re-) appeared since 1989, such as the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP), standing for classic social-democratic issues, and the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LCDP), a populist, nationalist-conservative party with a religious, Catholic orientation (Ramonaitė 2006, p. 76). The LCDP ran for parliament in the 1992 election in an alliance (called L-L-L) with the Union of Lithuanian Political Prisoners and Deportees and Lithuanian Democratic Party (Döring and Manow 2012).

The disintegration of the governing Sąjūdis movement as well as of the parliament as a whole became so total that the parliament finally had to dissolve itself. Early elections were called for November 1992 (Ramonaitė 2006, p. 71).

*Campaign*

The two opposing forces, the Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania (LDDP) and Sąjūdis, dominated the 1992 campaign. The main topic of the election was the shape of economic and political transformation and the relation to Russia, with Sąjūdis and the LDDP occupying the extreme positions: LDDP aimed a careful and slow reform process and close relations to Russia, whereas Sąjūdis stood for rapid reform and distance to Russia (Ramonaitė 2006, p. 69). The LDDP presented itself as a social democratic party (Krupavičius 2001, p. 138). It advocated a socially acceptable reform process and tried to win the votes of socially underprivileged people (Ramonaitė 2006, p. 75). Sąjūdis presented itself as an non-ideological umbrella movement standing for "the nation's common political goals" (Krupavičius 2001, p. 137). It used anti-communist arguments in the campaign and criticised the LDDP for advocating the interests of the former communist elite (Junevičius 2001, p. 99). The campaign of the two major opponents overlaid the campaign of the 'traditional' parties. The Social Democrats (LSDP), cooperating with the trade unions, campaigned for classic social-democratic issues; the Christian Democrats (LCDP) (in coalition with other conservative parties under the banner L-L-L) for religious, Catholic values. The newly built Li-
Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU) campaigned for a deep reform process and fast introduction of a market economy (Krupavičius 2001, p. 137).

Results

Table 6: Lithuanian Election 1992; Election date: 25/11/1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania (LDDP)</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sąjūdis</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-L-L (=Lithuanian Christian Democrats LCDP in coalition with other right-wing parties)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP)</td>
<td>06.1</td>
<td>05.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effective number of parliamentary parties: 3.0; Data sources: Ramonaité 2006; Döring and Manow 2012

Explanatory note: Lithuania has a mixed election system that combines a proportional formula (based on countrywide party list voting with a threshold of 4%, later 5%, except for parties representing minorities) with direct elections in single-mandate electoral districts (see Krupavičius 1997). For reasons of clarity, only parties having passed the 4% threshold are included in the table. In addition, a number of parties won small numbers of seats in single-member constituencies that had, however, no impact on coalition formation.

Only four parties gained seats in parliament. 19 The Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP) was overwhelmingly successful; it won an absolute majority of seats. Sąjūdis was the second strongest party alliance, winning slightly more than 20% of the seats. In addition to these two alliances, the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP) and the Christian Democratic Party (LCDP) crossed the 4% threshold. With 12.8% of the seats, the Christian Democrats were relatively successful. Compared to the seat share of the two leading parties, the seat share of the two ‘traditional’ parties was not, however, very high. By and large, the two-block structure of the party system was contained (Ramonaité 2006, p. 69).

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19 The data for the 1992 Lithuanian Elections differ (compare, for example, Ramonaité 2006, p. 72; Tauber 2010, p. 192; Döring and Manow 2012). These differences can probably be ascribed to the Lithuanian mixed election system, which combines a countrywide proportional formula with direct elections in single-mandate electoral districts. Krupavičius (1997, p. 548) describes the consequences for the election results as follows: “In 1992 - 1997 10-12 parties were represented in the Seimas. But along the proportional formula of national election only five parties can be described as parliamentary ones without any doubt, i.e. HU/LC, LDLP, LChDP, LSDP and LCU.”
Having won an absolute majority, the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP) formed a single-party government under the leader of the LDDP, Algirdas Brazauskas. After two years of governance by the oppositional movement Sąjūdis, this meant a complete alternation of power.

5.3. Lithuanian Election 1996

Background

Once in government, the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP) had adopted a more moderate position. At the beginning, it was relatively successful: it succeeded in achieving economic stability (Krupavičius 1997, p. 542). The population was, however, expecting more and quicker changes. The popularity of the government ultimately began to decrease in the early 1995s in the face of the severe economic and banking crisis. The LDDP was blamed for financial mismanagement (Ibid.). Additionally, it was criticised for its communist past and for including former communist officials (Senn 1994, p. 85). Soon, the party suffered from overwhelming divisions. The centre-right parties were able to gain ground at the expense of the LDDP. In 1993, out of the right wing of Sąjūdis, the Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservative Party (TS-LK) was built. TS-LK managed to give the alliance a new image of a “quite moderate, pragmatic and competent Western-style party” (Krupavičius 1997, p. 545). It became the leading opposition party.

Campaign

Compared to the 1992 election, the campaign in the run of the 1996 election was rather quiet (Junevičius 2001, p. 99). The Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservative Party (TS-LK) mainly focused on economic issues and campaigned for the introduction of a market economy (Ramonaitė 2006, p. 75). The Centre Union (LCS) carried out a similar campaign. It stressed its liberal standpoint (Ramonaitė 2006, p. 76). The Christian Democrats (LCDP) emphasised social protection, even at the expense of economic efficiency (Krupavičius 1997, p. 545). The Social Democrats (LSDP) campaigned for classic social democratic values.
Although economic issues, especially the question of the shape of economic transformation, were dominant in the campaign, it was not the economic divide that structured party competition: “the left-right conflict reflected the dominant communist-anti-communist cleavage rather than a socio-economic ideological spectrum” (Ramonaitė 2006, p. 80).

Results

Table 7: Lithuanian Election 1996; Election date: 20/10/1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservative Party (TS-LK)</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian Christian Democrats (LCDP)</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Union of Lithuania (LCS)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP)</td>
<td>08.6</td>
<td>09.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP)</td>
<td>08.6</td>
<td>06.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effective number of parliamentary parties: 3.4; Data sources: Döring and Manow 2012; Clark and Prekevičius 2003

Explanatory note: Lithuania has a mixed election system that combines a proportional formula (based on countrywide party list voting with a threshold of 5% except for parties representing minorities) with direct elections in single-mandate electoral districts (see Krupavičius 1997). For reasons of clarity, only parties having passed the 5% threshold are included in the table.

The 1996 election again brought about a change of power: with the Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservative Party (TS-LK) winning 50.4% of the seats, the post-oppositional forces returned to power. The incumbent post-communist Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP) won less than 10% of the seats and was expelled from office. TS-LK also finished far ahead of the other liberal and conservative parties, the Christian Democrats (11.5% of the seats) and the Centre Union (10.1% of the seats).

Government formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Premier</th>
<th>Formateur</th>
<th>Coalition Partner</th>
<th>% seats total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>Gediminas Vagnorius</td>
<td>TS-LK</td>
<td>LCDP</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservative Party (TS-LK) won the majority of seats, but missed an absolute majority. After the 1996 election, the parliament was, however, composed of only 137 deputies, because in four single-mandate districts voter turnout was too low to validate the election results (Clark and Prekevičius 2003, p. 550). That is to say, the Homeland
Union Party controlled an absolute majority, at least an absolute working majority, and could have formed a government on its own. But instead of building a single-party government, TS-LK built a surplus coalition with the Christian Democrats (LCDP) under Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius (TS-LK), probably with the intention of securing the backing of a big part of the parliament in an economically and politically difficult situation. Later on, some representatives of the Centre Union (LCS) were also invited to participate in the ruling coalition in order to ensure the passage of the government’s economic programme (Krupavičius 1997, p. 546; Clark and Prekevičius 2003, p. 555; Ramonaitė 2006, p. 71).  

Although the members of the Centre Union held ministerial portfolios, they never officially declared themselves members of the government (Clark and Prekevičius 2003, p. 550; Ramonaitė 2006, p. 71).
6. Poland

6.1. General background

Regime change

Poland was the first post-communist country that departed from the communist regime. In the beginning, regime change took place in the form of power sharing rather than in the form of power transfer: it was negotiated between the representatives of the old regime and the oppositional camp, represented by the Solidarity movement (Solidarność) (Wiatr 1997, p. 444). Accordingly, Kitschelt et al. (1999, p. 39) describe the regime change in Poland as “transition by negotiation”, typical for the ‘national-accommodative’ type of communist regimes.21

The main opposition force, the Solidarity movement, arose from a strike movement among dockworkers in the early 1980s. Its growing influence and strength could only be stopped by the imposition of martial law in 1981 (Davies 2000, chap. 8). Solidarity was forbidden but continued to exist in the underground. In the late 1980s, Solidarity headed the newly emerging opposition movement. In 1988, negotiations between the government and the opposition began (Ibid.). At a round table established in early 1989, the opposition negotiated with representatives of the communist regime. They decided to hold semi-free elections in June 1989: 65% of the seats had to go to the Communist Party. The Solidarity movement won the remaining seats (Jasiewicz 1992). The first election was thus a great success for the opposition movement. In July 1989, a president was elected. In unwritten agreements, both sides of the round table had agreed that Wojciech Jaruzelski, at that time leader of the ruling communist Polish United Workers Party and chairman of the Council of State, would be the first president. Jaruzelski narrowly won the first round (Wiatr 1997, p. 444). In September 1989, two parties of the communist camp, the Peasant Party and the Democratic Party, switched to the Solidarity camp, which now had a majority. It built the first cabinet ever led by a leader of the opposition, Tadeusz Mazowiecki (Ibid.). In the face of a dramatic economic situation marked by hyperinflation, the Mazowiecki government pursued a rigid economic policy and introduced austerity measures. In December 1990, President Jaruzelski resigned. Lech

21 Because of the repression against dissident movements, Kitschelt et al. (1999, p. 39) situate Poland between the categories ‘national-accommodative communism’ and ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian communism’.
Walesa, the leader of Solidarity, became the first Polish president elected directly by the people (Wiatr 1997, p. 445).

Basic features of party competition

The first two decades of the Polish party system were characterised by a high degree of fragmentation, that is to say, a large number of relatively small parties, and quick changes in the party composition. Only in the late 1990s did the party system become more stable (Szczerbiak 2001, 2006).

For the whole first decade, the regime divide between post-communist and post-oppositional parties divided the parties into two irreconcilable camps, although the successors of the communist parties tried to present themselves as Western-style social democratic parties (Ziemer and Matthes 2010). Besides the regime divide, a clerical-secular divide was important, centred on the question of what role the church should play in public life. In the late 1990s, along with the EU accession process, a socio-economic divide became more and more salient. From 2000 onwards, populist parties with nationalist stances gained in importance and even made it temporarily into government (Szczerbiak 2006).
7. Romania

7.1. General background

Regime change

Romania is the only one of the Central and Eastern European countries where regime change took place violently. The administration under Nicolae Ceaușescu, leader of the Romanian Communist Party and president of Romania, had isolated Romania politically and economically (Popescu 1997, p. 174). The Communist Party, a monolithic organisation, controlled all political activities; any political opposition was sanctioned and oppressed (Gallagher 1996, p. 206). Accordingly, Kitschelt et al. (1999, p. 40) describe the Romanian communist regime as ‘patrimonial communism’, characterised by high degree of repression.

In December 1989, Ceaușescu, who opposed the ‘Perestroika’ initiated by Gorbachev, was overthrown (Gabanyi 1992, p. 354). The National Salvation Front (FSN) assumed power. The FSN was composed of former, marginalised officials of the Communist Party and the security apparatus (‘Securitate’). Its central personality was Ion Iliescu, a follower of Gorbachev and his politics (Nelson 1990, p. 362). Although the National Salvation Front wanted to end the Ceaușescu regime, it did not want to turn away from an authoritarian system (Gallagher 1996, p. 208). The regime change has thus been described as “quasi-revolutionary” (Tismaneanu 1993). The Front tried to secure the backing of the population and presented the overthrow of the Ceaușescu regime as an expression of the will of the whole Romanian population. It promised to ameliorate the situation of the population immediately (Gabanyi 1992, p. 353). In accord with the liberalisation that took place in the other Central and Eastern European countries, it allowed the population fundamental liberal rights (Ibid.). The re-admittance of political parties in 1989 led to the formation of a huge number of parties, associations and movements (International Republican Institute, Report 1992, p. 14). Many of the new parties were ‘phantom’ or ‘satellite’ parties of the Front (Gabanyi 1992, p. 359). Additionally, many oppositional parties were created. It was, however, only in the course of the 1992 election that an important section of the oppositional parties united and built an umbrella movement comparable to the Czech Civic Platform or the Polish Solidarnosc, the so-called Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) (International Republican Institute, Report 1992, p. 5). Although the Front had advocated building independent parties, it saw itself as the central organisation that would, sooner or later,
embrace all the other organisations. Only after heavy protest did the Front agree to take part in the first election as a party amongst others, and to build a round table with the other parties to negotiate the new electoral system (Gabanyi 1992, p. 356). Thus, as described by Kitschelt et al. (1999, p. 38 et seq.), the regime change in Romania was brought about by the communist elite through “preemptive reform”.

**Basic features of party competition**

Especially in the first years after the regime change, the Romanian party system was very fragmented and polarised (Grecu 2006). The main dividing line was for a long time the divide between reform-communists and anti-communists, mainly represented by the National Salvation Front (FSN) and the parties of the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) (de Nève 2002). The assignment of political forces to the anti-communist/post-communist divide is, however, not as straightforward in the Romanian case as in the other Central and Eastern European countries. The National Salvation Front, led by Iliescu, played an ambiguous role. It presented itself as the alliance that liberated Romania from communism, but it was not an anti-communist organisation (Mungiu-Pippidi 2001; Tismaneanu 1993). The Front did not intend to break completely with the communist past. Its representatives stemmed from the former communist elite (“nomenklatura”). They tried to preserve their privileges and the state property (Tismaneanu 1993). Only since 2000 has there been a “progressive blurring of the dividing line between the successors to the Communist regime and their opponents” (Maxfield 2008, p. 4). The divide between post-communists and anti-communists was, from the beginning, closely linked to a social-economic divide between those parties advocating only moderate economic changes (the parties associated with the Front) and those parties advocating a deep and quick reform process (mainly the parties stemming from the oppositional camp) (de Nève 2003, p. 203). In addition, an ethnic divide always played an important role. With the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) representing the Hungarian minority, there was, from the beginning, a strong and influential ethnic party (Nelson 1990, p. 357). It had to face a strong nationalist party: up until the 2008 election, the nationalist Greater Romania Party (PRM) was part of every parliament.

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22 Gabanyi (1997) sees the main dividing line between ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘non-bureaucratic parties’: the former stem from the old (communist) power apparatus, the latter are independent from the former power apparatus (Gabanyi 1997, p. 194).
7.2. Romanian Election 1990

Background

The first free parliamentary election as well as the presidential election took place on May 20, 1990. The election law pertaining to the first parliamentary election did not prescribe any threshold (de Nève 2003, p. 192). A huge number of parties and alliances competed; more than in any other post-communist country in the first free elections (Gabanyi 1992, p. 359). The National Salvation Front (FSN) and its “satellite-parties” (Ibid.) were confronted with many oppositional parties: some which had been forbidden during the Ceaușescu regime and had their roots in the pre-war era had been rebuilt, such as the National Liberal Party (PNL) or the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSDR). Furthermore, some completely new parties were founded, such as the Democratic Agrarian Party (PNTCD) and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), a party representing the interests of the Hungarian minority which soon became influential (Nelson 1990).

Campaign

The main topic of the campaign was the future of the Romanian political and economic system. The National Salvation Front (FSN) dominated the electoral campaign. The Front systematically stoked fears in the population; it warned against the costs of the economic reforms claimed by the opposition parties and the looming danger of a ‘sell-off’ of Romania to the West (Gabanyi 1992, p. 365). The opposition parties advocated first and foremost further democratisation and a transition to a market economy (International Republican Institute, Report 1992, p. 15). But they did not manage to make themselves heard in the campaign: they were too heterogeneous and did not have necessary resources for a successful campaign (Ibid.). The FSN, in contrast, could spend huge sums of money and controlled the information system. Additionally, there were accusations that the opposition parties were intimidated by acts of violence (International Republican Institute, Report 1992, p. 16; Nelson 1990, p. 357).

23 "Throughout the campaign, the Front enjoyed advantages from assuming the reins of an absolutist state and exploited these advantages to the maximum" (International Republican Institute, Report 1992, p. 15).
Results

Table 8: Romanian Election 1990; Election date: 20/05/1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Salvation Front (FSN)</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR)</td>
<td>07.3</td>
<td>07.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Liberal Party (PNL)</td>
<td>07.3</td>
<td>06.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (less than 3% of votes)</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effective number of parliamentary parties: 2.2; Data sources: Döring and Manow 2012; Essex Election Database, Popescu and Hannavy 2001, http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections (last access: 20/07/2014)

Despite the dominant position of the National Salvation Front (FSN), its outstanding electoral success (66.4% of the seats) came as a surprise. Equally surprising was the strong showing by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR): it finished second, albeit far behind the FSN (7.3% of the seats). The National Liberal Party (PNL) also won 7.3% of the seats. Fifteen other parties also entered parliament, but did not win more than 3% of the vote respectively. The National Salvation Front won not only the parliamentary election but also the presidential election with an overwhelming success: its candidate Ion Iliescu received 85% of the votes (International Republican Institute, Report 1992).

Government formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Premier</th>
<th>Formateur</th>
<th>Coalition Partner</th>
<th>% seats total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning</td>
<td>Petr Roman</td>
<td>FSN</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given its overwhelming success, the National Salvation Front (FSN) built a single-party majority government led by Premier Minister Petr Roman. Despite its two-thirds majority, it assigned some executive posts to members of its ‘satellite parties’ and the National Liberal Party (PNL) (Gabanyi 1995, p. 16).
8. Slovakia

8.1. General background

Regime change

The Slovak transformation process took place within the framework of the federal Czechoslovak state. In contrast to its neighbouring countries, Poland and Hungary, as well as to the Czech sector of the federation, there was no influential opposition movement to the communist regime in the Slovak sector before 1989 (Rybár 2006, p. 149; Kipke 2010, p. 336). This corresponds to the description given by Kitschelt et al. (1999, p. 41), who characterise Slovakia as a country sharing basic features of patrimonial communism, marked by high repression, weak opposition and a late reform process.24 The democratisation process started only in late 1989. The main opposition force was the broad anti-communist umbrella movement Public Against Violence (VPN), the Slovak counterpart to the Czech Civic Forum. Besides this, a huge number of additional oppositional as well as post-communist parties, alliances and forums were built. Almost all parties competed either in the Czech or in the Slovak part of the federal state. Thus, two relatively autonomous party systems appeared (Rybar 2006, p. 150). The first free elections in 1990 and 1992 took place within the framework of the Czechoslovak federation. In January 1993, an independent Slovakian state was established. The nascent process of democratisation was soon overshadowed by the authoritative and undemocratic governance style of the leading political force, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) led by Vladimír Mečiar.

Basic features of party competition

In the early 1990s, the dominant issue of party competition was the future of Czechoslovakia (Haughton and Rybár 2004, p. 117). After the formation of two separate states, a new main divide emerged: the authoritative governance style of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and its coalition

24 Kitschelt et al. (1999, p. 42) describe Slovakia as a country where the “republic-level communist party leaderships fought with greater or lesser success for autonomy within a federalist framework”, but without being backed by “a civil society and a stock of pre-communist political experiences that could have propelled forward the elite’s accommodation process from below.”
partners provoked a confrontation between authoritative nationalist forces and parties standing for a liberal, internationally oriented concept of democracy. This divide dominated party competition up until the normalisation of the political situation, which followed the defeat of the Mečiar-regime in the 1998 election (Kopecký 2002, p. 75 et seq.). The divide between post-communist and post-oppositional forces was never as dominant as in most of the other Central and Eastern European countries. Since the normalisation of the political situation after the HZDS regime, starting at the latest after the 2002 election, party competition has been mainly structured along a socio-economic divide between advocates and adversaries of a (neo)liberal reform process. In addition, ethnic questions have played an important role in party competition since the beginning, mainly due to the high percentage of Hungarians living in Slovakia. The main adversaries are the parties representing the Hungarian minority, on the one hand, and the anti-Hungarian Slovak National Party, on the other (Pridham 2002, p. 85; Rybár 2006).

8.2. Czechoslovak Election 1990 (Slovak part)

**Background**

In June 1990, the first free election of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly took place. Most of the parties that took part in the election competed either in the Czech or in the Slovak sector of the federal state. Two relatively autonomous party systems appeared. The following description of the Czechoslovak 1990 election is concentrated on the Slovak division of the federation.

In the Slovak sector of the federation, the most important representative of the oppositional camp was the movement Public Against Violence (VPN). In addition to the VPN, there were the conservative Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), founded in 1990, and the centre-right Democratic Party (DS), built in late 1989. The DS saw itself as the continuation of the historical Democratic Party that dated back to 1944 (Kipke 2010, p. 339 et seq.). A second party with roots in the pre-war years was re-founded in late 1989: the Catholic nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS). It pledged to dissolve the Czechoslovak federation and promoted the autonomy of Slovakia. Several parties representing the strong Hungarian minority in Slovakia built an alli-

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25 The main representative of the post-communist camp, the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), soon changed into a social democratic party. Several government coalitions between post-communist and anti-communist parties, especially the Dzurinda government (1998-2002), show “a form of historical reconciliation across the former political system divide” (Pridham 2002, p. 83). The surprising success of an unreformed communist party in the 2002 election was short-lived.
ance under the banner of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (ESWS). There was also a small, not very influential Green Party (SZ) (Rybir 2006).

The main representative of the post-communist camp was the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), led by Peter Weiss. It was founded from the Communist Party of Slovakia but tried to present itself as a modern social democratic party (Fitzmaurice 1995, p. 205). Another left-wing party, the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), founded in early 1990, as well as some small communist parties, remained marginal.

**Campaign**

The key issues in the 1990 election were the relations with the Czech section of the federation, privatisation policy, and relations with Hungary and the Hungarian minority (Fitzmaurice 1995, p. 204). The centre-right parties, the Christian Democrat Movement (KDH) and the Democratic Party (DS), were in favour of economic reform and a pro-minority policy. The Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) shared the pro-minority attitude but advocated a more moderate economic reform process. The Slovak National Party (SNS) led a nationalist campaign. The profile of Public Against Violence (VPN), a conglomerate of opposition forces, was not easy to grasp, but all in all, it leaned to the centre-right (Fitzmaurice 1995; Kipke 2010).

**Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Against Violence (VPN)</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrat Movement (KDH)</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Democratic Left (SDL)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak National Party (SNS)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (ESWS)</td>
<td>09.3</td>
<td>08.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DS)</td>
<td>04.7</td>
<td>04.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party (SZ)</td>
<td>04.0</td>
<td>03.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effective number of parliamentary parties: 5.0; Data source: Döring and Manow 2012

The most successful alliance in the 1990 election was the broad anti-communist umbrella movement Public Against Violence (VPN) (32% of the seats). The Christian Democrats (KDH) finished second (20.7%). The Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) as well as the Slovak National Party (SNS) scored around 14%. The Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement
(ESWS) polled very well with a seat share of 9.3%. The Democratic Party (DS) as well as the Green Party (SZ) managed to enter parliament.

**Government formation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Premier</th>
<th>Formateur</th>
<th>Coalition Partner</th>
<th>% seats total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surplus</td>
<td>Vladimír Mečiar</td>
<td>VPN</td>
<td>KDH, DS</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The winner of the election, Public Against Violence (VPN), built a coalition government with the conservative centre-right parties, the Christian Democrat Movement (KDH) and the Democratic Party (DS).

8.3. Czechoslovak Election 1992 (Slovak part)

**Background**

The 1992 election took place within what was still the federal Czechoslovak state. The first freely elected government had been far from stable. After a dispute over the leadership of Public Against Violence (VPN)\(^{26}\), about half of the VPN deputies left the party and built the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), led by Mečiar (Rybár 2006, p. 150). Some former communists also joined the alliance, which had a nationalist-populist profile (Fitzmaurice 1995, p. 204). After the breaking apart of the VPN, a new government was built by the VPN, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and the Democratic Party (DS), this time led by a Christian democratic premier.

In the main, the same parties as in 1990 competed in the election. Only one new party appeared: some small unreformed communist parties that rejected the social democratic profile of the post-communist Party of Democratic Left (SDL) built the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) (Rybár 2006, p. 151 et seq.; Kipke 2010, p. 319 et seq.).

**Campaign**

The topics of the campaign were basically the same as in 1990: the relation with the Czechs, privatisation policy, and ethnic questions, especially the

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\(^{26}\) Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar was to be replaced by another party representative (Rybár 2006, p. 150).
relation with the Hungarian minority (Fitzmaurice 1995, p. 204). While the Christian Democrat Movement (KDH) was in favour of economic reform and good relations with the Hungarian minority, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS) had a nationalist profile and campaigned for a slow and careful economic reform process. The Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) shared the pro-minority attitude of the KDH but stood for a less liberal economic programme (Kipke 2010; Fitzmaurice 1995, p. 205).

Results

Table 10: Czechoslovak Election 1992 (Slovak part); Election date: 06/06/1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of seats</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of the Democratic Left (SDL)</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrat Movement (KDH)</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>08.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak National Party (SNS)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>07.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (ESWS)</td>
<td>09.3</td>
<td>07.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effective number of parliamentary parties: 3.2; Data source: Döring and Manow 2012

The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) emerged as the winner. It won almost a majority of seats (49.3%). The Party of Democratic Left (SDL) came in second with 19.3% of the seats. The parties of the incumbent government were severely punished. The Christian Democrat Movement (KDH) was the only party of the outgoing coalition that made it into parliament (12% of the seats). The nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) won a considerable seat share (10%). In addition, only the two Hungarian parties, running on a joined list, passed the threshold (9.3% of the seats).

Government formation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government type</th>
<th>Premier</th>
<th>Formateur</th>
<th>Coalition Partner</th>
<th>% seats total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimal winning</td>
<td>Vladimir Mečiar</td>
<td>HZDS</td>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The winner of the most votes was the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). Just as the HZDS won in the Slovak section of the federation, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) won the parliamentary elections in the Czech sector. Its leader, Václav Klaus, asked the leader of the HZDS, Vladimir Mečiar, to form the federal government together. Mečiar refused (Novák 2003a, p. 152). Instead, Mečiar and Klaus became Prime Ministers of the
Slovak and the Czech governments. The HZDS built a government coalition with the Slovak National Party (SNS).
References


